Editing Charles Lee (general) (section)

==American Revolution==
===Continental Army===
[[File:Appletons' Lee Charles.jpg|thumb|Lee as depicted in ''[[Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography]]'']]
Although Lee was generally acknowledged at the [[Second Continental Congress]] to be the most capable candidate for the command of the [[Continental Army]], the role was given to [[George Washington]]. Lee recognized the sense of giving the position to a native-born North American, but expected to be given the role of second-in-command. He was disappointed when that role went to [[Artemas Ward]], whom Lee considered too inexperienced for the job. Lee was appointed major-general and third in line, but succeeded to second-in-command in 1776 when Ward resigned due to ill health.<ref>Thayer 1976 pp. 15–16</ref>

===Southern command===
{{Main|Battle of Sullivan's Island}}
Lee also received various other titles: in 1776, he was named commander of the so-called Canadian Department, although he never got to serve in this capacity.<ref name="anb"/><ref name="DNB"/><ref name="appleton"/> He was appointed as the first commander of the [[Departments of the Continental Army|Southern Department]].<ref name="anb"/><ref name="DNB"/><ref name="appleton"/> He served in this post for six months, until he was recalled to the main army. During his time in the South, the British sent an expedition under [[Henry Clinton (American War of Independence)|Henry Clinton]] to recover [[Charleston, South Carolina]].<ref name="DNB"/><ref name="appleton"/> Lee oversaw the fortification of the city.<ref name="anb"/> Fort Sullivan was a fortification built out of [[Sabal palmetto|palmetto]] logs, later named for commander Col. William Moultrie.<ref name="DNB"/><ref name="appleton"/> Lee ordered the army to evacuate the fort because as he said it would only last thirty minutes and all soldiers would be killed.<ref name="allen185">Allen, p. 185</ref> Governor John Rutledge forbade Moultrie to evacuate and the fort held.<ref name="DNB"/><ref name="appleton"/> The spongy palmetto logs repelled the cannonball from the British ships.<ref name="allen186">Allen, p. 186</ref> The [[Battle of Sullivan's Island|assault on Sullivan's Island]] was driven off, and Clinton abandoned his attempts to capture the city. Lee was acclaimed as the "hero of Charleston", although according to some American accounts the credit for the defense was not his.<ref name="DNB"/><ref name="appleton"/>

===New York and capture===
{{Main|New York Campaign}}
The British capture of Fort Washington and its near 3,000-strong garrison on 16 November 1776, prompted Lee's first overt criticism of Washington. Believing the commander-in-chief's hesitation to evacuate the fort to be responsible for the loss, Lee wrote to [[Joseph Reed (politician)|Joseph Reed]] lamenting Washington's indecision, a criticism Washington read when he opened the letter believing it to be official business.<ref>Thayer 1976 p. 17</ref> As Washington retreated across New Jersey after the defeat at New York, he urged Lee, whose troops were north of New York, to join him. Although Lee's orders were at first discretionary, and although there were good tactical reasons for delaying, his slow progress has been characterized as insubordinate. On 12 December 1776, Lee was captured by British troops at White's Tavern in [[Basking Ridge, New Jersey]], while writing a letter to General [[Horatio Gates]] complaining about Washington's deficiency.<ref>Thayer 1976 pp. 18–19</ref><ref>Lender & Stone 2016 p. 110</ref>

===Battle of Monmouth===
{{Main|Battle of Monmouth}}
[[File:Charles Lee Esq'r. - major general of the Continental-Army in America.jpg|thumb|left|General Lee on horseback]]
Lee was released on [[parole]] as part of a prisoner exchange in early April 1778 and, while on his way to [[York, Pennsylvania]], was greeted enthusiastically by Washington at [[Valley Forge]]. Lee was ignorant of the changes that had occurred during his sixteen-month captivity; he was not aware of what Washington believed to be a [[Conway Cabal|conspiracy]] to install Gates as commander-in-chief or of the reformation of the Continental Army under the tutelage of [[Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben|Baron von Steuben]].<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 110, 113</ref> According to [[Elias Boudinot]], the commissary who had negotiated the prisoner exchange, Lee claimed that "he found the Army in a worse situation than he expected and that General Washington was not fit to command a sergeant's guard." While in York, Lee lobbied Congress for promotion to [[lieutenant general]], and went above Washington's head to submit to it a plan for reorganizing the army in a way that was markedly different from that which Washington had worked long to implement.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 114–117</ref>

