Editing Consciousness (section)

===Coherence of the concept===
Philosophers differ from non-philosophers in their intuitions about what consciousness is.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Justin Sytsma|author2=Edouard Machery|title=Two conceptions of subjective experience|journal=Philosophical Studies|year=2010|volume=151|issue=2|pages=299–327|doi=10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x|s2cid=2444730|url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004888/01/Two_Conceptions_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004888/01/Two_Conceptions_of_Subjective_Experience.pdf|archive-date=2022-10-09|url-status=live}}</ref> While most people have a strong intuition for the existence of what they refer to as consciousness,<ref name=Antony2001/> skeptics argue that this intuition is too narrow, either because the concept of consciousness is embedded in our intuitions, or because we all are illusions. [[Gilbert Ryle]], for example, argued that traditional understanding of consciousness depends on a [[dualism (philosophy of mind)|Cartesian dualist]] outlook that improperly distinguishes between mind and body, or between mind and world. He proposed that we speak not of minds, bodies, and the world, but of entities, or identities, acting in the world. Thus, by speaking of "consciousness" we end up leading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings.<ref name=RyleConsciousness>{{cite book|title=The Concept of Mind|author=Gilbert Ryle|publisher=University of Chicago Press|date=2000 |orig-date=1949|pages=156–163|isbn=978-0-226-73296-1|title-link=The Concept of Mind|author-link=Gilbert Ryle}}</ref>