Editing Brezhnev Doctrine (section)

===Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979===
The Soviet government's desire to link its foreign policy to the Brezhnev Doctrine was evoked again when it ordered a [[Soviet–Afghan War|military intervention in Afghanistan]] in 1979. This was perhaps the last chapter of this doctrine's saga.

In April 1978, a [[Saur Revolution|coup in Kabul]] brought the Afghan Communist Party to power with [[Nur Muhammad Taraki]] being installed as the second president of Afghanistan. The previous president, [[Mohammed Daoud Khan]] was killed during the coup. The Saur Revolution (as the coup was known) took Moscow by surprise, who preferred that the pro-Soviet Daoud Khan stay in power.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=131}} The previous regime had maintained a pro-Soviet foreign policy as Daoud Khan was a [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] who rejected the [[Durand Line]] as the frontier with Pakistan. The [[People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|Afghan Communist Party]] was divided into a factional struggle between factions known as the [[Khalq]] and [[Parcham]]. The Parcham was the more moderate of the two factions, arguing that Afghanistan was not ready for socialism, requiring more gradual process while the ultra-Communist Khalq favored a more radical approach. The Khalq faction was victorious and the leader of the Pacham faction [[Babrak Karmal]] fled to Moscow in fear of his life, to take up the position as Afghan ambassador in Moscow.

Islamic fundamentalists took issue with the Communist party in power. As a result, a ''jihad'' was proclaimed against the Communist government. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders falsely portrayed the United States as the one behind the ''jihad'' in Afghanistan,<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Steve Coll|last=Coll|first=Steve|title=[[Ghost Wars|Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001]]|publisher=[[Penguin Group]]|year=2004|isbn=9781594200076|pages=47–49|quote=Frustrated and hoping to discredit him, the KGB initially planted false stories that Amin was a CIA agent. In the autumn these rumors rebounded on the KGB in a strange case of "[[Blowback (intelligence)|blowback]]," the term used by spies to describe planted propaganda that filters back to confuse the country that first set the story loose.}}</ref> and the rebellion in Afghanistan was seen in Moscow not so much in the context of Afghan politics with an unpopular government pursuing policies that much of the population rejected (such as the collectivisation of agriculture), but rather in the context of the Cold War, being seen as the first stage of an alleged American plot to instigate a ''jihad'' in [[Soviet Central Asia]] where the majority of the population was Muslim.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=131-132}} To assist the government, the Soviet Union drastically increased its military aid to Afghanistan while sending Soviet advisers to train the Afghan military.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=131-132}}

Following a split in the Communist Party, the leader of the Khalq faction, [[Hafizullah Amin]], overthrew President [[Nur Muhammad Taraki]] and had him murdered on 8 October 1979. Soviet diplomats in Kabul had a low opinion of Taraki's ability to handle the rebellion, and an even lower one of Amin, who was regarded as a fanatic, but incompetent leader who lost control of the situation.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=132}} In the fall of 1979, the leaders who pressed the most strongly for an invasion of Afghanistan to replace the incompetent Amin with Karmal, who was the man better able to preserve the communist regime's existence, were the Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]], the Chairman of KGB, [[Yuri Andropov]] and the Defense Minister Marshal [[Dmitry Ustinov]].{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=136}} The intervention was envisioned in Moscow was merely a short conflict to stabilize the situation and allow the Communist regime to regain power.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=134-136}} Brezhnev was indecisive, fearing that an occupation of Afghanistan might not be the short war that Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov kept insisting it would be, but was fearful of the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime being established that would export Islam into Soviet Central Asia.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=136}} As it was, the inability and unwillingness of much of the Soviet-controlled Afghan Army to fight led the Soviets to involve themselves in Afghanistan for almost 10 years.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=136}} Ironically, despite what was being feared in Moscow, the United States was not supporting the Islamic fundamentalist rebellion in Afghanistan, and only started to support the ''mujahideen'' ("warriors of Allah") with weapons after the Soviet invasion, concentrating foreign policy matters in the form of [[Linkage (policy)|linkage]] towards preventing Soviet expansion.{{sfn|Gompert|Binnendijk|Lin|2014|p=135-136}}

During his talks with the Soviets during his time as Ambassador, Karmal coordinated with the Soviet government to replace Amin. It was this coordination that led to both Soviet soldiers and airborne units organizing a [[Operation Storm-333|coup]] against the Amin-led Afghanistan government, during which Amin was assassinated. In his place, the Soviets installed their ally, former-Ambassador Babrak Karmal, as the new lead of the government in Afghanistan.<ref name=":5" />

The Soviet Union, once again, fell back to the Brezhnev Doctrine for rationale, claiming that it was both morally and politically justified. It was also explained by the Soviets that they owed help to their friend and ally Babrak Karmal.