Editing Environmental ethics (section)

== Normative ethical theories ==
[[Normative ethics]] is a field in Moral Philosophy that investigates how one ''ought'' to act. What is morally right and wrong, and how moral standards are determined. Superficially, this approach may seem intrinsically anthropocentric. However, theoretical frameworks from traditional normative ethical theories are abundant within contemporary environmental ethics.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/184983347|title=A companion to environmental philosophy|date=2001|publisher=Blackwell|others=Dale Jamieson|isbn=978-0-470-75166-4|location=Malden, Mass.|pages=177|oclc=184983347}}</ref>

=== Consequentialism ===
[[Consequentialism|Consequentialist]] theories focus on the consequences of actions, this emphasizes not what is 'right', but rather what is of 'value' and 'good'. [[Act utilitarianism|Act Utilitarianism]], for example, expands this formulation to emphasize that what makes an action right is whether it maximises well-being and reduces pain. Thus, actions that result in greater well-being are considered obligatory and permissible. It has been noted that this is an 'instrumentalist' position towards the environment, and as such not fully adequate to the delicate demands of ecological diversity.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Hiller|first=Avram|editor1-first=Stephen M|editor1-last=Gardiner|editor2-first=Allen|editor2-last=Thompson|date=2017-01-26|title=Consequentialism in Ethics|url=https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199941339-e-18|access-date=2021-03-14|website=The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics|pages=199–200|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.18|isbn=978-0-19-994133-9}}</ref>[[Rule utilitarianism|Rule-utilitarianism]] is the view that following certain rules without exception is the surest way to bring about the best consequences. This is an important update to act-utilitarianism because agents do not need to judge about the likely consequences of each act; all they must do is determine whether or not a proposed course of action falls under a specific rule and, if it does, act as the rule specifies.

[[Aldo Leopold]]'s ''Land Ethic'' (1949) tries to avoid this type of instrumentalism by proposing a more holistic approach to the relationship between humans and their 'biotic community',<ref name=":0" /> so to create a 'limit' based on the maxim that "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; it is wrong when it tends otherwise."<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Leopold|first=Aldo|title=A Sand County Almanac|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1949|location=New York|pages=224–225}}</ref> Thus, the use of natural resources is permissible as long as it does not disrupt the stability of the ecosystem. Some philosophers have categorised Leopold's views to be within a consequentialist framework, however it is disputed whether this was intentional.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Hiller|first=Avram|url=http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199941339-e-18|title=Consequentialism in Environmental Ethics|date=2016-02-11|publisher=Oxford University Press|editor-last=Gardiner|editor-first=Stephen M.|volume=1|pages=202|language=en|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199941339.013.18|isbn=978-0-19-994133-9|editor-last2=Thompson|editor-first2=Allen}}</ref> Other consequentialist views such as that of [[Peter Singer]] tend to emphasis the inclusion of non-human sentient beings into ethical considerations. This view argues that all sentient creates which are by nature able to feel pleasure and pain, are of equal moral consideration for their intrinsic value. Nevertheless, non-sentient beings, such as plants, rivers and ecosystems, are considered to be merely instrumental.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Singer, Peter|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/773539930|title=Practical ethics|date=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-04150-8|oclc=773539930}}</ref>

=== Deontology ===
[[Deontological ethics|Deontological]] theories state that an action should be based on duties or obligations to what is ''right'', instead of what is ''good''. In strong contrast to consequentialism, this view argues for principles of duty based not on a function of value, but on reasons that make no substantive reference to the consequences of an action. Something of ''intrinsic'' value, then, has to be protected not because its goodness would maximise a wider good, but because it is valuable in itself; not as a means towards something, but as an end in itself.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Alexander|first1=Larry|title=Deontological Ethics|date=2020|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/ethics-deontological/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2020|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-14|last2=Moore|first2=Michael}}</ref> Thus, if the natural environment is categorised as intrinsically valuable, any destruction or damage to such would be considered wrong as a whole rather than merely due to a calculated loss of net value. It can be said that this approach is more holistic in principle than one of consequentialist nature, as it fits more adequately with the delicate balance of large ecosystems.