Lee's suggestion was for a militia army that avoided competing with a professional enemy in a pitched battle and relied instead on a defensive strategy which would wear down an opposing army with harassing, small-unit actions.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 119–120</ref> After completing his parole, Lee returned to duty with the Continental Army as Washington's second-in-command on 21 May.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 117–118</ref> In June, as the British evacuated Philadelphia and marched through New Jersey en route to New York, Washington twice convened war councils to discuss the best course of action. In both, his generals largely agreed that Washington should avoid a major battle, Lee arguing that such a battle would be criminal, though a minority favored a limited engagement. At the second council, Lee argued the Continental Army was no match for the British Army, and favored allowing the British to proceed unimpeded and waiting until French military intervention following the [[Franco-American alliance]] could shift the balance in favor of the Americans.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 101, 173</ref>

Washington agreed with the minority of his generals who favored an aggressive but limited action. He allocated some 4,500 troops, approximately a third of his army, to a [[vanguard]] that could land a heavy blow on the British without risking his army in a general engagement. The main body would follow and provide support if circumstances warranted.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 174–177, 234</ref> He offered Lee command of the vanguard, but Lee turned the job down on the basis that the force was too small for a man of his rank and position.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 177–178</ref><ref>Ferling 2009 p. 176</ref> Washington gave the position to Major General the [[Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette|Marquis de Lafayette]]. In his haste to catch the British, Lafayette pushed the vanguard to exhaustion and outran his supplies, prompting Washington to send Lee, who had in the meantime changed his mind, to replace him.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 178–182, 187, 188</ref>

Lee took over on 27 June at [[Englishtown, New Jersey|Englishtown]].<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 p. 188</ref> The British were at Monmouth Courthouse (modern-day [[Freehold Borough, New Jersey|Freehold]]), {{convert|6|mi|km|spell=on|0}} from Englishtown. Washington was with the main body of just over 7,800 troops and the bulk of the artillery at [[Manalapan Township, New Jersey|Manalapan Bridge]], {{convert|4|mi|km|spell=on|0}} behind Lee.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 157–158, 184</ref> Believing action to be imminent, Washington conferred with the vanguard's senior officers at Englishtown that afternoon but did not offer a battle plan. Lee believed he had full discretion on whether and how to attack and called his own war council after Washington left. He intended to advance as soon as he knew the British were on the move, in the hope of catching their rearguard when it was most vulnerable. In the absence of any intelligence about British intentions or the terrain, Lee believed it would be useless to form a precise plan of his own.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 191–193</ref>

====Lee's battle====
[[File:Battle of Monmouth - American vanguard attack.png|thumb|Lee's attack on the British rearguard|alt=map]]
When news arrived at 05:00 on 28 June that the British were moving, Lee led the vanguard towards Monmouth Court House, where he discovered the British rearguard, which he estimated at 2,000 troops. He ordered Brigadier General [[Anthony Wayne]] with some 550 men to fix the rearguard in place while he led the remainder of the vanguard on a left hook with the intention of outflanking the British, but he neglected to inform his subordinates, Brigadier General [[Charles Scott (governor)|Charles Scott]] and Brigadier General [[William Maxwell (Continental Army general)|William Maxwell]], of his plan. Lee's confidence crept into reports back to Washington that implied "the certainty of success."<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 198, 253–255, 261</ref>

As soon as the British commander, General Sir [[Henry Clinton (British Army officer, born 1730)|Henry Clinton]], received news that his rearguard was being probed, he ordered his main combat division to march back towards Monmouth Court House.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 264–265</ref> Lee became concerned that his right flank would be vulnerable and moved with Lafayette's detachment to secure it.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 262–264</ref> To his left, Scott and Maxwell were not in communication with Lee and not privy to his plan. They became concerned that the arriving British troops would isolate them, and decided to withdraw. To their left, Wayne's isolated troops, having witnessed the British marching back, were also withdrawing.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 264–266</ref><ref>Bilby & Jenkins 2010 p. 199</ref> Lee witnessed one of Lafayette's units pulling back after a failed attempt to silence some British artillery around the same time as one of his staff officers returned with the news that Scott had withdrawn. With his troops withdrawing without orders, it became clear to Lee that he was losing control of the vanguard, and with his immediate command now only 2,500 strong, he realized his plan to envelop the British rearguard was finished. His priority became the safety of his troops in the face of superior numbers, and he ordered a general retreat.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 266–269</ref>

Lee had significant difficulties communicating with his subordinates and could exercise only limited command and control of the vanguard, but at unit level, the retreat was generally conducted with a discipline that did credit to Steuben's training, and the Americans suffered few casualties. Lee believed he had conducted a model "retrograde manoeuver in the face and under fire of an enemy" and claimed his troops moved with "order and precision." He had remained calm during the retreat but began to unravel at Ker's house. When two of General Washington's aides informed Lee that the main body was still some {{convert|2|mi|km|spell=on|0}} away and asked him what to report back, Lee replied "that he really did not know what to say."<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 268–272</ref> Crucially, he failed to keep Washington informed of the retreat.<ref>Ferling 2009 p. 178</ref>

