Editing Bernard Montgomery (section)

==Second World War==

===British Expeditionary Force===

====Phoney war====

Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 and the 3rd Division, together with its new [[General Officer Commanding]] (GOC), was deployed to France as part of the [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] (BEF), commanded by General [[John Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort|Lord Gort]]. Shortly after the division's arrival overseas, Montgomery faced serious trouble from his military superiors and [[Clergy|the clergy]] for his frank attitude regarding the sexual health of his soldiers, but was defended from dismissal by his superior [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]], commander of [[II Corps (United Kingdom)|II Corps]], of which Montgomery's division formed a part.<ref>{{harvnb|Heathcote|1999|p=218,}}</ref> Montgomery had issued a circular on the prevention of venereal disease, worded in such "obscene language" that both the [[Church of England]] and [[Catholic Church|Roman Catholic]] senior [[chaplain]]s objected; Brooke told Monty that he did not want any further errors of this kind, though deciding not to get him to formally withdraw it as it would remove any "vestige of respect" left for him.{{sfn|Alanbrooke|2001|pp=18, 19}}

[[File:The British Expeditionary Force (bef) in France 1939-1940 O812.jpg|thumb|right|Lieutenant-General Alan Brooke, GOC II Corps, with Major-General Bernard Montgomery, GOC 3rd Division, and Major-General [[Dudley Graham Johnson|Dudley Johnson]], GOC [[4th Infantry Division (United Kingdom)|4th Infantry Division]], pictured here in either 1939 or 1940]]

Although Montgomery's new command was a Regular Army formation, comprising the [[7th Infantry Brigade and Headquarters East|7th (Guards)]], and the [[8th Infantry Brigade (United Kingdom)|8th]] and 9th Infantry Brigades along with supporting units, he was not impressed with its readiness for battle.{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=39}} As a result, while most of the rest of the BEF set about preparing defences for an expected [[Wehrmacht|German]] attack sometime in the future, Montgomery began training his 3rd Division in [[Offensive (military)|offensive]] tactics, organising several [[Military exercise|exercise]]s, each of which lasted for several days at a time. Mostly they revolved around the division advancing towards an objective, often a river line, only to come under attack and forced to withdraw to another position, usually behind another river.{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=39}} These exercises usually occurred at night with only very minimal lighting being allowed. By the spring of 1940 Montgomery's division had gained a reputation of being a very agile and flexible formation.{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=39}} By then the [[Allies of World War II|Allies]] had agreed to [[French war planning 1920–1940|Plan D]], where they would advance deep into Belgium and take up positions on the [[Dyle (river)|River Dyle]] by the time the German forces attacked. Brooke, Montgomery's corps commander, was pessimistic about the plan but Montgomery, in contrast, was not concerned, believing that he and his division would perform well regardless of the circumstances, particularly in a [[Maneuver warfare|war of movement]].{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=39−40}}

====Battle of France====
{{See also|Battle of France|Battle of Dunkirk|Dunkirk evacuation}}

Montgomery's training paid off when the Germans began their [[Battle of France|invasion of the Low Countries]] on 10 May 1940 and the 3rd Division advanced to its planned position, near the Belgian city of [[Leuven|Louvain]]. Soon after arrival, the division was fired on by members of the Belgian 10th Infantry Division who mistook them for [[Fallschirmjäger|German paratroopers]]; Montgomery resolved the incident by approaching them and offering to place himself under Belgian command,<ref>{{cite book|last=Bond|first=Brian|title=Britain, France, and Belgium, 1939–1940|year=1990|publisher=Brassey's (UK)|page=44|isbn=978-0-08-037700-1}}</ref> although Montgomery himself took control when the Germans arrived.{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=39−40}} During this time he began to develop a particular habit, which he would keep throughout the war, of going to bed at 21:30 every night without fail and giving only a single order—that he was not to be disturbed—which was only very rarely disobeyed.{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=40}}

The 3rd Division saw comparatively little action but, owing to the strict training methods of Montgomery, the division always managed to be in the right place at the right time, especially so during the [[Battle of Dunkirk|retreat into France]].{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=40}} By 27 May, when the [[Belgian Land Component|Belgian Army]] on the left flank of the BEF began to disintegrate, the 3rd Division achieved something very difficult, the movement at night from the right to the left of another division and only 2,000 yards behind it. This was performed with great professionalism and occurred without any incidents and thereby filled a very vulnerable gap in the BEF's defensive line.<ref>{{cite book|last=Lord|first=Walter|title=The Miracle of Dunkirk|year=1999|publisher=The Viking Press|location=London|isbn=978-1-85326-685-0}}</ref>{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=40}} On 29/30 May, Montgomery temporarily took over from Brooke, who received orders to return to the United Kingdom, as GOC of II Corps for the final stages of the [[Dunkirk evacuation]].{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=40}}

