Editing George C. Marshall (section)

===Replacement system criticized===
[[File:George marshall&henry stimson.jpg|thumb|Army Chief of Staff Marshall with [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] [[Henry Stimson]]|left]]
Originally, Marshall had planned a 265-division army with a system of unit rotation such as that practiced by the [[United Kingdom|British]] and other Allies.{{sfn| Vandergriff | 2003}} By mid-1943, however, after pressure from government and business leaders to preserve manpower for industry and agriculture, he had abandoned this plan in favor of a 90-division Army using individual replacements sent via a circuitous process from training to divisions in combat.{{sfn| Vandergriff | 2003}} The individual replacement system devised by Marshall and implemented by McNair exacerbated problems with [[unit cohesion]] and effective transfer of combat experience to new soldiers and officers.{{sfn|Keast|1945}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=277–84}} In Europe, where there were few pauses in combat with German forces, the individual replacement system had broken down completely by late 1944.{{sfn|Henry|2001 |pp= 12–14}} Hastily trained replacements or service personnel reassigned as infantry were often given only a few weeks' refresher training before being thrown into battle with Army divisions locked in front-line combat.

The new men were often not even proficient in the use of their own weapons, and once in combat, could not receive enough practical instruction from veterans before being killed or wounded, sometimes within the first few days.{{sfn|Keast|1945}}{{sfn|Henry|2001 |pp= 12–14}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=271–84}} Under such conditions, many soldiers suffered a crippling loss of morale, while veterans were kept at the front until they were killed, wounded, or incapacitated by battle fatigue or illness. Incidents of soldiers going [[AWOL]] from combat duty as well as battle fatigue and self-inflicted injury rose rapidly during the last eight months of the war with [[Nazi Germany]].{{sfn|Keast|1945}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|pp=277–84}}{{sfn|Henry| 2001 |pp= 12-14}} As one historian concluded, "Had the Germans been given a free hand to devise a replacement system..., one that would do the Americans the most harm and the least good, they could not have done a better job."{{sfn|Henry| 2001 |pp= 12-14}}{{sfn|Ambrose|1997|p=277}}

Marshall's abilities to pick competent field commanders during the early part of the war was decidedly mixed. He was instrumental in advancing the careers of the highly capable generals such as [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[Omar Bradley]], [[George S. Patton]], [[Walter Krueger]] and [[Mark W. Clark]]. A notable exception was his recommendation of the swaggering [[Lloyd Fredendall]] to Eisenhower for a major command in the American invasion of North Africa during Operation Torch. Marshall was especially fond of Fredendall, describing him as "one of the best" and remarking in a staff meeting when his name was mentioned, "I like that man; you can see determination all over his face." Eisenhower duly picked him to command the 39,000-man Central Task Force (the largest of three) in Operation Torch. Both men would come to regret that decision, as Fredendall was the leader of U.S. Army forces at the disastrous [[Battle of Kasserine Pass]].{{sfn|Ossad|2003}}