[[File:Battle of Monmouth - American rearguard.png|thumb|left|American rearguard action|alt=map]]

Without any recent news from Lee, Washington had no reason to be concerned as he approached the battlefield with the main body shortly after midday. In the space of some ten minutes, his confidence gave way to alarm as he encountered a straggler bearing the first news of Lee's retreat and then whole units in retreat. None of the officers Washington met could tell him where they were supposed to be going or what they were supposed to be doing. As the commander-in-chief rode on ahead, he saw the vanguard in full retreat but no sign of the British. At around 12:45, Washington found Lee marshalling the last of his command across the middle morass, marshy ground southeast of a bridge over the Spotswood Middle Brook.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 281–286</ref>

Expecting praise for a retreat he believed had been generally conducted in good order, Lee was uncharacteristically lost for words when Washington asked without pleasantries, "I desire to know, sir, what is the reason&nbsp;– whence arises this disorder and confusion?"<ref name="Lender&Stone289">Lender & Stone 2016 p. 289</ref> When he regained his composure, Lee attempted to explain his actions. He blamed faulty intelligence and his officers, especially Scott, for pulling back without orders, leaving him no choice but to retreat in the face of a superior force, and reminded Washington that he had opposed the attack in the first place.<ref name="Lender&Stone289 "/><ref name="Chernow448">Chernow 2010 p. 448</ref> Washington was not convinced; "All this may be very true, sir," he replied, "but you ought not to have undertaken it unless you intended to go through with it."<ref name="Lender&Stone289 "/> Washington made it clear he was disappointed with Lee and rode off to organize the battle he felt his subordinate should have given. Lee followed at a distance, bewildered and believing he had been relieved of command.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 289–290</ref>{{efn|According to Lender & Stone, the encounter between Washington and Lee "became part of the folklore of the Revolution, with various witnesses (or would-be witnesses) taking increasing dramatic license with their stories over the years."<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 p. 290</ref> Ferling writes of eyewitness testimony in which a furious Washington, swearing "till the leaves shook on the trees" according to Scott, called Lee a "damned poltroon" and relieved him of command.<ref name="Ferling179 "/> Chernow reports the same quote from Scott, quotes Lafayette to assert that a "terribly excited" Washington swore and writes that Washington "banished [Lee] to the rear."<ref name="Chernow448 "/> Bilby & Jenkins attribute the poltroon quote to Lafayette, then write that neither Scott nor Lafayette were present.<ref>Bilby & Jenkins 2010 p. 205</ref> Lender & Stone are also skeptical, and assert that such stories are apocryphal nonsense which first appeared almost a half century or more after the event, that Scott was too far away to have heard what was said, and that Lee himself never accused Washington of profanity. According to Lender & Stone, "careful scholarship has conclusively demonstrated that Washington was angry but not profane at Monmouth, and he never ordered Lee off the field."<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 290–291</ref>}}

With the main body still arriving and the British no more than {{convert|1/2|mi|km|spell=on|0}} away, Washington began to rally the vanguard to set up the very defenses Lee had been attempting to organize. He then offered Lee a choice: remain and command the rearguard, or fall back across the bridge and organize the main defenses on Perrine's Hill. Lee opted for the former while Washington departed to take care of the latter.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 291–295</ref><ref name="Ferling179">Ferling 2009 p. 179</ref> Lee fought the counter-attacking British in a rearguard action that lasted no more than thirty minutes, enough time for Washington to complete the deployment of the main body, and at 13:30, he was one of the last American officers to withdraw across the bridge.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 298–310, 313</ref> When Lee reached Perrine's Hill, Washington sent him with part of the former vanguard to form a reserve at Englishtown. At 15:00, Steuben arrived at Englishtown and relieved Lee of command.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 315–316</ref>

General Lee regarded [[John Skey Eustace]] as his adopted son and declared him as his heir,<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=GaqVflnNvZwC&dq=John+skey+eustace+Northern+Neck&pg=PA72 A Cock and Bull for Kitty: Lord Dunmore and the Affair that Ruined the ... by George Morrow, p. 73]</ref><ref name="founders.archives.gov">"To Alexander Hamilton from John Skey Eustace, [27 October 1798]," Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-22-02-0127. [Original source: The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 22, July 1798 – March 1799, ed. Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, pp. 213–216.]</ref><ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=BF83GXqGq4EC&dq=john+skey+eustace+savannah+georgia&pg=PA156 The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-1784: August-September 1781]</ref> but the handsome Eustace decided to desert the unpredictable Lee.<ref>[https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015028745571&view=1up&seq=311&q1=eustace General Charles Lee, traitor or patriot?]</ref><ref name="founders.archives.gov"/>