Theories of rights, for example, are generally deontological. That is, within this framework an environmental policy that gives rights to non-human sentient beings, would prioritise the conservation of such in their natural state, rather than in an artificial manner. Consider for example, issues in [[climate engineering]]; [[Ocean fertilization|Ocean fertilisation]] aims to expand marine algae in order to remove higher levels of CO<sub>2</sub>. A complication from this approach is that it creates salient disruptions to local ecosystems.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Scott-Buechler|first1=Celina M.|title=Chapter 6 - Role of the ocean in climate stabilization|date=2019-01-01|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128162293000065|work=Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage|pages=109–130|editor-last=Magalhães Pires|editor-first=José Carlos|publisher=Academic Press|language=en|doi=10.1016/b978-0-12-816229-3.00006-5|isbn=978-0-12-816229-3|access-date=2021-03-14|last2=Greene|first2=Charles H.|osti=2234010 |s2cid=202467968 |editor2-last=Cunha Gonçalves|editor2-first=Ana Luísa Da}}</ref> Furthermore, an environmental ethical theory based on the rights of marine animals in those ecosystems, would create a protection against this type of intervention. Environmental deontologists such as [[Paul W. Taylor]], for example, have argued for a [[Kantian ethics|Kantian]] approach to issues of this kind. Taylor argues that all living things are 'teleological centres of life' <ref>{{Cite book|last=Taylor|first=Paul W.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/13124739|title=Respect for nature : a theory of environmental ethics|date=1986|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=0-691-07709-6|location=Princeton, N.J.|pages=99|oclc=13124739}}</ref> deserving of rights and respect. His view uses a concept of '[[universalizability]]', to argue that one ought to act only on actions which could be rationally willed as a universal law. [[Val Plumwood]] has criticised this approach by noting that the universalisation framework, is not necessarily based on 'respect' for the other, as it's based on duty and 'becoming' part of the environment.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Plumwood|first=Val|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51779272|title=Feminism and the mastery of nature|date=1993|publisher=Routledge|isbn=0-203-00675-5|location=London|pages=171|oclc=51779272}}</ref>

=== Virtue ethics ===
[[Environmental virtue ethics|Virtue ethics]] states that some character traits should be cultivated, and others avoided. This framework avoids problems of defining what is of intrinsic value, by instead arguing that what is important is to act in accordance with the correct character trait. The [[Golden mean (philosophy)|Golden mean]] formulation, for example, states that to be 'generous' (virtue), one should neither be miserly (deficiency) or extravagant (excess). Unlike [[deontology]] and consequentialism, theories of virtue focus their formulations on how the individual has to act to live a [[Eudaimonia|flourishing life]]. This presents a 'subjective flexibility' which seems like an adequate position to hold considering the fluctuating demands of sustainability.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hill|first=Thomas E.|date=1983|title=Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19835327|journal=Environmental Ethics|volume=5|issue=3|pages=211–224|doi=10.5840/enviroethics19835327|issn=0163-4275}}</ref>  However, as a consequence, it can also be said that this is an inherently anthropocentric standpoint.

Some [[Ecofeminism|Ecofeminist]] theories such as that of [[Val Plumwood]], have been categorised as a form of virtue ethics. Plumwood argues that a virtue-based ethical framework adapts more fittingly to environmental diversity, as virtues such as 'respect', 'gratitude', and 'sensitivity', are not only suitable to ecological subjectivity but also more applicable to the views of indigenous people.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Plumwood|first=Val|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/51779272|title=Feminism and the mastery of nature|date=1993|publisher=Routledge|isbn=0-203-00675-5|location=London|pages=183|oclc=51779272}}</ref> Furthermore, what traits would be considered as part of environmental ''vices''? Ronald Sandler argues that detrimental dispositions to human flourishing such as 'greed', 'intemperance' and 'arrogance', lead to detrimental dispositions to the protection of the environment such as 'apathy', against other species, and 'pessimism' about conservation.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Sandler|first=Ronald L.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/607781405|title=Character and environment : a virtue-oriented approach to environmental ethics|date=2007|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-51186-5|location=New York|pages=6–7|oclc=607781405}}</ref> Views such as this, create a [[Mutualism (biology)|mutualistic]] connection between virtuous human flourishing, and environmental flourishing.