Editing Chinese room (section)

=== Consciousness ===
Searle's original presentation emphasized understanding—that is, [[mental state]]s with [[intentionality]]—and did not directly address other closely related ideas such as "consciousness". However, in more recent presentations, Searle has included consciousness as the real target of the argument.{{sfn|Searle|1992|p=44}}
{{blockquote|Computational models of consciousness are not sufficient by themselves for consciousness. The computational model for consciousness stands to consciousness in the same way the computational model of anything stands to the domain being modelled. Nobody supposes that the computational model of rainstorms in London will leave us all wet. But they make the mistake of supposing that the computational model of consciousness is somehow conscious. It is the same mistake in both cases.{{sfn|Searle|2002}}|John R. Searle| ''Consciousness and Language'', p. 16}}
[[David Chalmers]] writes, "it is fairly clear that consciousness is at the root of the matter" of the Chinese room.{{sfn|Chalmers|1996|p=322}}

[[Colin McGinn]] argues that the Chinese room provides strong evidence that the [[hard problem of consciousness]] is fundamentally insoluble. The argument, to be clear, is not about whether a machine can be conscious, but about whether it (or anything else for that matter) can be shown to be conscious. It is plain that any other method of probing the occupant of a Chinese room has the same difficulties in principle as exchanging questions and answers in Chinese. It is simply not possible to divine whether a conscious agency or some clever [[simulation]] inhabits the room.{{sfn|McGinn|2000}}

Searle argues that this is only true for an observer outside of the room. The whole point of the thought experiment is to put someone inside the room, where they can directly observe the operations of consciousness. Searle claims that from his vantage point within the room there is nothing he can see that could imaginably give rise to consciousness, other than himself, and clearly he does not have a mind that can speak Chinese. In Searle's words, "the computer has nothing more than I have in the case where I understand nothing".{{sfn|Searle|1980|p=418}}