The 3rd Division, temporarily commanded by [[Kenneth Anderson (British Army officer)|Kenneth Anderson]] in Montgomery's absence, returned to Britain intact with minimal casualties. Operation Dynamo—codename for the Dunkirk evacuation—saw 330,000 Allied military personnel, including most of the BEF, to Britain, although the BEF was forced to leave behind a significant amount of equipment.<ref name=heath216>{{harvnb|Heathcote|1999|p=216}}</ref>{{sfn|Mead|2015|p=40}}

===Service in the United Kingdom 1940−1942===
[[File:The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45 H8492.jpg|thumb|left|upright|Montgomery, GOC V Corps, with war correspondents during a large-scale exercise in Southern Command, March 1941]]

On his return Montgomery antagonised the War Office with trenchant criticisms of the command of the BEF<ref name="biermansmith"/> and was briefly relegated to divisional command of 3rd Division, which was the only fully equipped division in Britain.<ref name=memoirs64>The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, p. 64</ref> He was made a [[Companion of the Order of the Bath]].<ref name=cb/>

[[File:The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45 H8404.jpg|thumb|right|Montgomery inspecting men of the 7th Battalion, [[Suffolk Regiment]], at Sandbanks near [[Poole]], [[Dorset]], 22 March 1941. To his right, wearing a [[peaked cap]], is Brigadier [[Gerald Templer]], commanding the [[210th Independent Infantry Brigade (Home)|210th Brigade]], the 7th Suffolks' parent formation.]]

Montgomery was ordered to make ready the 3rd Division to invade the neutral Portuguese [[Azores]].<ref name=memoirs64/> Models of the islands were prepared and detailed plans worked out for the invasion.<ref name=memoirs64/> The invasion plans did not go ahead and plans switched to invading [[Cape Verde]] island also belonging to neutral Portugal.<ref name=memoirs65>The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, p. 65</ref> These invasion plans also did not go ahead. Montgomery was then ordered to prepare plans for the invasion of neutral Ireland and to seize [[Cork (city)|Cork]], [[Cobh]] and Cork harbour.<ref name=memoirs65/> These invasion plans, like those of the Portuguese islands, also did not go ahead and in July 1940, Montgomery was appointed acting lieutenant-general and after handing over command of his division to [[James Gammell]], he was placed in command of [[V Corps (United Kingdom)|V Corps]], responsible for the defence of [[Hampshire]] and [[Dorset]] and started a long-running feud with the new Commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of Southern Command, Lieutenant-General [[Claude Auchinleck]].<ref>{{London Gazette|issue=34909|page=4660|supp=y|date=26 July 1940}}</ref><ref name="biermansmith"/>

[[File:The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45 H14377.jpg|thumb|left|During Exercise 'Bumper' on 2 October 1941 Montgomery, the Chief Umpire, talks to General Sir Alan Brooke (C-in-C Home Forces).]]

In April 1941, he became commander of [[XII Corps (United Kingdom)|XII Corps]] responsible for the defence of [[Kent]].<ref name=heath216/> During this period he instituted a regime of continuous training and insisted on high levels of physical fitness for both officers and other ranks. He was ruthless in sacking officers he considered unfit for command in action.<ref name="Mead303">{{harvnb|Mead|2007|p=303}}</ref> Promoted to temporary lieutenant-general in July, overseeing the defence of Kent, [[Sussex]] and [[Surrey]].<ref name="Mead303"/><ref>{{London Gazette|issue=35224|page=4202|supp=y|date=22 July 1941}}</ref> In December Montgomery was given command of [[Aldershot Command|South-Eastern Command]].<ref>{{London Gazette|issue=35397|page=7369|date=26 December 1941|supp=y}}</ref> He renamed his command the South-Eastern Army to promote offensive spirit. During this time he further developed and rehearsed his ideas and trained his soldiers, culminating in [[Exercise Tiger (1942)|Exercise Tiger]] in May 1942, a combined forces exercise involving 100,000 troops.<ref>Stacey, Charles P. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966.<!-- ISBN, pages needed --></ref>

===North Africa and Italy===

====Montgomery's early command====
{{See also|North African campaign|Western Desert campaign|Tunisia campaign|Italian campaign (World War II)}}
[[File:Bernard Law Montgomery 1942.jpg|thumb|Montgomery in a [[M3 Lee|Grant]] tank in North Africa, November 1942]]

In 1942, a new field commander was required in the Middle East, where Auchinleck was fulfilling both the role of C-in-C of [[Middle East Command]] and commander [[Eighth Army (United Kingdom)|Eighth Army]]. He had stabilised the Allied position at the [[First Battle of El Alamein]], but after a visit in August 1942, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, replaced him as C-in-C with General [[Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis|Sir Harold Alexander]] and [[William Gott]] as commander of the Eighth Army in the [[Western Desert Campaign|Western Desert]]. However, after Gott was killed flying back to [[Cairo]], Churchill was persuaded by Brooke, who by this time was [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]] (CIGS), to appoint Montgomery, who had only just been nominated to replace Alexander, as commander of the [[First Army (United Kingdom)|British First Army]] for [[Operation Torch]], the invasion of [[French North Africa]].<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004c|pp=367–369}}</ref>