====Court martial====
Even before the day was out, Lee was cast in the role of villain, and his vilification became an integral part of after-battle reports written by Washington's officers.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 391–392</ref> Lee continued in his post as second-in-command immediately after the battle, and it is likely that the issue would have simply subsided if he had let it go. On 30 June, after protesting his innocence to all who would listen, Lee wrote an insolent letter to Washington in which he blamed "dirty earwigs" for turning Washington against him, claimed his decision to retreat had saved the day, and pronounced Washington to be "guilty of an act of cruel injustice" towards him. Instead of the apology Lee was tactlessly seeking, Washington replied that the tone of Lee's letter was "highly improper" and that he would initiate an official inquiry into Lee's conduct. Lee's response demanding a [[court-martial|court martial]] was again insolent, and Washington ordered his arrest and set about obliging him.<ref name="Ferling 2009 p. 180">Ferling 2009 p. 180</ref><ref>Chernow 2010 p. 452</ref><ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 392–393</ref>

The court convened on 4 July 1778, and three charges were laid before Lee: disobeying orders in not attacking on the morning of the battle, contrary to "repeated instructions"; conducting an "unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat"; and disrespect towards the commander-in-chief. The trial concluded on 12 August 1778, and the accusations and counter-accusations continued to fly until the verdict was confirmed by Congress on 5 December 1778.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 395–396, 400</ref> Lee's defense was articulate but fatally flawed by his efforts to turn it into a personal contest between himself and Washington. He denigrated the commander-in-chief's role in the battle, calling Washington's official account "from beginning to end a most abominable damn'd lie", and disingenuously cast his own decision to retreat as a "masterful manoeuvre" designed to lure the British onto the main body.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 396, 397, 399</ref> Washington remained aloof from the controversy, but his allies portrayed Lee as a traitor who had allowed the British to escape and linked him to the previous winter's alleged conspiracy against Washington.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 397–399</ref>

Although the first two charges proved to be dubious,{{efn|According to the court martial transcript, Lee's actions had saved a significant portion of the army.<ref name="Ferling 2009 p. 180"/> Both Scott and Wayne testified that although they understood that Washington had wanted Lee to attack but at no stage explicitly gave Lee an order to do so.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 191–192</ref> Hamilton testified that as he understood it, Washington's instructions allowed Lee the discretion to act as circumstances dictated.<ref name="Lender & Stone 2016 p. 194">Lender & Stone 2016 p. 194</ref> Lender and Stone identify two separate orders Washington issued to Lee on the morning of 28 June in which the commander-in-chief made clear his expectation that Lee should attack unless "some very powerful circumstance" dictate otherwise and that Lee should "proceed with caution and take care the Enemy don't draw him into a scrape."<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 195–196</ref>}} Lee was undeniably guilty of disrespect, and Washington was too powerful to cross.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 p. 396</ref> As the historian John Shy noted, "Under the circumstances, an acquittal on the first two charges would have been a vote of no-confidence in Washington."<ref>Shy 1973, cited in Lender & Stone 2016, p. 396</ref> Lee was found guilty on all three counts, but the court deleted "shameful" from the second and noted the retreat was "disorderly" only "in some few instances." Lee was suspended from the army for a year, a sentence so lenient that some interpreted it as a vindication of all but the charge of disrespect.<ref>Lender & Stone 2016 pp. 396–397</ref> Lee continued to argue his case and rage against Washington to anyone who would listen, prompting both Lieutenant Colonel [[John Laurens]], one of Washington's aides, and Steuben to challenge him to a duel.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Founders Online: Account of a Duel between Major General Charles Lee and Lieute …|url=http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0687|access-date=2020-10-21|website=founders.archives.gov|language=en}}</ref> Only the duel with Laurens actually transpired on December 23, 1778, during which Lee was wounded in the side. Laurens, believing the wound was more serious than it seemed, went to help the general. However, Lee said it was fine and proposed to shoot a second time. The men's seconds, [[Alexander Hamilton]] and Evan Edwards, opposed this idea and had the duel end there, despite Lee's protests to fire again and Laurens's agreeance. In 1780, Lee sent such a poorly received letter to Congress that it terminated his service with the army.<ref>Ferling 2009 pp. 180–181</ref><ref>Lender & Stone 2016 p. 400–401</ref><ref>Chernow 2010 p. 455</ref>