Editing Foreign relations of China (section)

== Economic policy ==
{{See also|Made in China 2025|Go Out policy|Debt-trap diplomacy}}

China increased its standing as a responsible global actor during the [[2008 financial crisis]].<ref name="Mitter-2020">{{Cite book|last=Mitter|first=Rana|title=China's good war: how World War II is shaping a new nationalism|date=2020|publisher=The Belknap Press of [[Harvard University Press]]|isbn=978-0-674-98426-4|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|page=8|oclc=1141442704}}</ref> When Western countries were nearing financial disaster, China created credit for spending on infrastructure.<ref name="Mitter-2020" /> This both helped stabilize the global economy and it also provided an opportunity for China to retool its own infrastructure.<ref name="Mitter-2020" />

The Communist Party's [[17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|Seventeenth National Congress]] in 2007 made the negotiation of [[free trade agreement]]s a priority and was further emphasized following a 2015 [[State Council of the People's Republic of China|State Council]] opinion.<ref name=":4" />{{Rp|page=153}} The pace of China's free trade agreement negotiations has accelerated since 2007.<ref name=":4" />{{Rp|page=153}}

China has invested in many infrastructure projects around Eurasia and Africa, including the [[Eurasian Land Bridge]], [[Sino-Myanmar pipelines]] and [[Dali–Ruili railway|railway]] and [[China–Pakistan Economic Corridor|an economic corridor]] and [[Gwadar Port|a port]] in Pakistan.

=== Debt trap allegations ===
China financed [[Hambantota International Port]] in Sri Lanka, which drew allegations of [[debt-trap diplomacy]] when Sri Lanka defaulted on its loans and China took control of the port for 99 years.<ref name="bloomb">{{cite web|last=Marlow|first=Iain|date=17 April 2018|title=China's $1 Billion White Elephant|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190503015142/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-17/china-s-1-billion-white-elephant-the-port-ships-don-t-use|archive-date=3 May 2019|access-date=15 September 2018|publisher=[[Bloomberg News]]}}</ref> Some western analysts have suggested China's debt-trap diplomacy may hide hegemonic intentions and challenges to states' sovereignty.<ref>{{cite web|date=3 February 2019|title=China's Era of Debt-Trap Diplomacy May Pave the Way for Something Sinister|url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-era-debt-trap-diplomacy-may-pave-way-something-sinister-42927|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401015136/https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-era-debt-trap-diplomacy-may-pave-way-something-sinister-42927|archive-date=1 April 2019|access-date=3 February 2019|website=[[The National Interest]]}}</ref> A 2022 study from Johns Hopkins University's [[China Africa Research Initiative]] found that contrary to popular narratives regarding Hambantota port, there were no Chinese debt-to-equity swaps, no asset seizures, and no "hidden debt."<ref name="CARI-2022">{{Cite web|last=Umesh Moramudali and Thilina Panduwawal|date=29 November 2022|title=Evolution of Chinese Lending to Sri Lanka Since the mid-2000s: Separating Myth from Reality|url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/638689771d0e3c4beb14bf2f/1669761400150/Briefing+Paper+-+Sri+Lanka+Debt+-+V5.pdf|access-date=5 January 2023|website=[[China Africa Research Initiative]]}}</ref> It concluded that "the popular narrative of Sri Lanka getting caught in a Chinese debt-trap has been debunked on many occasions."<ref name="CARI-2022" /> Numerous other academics have also argued that the notion of a Chinese "debt-trap" is false, and have called the allegation a "meme" based on anxiety about China's rise,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brautigam|first=Deborah|date=2 January 2020|title=A critical look at Chinese 'debt-trap diplomacy': the rise of a meme|journal=Area Development and Policy|volume=5|issue=1|pages=1–14|doi=10.1080/23792949.2019.1689828|s2cid=214547742|issn=2379-2949}}</ref> a function of China-US rivalries rather than reality,<ref>{{Cite web|last=Jevans Nyabiage|date=6 June 2022|title=Chinese debt traps in Africa? The big worry is bondholders: study|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3180478/chinese-debt-traps-africa-bigger-worry-bondholders-study-finds|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240503190500/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3180478/chinese-debt-traps-africa-bigger-worry-bondholders-study-finds|archive-date=3 May 2024|access-date=14 October 2022|website=South China Morning Post}}</ref> and that such allegations of "neo-colonialism" are false or misrepresentations.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Murphy|first=Dawn C.|title=China's rise in the Global South: the Middle East, Africa, and Beijing's alternative world order|date=2022|publisher=[[Stanford University Press]]|isbn=978-1-5036-3060-4|location=Stanford, California|page=84|oclc=1249712936}}</ref> As of 2021, China had not seized the Sri Lankan port or any other asset from another country.<ref>{{Cite magazine|author=Deborah Brautigam|author-link=Deborah Bräutigam|author2=Meg Rithmire|date=6 February 2021|title=The Chinese 'Debt Trap' Is a Myth|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap-diplomacy/617953/|url-access=subscription|access-date=14 October 2022|magazine=The Atlantic}}</ref>

