Editing Chandrakirti (section)

=== ''Prāsaṅga'' and reasoning ===
Chandrakirti defended [[Buddhapālita]] and his madhyamaka method against the views of [[Bhāviveka]]. According to Chandra, Madhyamikas should not use autonomous or independent inferences (''svatantrānumāna'') when debating an opponent.{{sfn|Buswell|Lopez|2013|loc=Entry for {{IAST|Candrakīrti}}}}<ref name=":3">Dunne, John. "Madhyamaka in India and Tibet"</ref> This method had been developed by the Buddhist epistemologist [[Dignāga]] and had been adopted by madhyamikas like [[Bhāviveka]].<ref>Hayes, Richard, "Madhyamaka", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/madhyamaka/>.</ref><ref name=":1">Vose 2015, p. 3.</ref> Bhāviveka had argued that to be able to accurately and effectively defend the madhyamaka view against its opponents, one needed to positively prove one's thesis by means of independent inferences (''svatantrānumāna'') in formal [[syllogism]]s (''prayoga'') which proved the madhyamika thesis in a self-contained manner independent of the views of non-madhyamika interlocutors.<ref name=":2" /><ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 20-21, 25.</ref> He therefore faulted  [[Buddhapālita]]'s analysis of madhyamaka as inadequate.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 25.</ref>

Chandrakirti critiqued Bhāviveka on this point and argued that madhyamaka thinkers should instead only rely on ''prāsaṅga'' arguments (literally "consequence"), which mainly refers to [[Reductio ad absurdum|reductio arguments]] that seek to show how an opponent's views lead to absurd or unwanted consequences.{{sfn|Buswell|Lopez|2013|loc=Entry for {{IAST|Candrakīrti}}}}<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> Furthermore, these reductio arguments only refute the opponents position on the opponent's own terms. They do not put forth a counter-position in return nor do they commit the madhyamika to the principles and conclusions used in the course of the argument.<ref name=":10">Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 23.</ref> In this sense, the madhyamikas merely point out the absurdity of their opponents views without stating a position of their own, and merely indicate the truth indirectly.<ref name=":10" />

Chandrakirti states:<blockquote>Whoever speaks in terms of independently valid logical arguments (inferences) reaps some fault. We do not rely on them, because the only fruit of our arguments is the annulment of someone else's thesis.<ref name=":8">Dreyfus & McClintock 2015, p. 82.</ref> </blockquote>Chandrakirti argues that the idea that one ''must'' use the syllogistic arguments commits one to the acceptance of inherent natures or some other form of [[foundationalism]] or [[essentialism]].<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /> He also points out that Nagarjuna did not make use of such arguments and relied on ''prāsaṅga''. Chandrakirti sees figures like Bhāviveka as not really being madhyamikas, instead he sees them as logicians which "may take the side of the madhyamaka school out of a desire to parade the extent of his own dialectical skill." According to Chandrakirti, the philosophical practices of these logicians, motivated as they are by a desire for certainty and logic, becomes "an enormous reservoir where faults pile up one after another."<ref name=":8" /> Thus, Chandrakirti does not see Bhāviveka as being a madhyamika (unlike later Tibetan doxographers), but sees him as being a logician (''tārkika''), like other Buddhist thinkers such as Dignaga.<ref>Dreyfus & McClintock 2015, pp. 82-83.</ref>

Another problem which Chandrakirti sees with the idea that a madhyamika must use independent syllogisms is that a madhyamika interlocutor and any essentialist or realist opponent do not share a basic set of premises required for syllogistic reasoning. This is because they do not have the same idea of what it means for something to "exist" and therefore they cannot even agree on a set of basic premises on which to develop an independent syllogism.<ref>Newland 2009, p. 80.</ref><ref name=":3" /> The validity of any independent syllogism depends on the fact that the terminology it uses has the same meaning for both parties in the debate. However, this is impossible in a debate between a madhyamika and a realist according to Chandrakirti, since the very subject of debate is the nature of how the very objects of discussion are said to exist. Thus, a true madhyamika cannot put forth an independent syllogism which is not defective. Furthermore, if both parties use the same terminology but interpret them differently, they also lack a common understanding on which to ground a debate.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 26-27.</ref>

''Prāsaṅga'' arguments meanwhile, are mainly negative, and thus do not require the affirmation of any positive thesis or view, but merely deconstructs the arguments of one's opponent. As such, Chandrakirti thinks ''prāsaṅga'' arguments are more suited to the [[Apophasis|apophatic]] method of madhyamaka philosophy.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":4" /> Indeed, according to Chandrakirti, madhyamaka presents no positive view at all and he cites Nagarjuna's ''Vigrahavyāvartanī'' in which he states "I have no thesis" in this regard.<ref name=":3" />

Chandrakirti  also critiques the view of the non-madhyamika epistemologists like Dignāga for having failed to provide a sufficiently indisputable foundation for their premises and for having failed to respond to Nagarjuna's criticism of the foundations of pramana in the ''Vigrahavyāvartanī.<ref name=":4" />''

There is a further problem with the view of the logicians and this is that, for Chandrakirti, all cognitions involve ignorance from an ultimate point of view and thus no cognition is fully reliable. Because of this, meditation on emptiness does not rely on an object at all (even the idea or view of emptiness) and ultimate truth is thus said to be beyond the ordinary mind.<ref name=":3" /><ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 24.</ref> However, there is a role for reasoning in Chandrakirti's thought. Reasoning is only useful for negating all views regarding existence and non-existence. Furthermore, reasoning must also negate itself, because it also relies on conceptual proliferation ([[Conceptual proliferation|''prapañca'']]), which is based on ignorance.<ref name=":3" /> Thus, for Chandrakirti, reasoning and conceptual thought cannot know the ultimate truth, because the ultimate is beyond all concepts and discursive proliferation (''prapañca'').<ref>Ruegg 1981, p. 75.</ref> However, reasoning ''can'' be used to understand the very limitations of reason and thought in explaining the ultimate and how any attempt at conceptually understanding the ultimate leads to contradictions. Reason can thus indirectly point to the ineffable ultimate truth (which can only be realized by another means, i.e. through wisdom, [[Jnana|''jñana'']]) by revealing what it is not.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 24-27.</ref>