Editing Existence (section)

=== Other types ===
Fictional entities are entities that exist as inventions inside works of [[fiction]].{{efn|Some [[empiricist]] philosophers also include entities that are [[Unobservable|not directly observable]], like powers and moral obligations.<ref>{{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} For example, [[Sherlock Holmes]] is a fictional character in [[Arthur Conan Doyle]]'s book ''[[A Study in Scarlet]]'' and [[flying carpets]] are fictional objects in the folktales ''[[One Thousand and One Nights]]''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} }}</ref> According to anti-realism, fictional entities do not form part of reality in any substantive sense. Possibilists, by contrast, see fictional entities as a subclass of possible objects; creationists say that they are artifacts that depend for their existence on the authors who first conceived them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=§ 1. The Metaphysics of Fictional Entities}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=§ 2. Deflationary theories, § 3. Hospitable theories}} }}</ref>

[[Intentionality#The problem of intentional inexistence|Intentional inexistence]] is a similar phenomenon concerned with the existence of objects within mental states. This happens when a person perceives or thinks about an object. In some cases, the [[intentional object]] corresponds to a real object outside the mental state, like when accurately perceiving a tree in the garden. In other cases, the intentional object does not have a real counterpart, like when thinking about [[Bigfoot]]. The [[problem of intentional inexistence]] is the challenge of explaining how one can think about entities that do not exist since this seems to have the paradoxical implication that the thinker stands in a [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]] to a nonexisting object.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jacob|2023|loc=2. Intentional inexistence}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2007|pp=307–308}} | {{harvnb|O’Madagain|loc=§ 2. Intentional Objects}} }}</ref>