===Recent initiatives===
{{Main|Belt and Road Initiative|List of projects of the Belt and Road Initiative}}
[[File:One-belt-one-road.svg|alt= Map of Asia, showing the OBOR initiative|thumb|upright=1.4|[[Belt and Road Initiative]] {{legend|red|[[China]]}}{{legend|orange|Members of the [[Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank]]}}{{legend|black| The six Belt and Road corridors}}{{legend|#0186D7|[[21st Century Maritime Silk Road|Maritime silk road]]}} China in red, Members of the [[Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank]] in orange, the six corridors in black
China Britain Business Council: One Belt One Road<ref>{{cite web|title=One Belt One Road: A role for UK companies in developing China's new initiative|publisher=China–Britain Business Council|access-date=22 March 2019|url=http://www.cbbc.org/cbbc/media/cbbc_media/One-Belt-One-Road-main-body.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170713011420/http://www.cbbc.org/cbbc/media/cbbc_media/One-Belt-One-Road-main-body.pdf|archive-date=13 July 2017|date=13 July 2017}}</ref>]]

As the [[First presidency of Donald Trump|Trump administration]] in the United States opened a trade and tariff war with China in 2017, China's response has been to set up its own multinational trading arrangements. In late March 2019, Xi Jinping moved forward with major trading deals with France and Italy. French President [[Emmanuel Macron]] and Xi Jinping signed a series of large-scale trade agreements that covers many sectors over a period of years. The centerpiece was a €30 billion purchase of airplanes from Airbus. The new trade agreement also covered French exports of chicken, a French-built offshore wind farm in China, and a Franco-Chinese cooperation fund, as well as co-financing between [[BNP Paribas]] and the [[Bank of China]]. Other plans include billions of euros to be spent on modernizing Chinese factories, as well as new ship building.<ref>Rym Momtaz, "Macron steals Trump's thunder with Chinese Airbus order: France lands €30B aviation deal with Beijing," [https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-steals-trumps-thunder-with-chinese-airbus-order/ ''POLITICO'' 25 March 2019] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190326232439/https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-steals-trumps-thunder-with-chinese-airbus-order/ |date=26 March 2019 }}</ref> The same week Xi Jinping signed an infrastructure plan with Italian Prime Minister [[Giuseppe Conte]]. Italy became the first European power to join the [[Belt and Road Initiative]].<ref>{{Cite news|last=Legorano|first=Giovanni|date=23 March 2019|title=Italy Signs Up to China's Global Infrastructure Plan Despite U.S. Ire|work=[[The Wall Street Journal]]|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/italy-signs-up-to-chinas-global-infrastructure-plan-despite-u-s-ire-11553341408|access-date=15 October 2022|issn=0099-9660}}</ref>

As of fall 2023, Italy has started the process to exit the Belt and Road Initiative by not renewing the five-year Belt and Road Initiative Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)<ref name=":1" /> of 2019 at the end of 2023.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Why Is Italy Withdrawing From China's Belt and Road Initiative?|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-italy-withdrawing-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative|access-date=30 October 2023|website=Council on Foreign Relations}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=Italy Wants to Exit the Belt and Road – But Without Curbing Ties With China|url=https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/italy-wants-to-exit-the-belt-and-road-but-without-curbing-ties-with-china/|access-date=30 October 2023|website=thediplomat.com}}</ref> With anticipated Italy's notice not to renew, the MOU will officially end in March 2024.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|title=MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA|url=https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Memorandum_Italia-Cina_EN.pdf|access-date=29 October 2023|website=governo.it}}</ref> Eighty percent of the 193-member United Nations have participated in the Belt and Road Initiative, and the developed Western countries have largely stayed away.<ref name=":0" />

===China–United States trade war===
{{Main|China–United States trade war}}
The world's two largest economies have engaged in an escalating [[trade war]] through increasing [[tariff]]s and other measures since 2018.<ref>{{cite news|last=Swanson|first=Ana|date=5 July 2018|title=Trump's Trade War With China Is Officially Underway|newspaper=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html|access-date=9 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180712201844/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html|archive-date=12 July 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

Lawrence J. Lau argues that a major cause is the growing battle China and the U.S. for global economic and technological dominance. He argues, "It is also a reflection of the rise of populism, isolationism, nationalism and protectionism almost everywhere in the world, including in the US."<ref>Lawrence J. Lau,  "The China–US Trade War and Future Economic Relations." ''China and the World'' (Lau Chor Tak Institute of Global Economics and Finance, 2019): 1–32. quote p. 3  [http://www.igef.cuhk.edu.hk/igef_media/working-paper/IGEF/igef%20working%20paper%20no.%2072%20english%20version.pdf online]</ref>

=== RCEP ===
{{Main|Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership}}The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade agreement between the Asia-Pacific nations of Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. The agreement covers approximately 30% of the global population and 30% of the global economy.<ref>{{Cite news|date=15 November 2020|title=Asia forms world's biggest trade bloc, a China-backed group excluding U.S.|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/asean-trade-summit-rcep-signing-idUSKBN27V03K|access-date=14 October 2022}}</ref> In January 2022, RCEP became the world's largest [[trade bloc]] (in economic terms) and continues to be the world's largest as of at least early 2024.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book|last1=Curtis|first1=Simon|title=The Belt and Road City: Geopolitics, Urbanization, and China's Search for a New International Order|last2=Klaus|first2=Ian|publisher=[[Yale University Press]]|isbn=9780300266900|location=New Haven and London|publication-date=2024}}</ref>{{Rp|page=148}}

The 2017 decision by United States President Donald Trump to withdraw from the [[Trans-Pacific Partnership]] strengthened the appeal of the RCEP.<ref name="Mitter-2020" />