A story, probably apocryphal but popular at the time, is that the appointment caused Montgomery to remark that "After having an easy war, things have now got much more difficult." A colleague is supposed to have told him to cheer up—at which point Montgomery said "I'm not talking about me, I'm talking about [[Erwin Rommel|Rommel]]!"<ref>Churchill, p. 420. According to J. Toland, ''Battle: The Story of the Bulge'', 1959, p. 157, this conversation was with Churchill's chief military assistant, General [[Hastings Ismay, 1st Baron Ismay|Ismay]], beginning with Montgomery saying to Ismay, "It's a sad thing that a professional soldier can reach the peak of generalship and then suffer a reverse which ruins his career."</ref>

Montgomery's assumption of command transformed the fighting spirit and abilities of the Eighth Army.<ref name="Playfair370">{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004c|p=370}}</ref> Taking command on 13 August 1942, he immediately became a whirlwind of activity. He ordered the creation of the [[X Corps (United Kingdom)|X Corps]], which contained all armoured divisions, to fight alongside his [[XXX Corps (United Kingdom)|XXX Corps]], which was all infantry divisions. This arrangement differed from the German Panzer Corps: one of Rommel's Panzer Corps combined infantry, armour and artillery units under one corps commander. The only common commander for Montgomery's all-infantry and all-armour corps was the Eighth Army Commander himself. Writing post-war the English historian [[Correlli Barnett]] commented that Montgomery's solution "was in every way opposite to Auchinleck's and in every way wrong, for it carried the existing dangerous separatism still further."<ref>{{harvnb|Barnett|1983|p=281}}</ref> Montgomery reinforced the {{convert|30|mi|km}} long front line at El Alamein, something that would take two months to accomplish. He asked Alexander to send him two new British divisions ([[51st (Highland) Division|51st Highland]] and [[44th (Home Counties) Division|44th Home Counties]]) that were then arriving in Egypt and were scheduled to be deployed in defence of the Nile Delta. He moved his field HQ to Burg al Arab, close to the Air Force command post in order to better coordinate combined operations.<ref name="Playfair370"/>

Montgomery was determined that the army, navy and air forces should fight their battles in a unified, focused manner according to a detailed plan. He ordered immediate reinforcement of the vital heights of Alam Halfa, just behind his own lines, expecting the German commander, Erwin Rommel, to attack with the heights as his objective, something that Rommel soon did. Montgomery ordered all contingency plans for retreat to be destroyed. "I have cancelled the plan for withdrawal. If we are attacked, then there will be no retreat. If we cannot stay here alive, then we will stay here dead",<ref name="Moorehead118-127">{{harvnb|Moorehead|1973|pp=118–127}}</ref> he told his officers at the first meeting he held with them in the desert, though, in fact, Auchinleck had no plans to withdraw from the strong defensive position he had chosen and established at El Alamein.{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2012|p=461}}

[[File:The British Army in North Africa 1942 E15787.jpg|thumb|left|Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, the new commander of the British Eighth Army, and Lieutenant-General [[Brian Horrocks]], the new GOC XIII Corps, discussing troop dispositions at 22nd Armoured Brigade HQ, 20 August 1942. The brigade commander, Brigadier [[George Philip Bradley Roberts|George Roberts]] is on the right (in beret).]]

Montgomery made a great effort to appear before troops as often as possible, frequently visiting various units and making himself known to the men, often arranging for cigarettes to be distributed. Although he still wore a standard British officer's cap on arrival in the desert, he briefly wore an Australian [[slouch hat|broad-brimmed hat]] before switching to wearing the black beret (with the badge of the [[Royal Tank Regiment]] and the British General Officer's [[cap badge]]) for which he became notable. The black beret was offered to him by Jim Fraser while the latter was driving him on an inspection tour.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/27/jim-fraser-obituary|title=Jim Fraser obituary|newspaper=The Guardian|date=27 May 2013|access-date=28 May 2013}}</ref> Both Brooke and Alexander were astonished by the transformation in atmosphere when they visited on 19 August, less than a week after Montgomery had taken command.<ref name="Moorehead118-127"/>

Alan Brooke said that Churchill was always impatient for his generals to attack at once, and he wrote that Montgomery was always "my Monty" when Montgomery was out of favour with Churchill. [[Anthony Eden|Eden]] had some late night drinks with Churchill, and Eden said at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff the next day (29 October 1942) that the Middle East offensive was "petering out". Alanbrooke had told Churchill "fairly plainly" what he thought of Eden's ability to judge the tactical situation from a distance, and was supported at the Chiefs of Staff meeting by [[Jan Smuts|Smuts]].{{sfn|Alanbrooke|2001|pp=}}

====First battles with Rommel====
[[File:General Montgomery with his puppies "Hitler" and "Rommel" at his mobile headquarters in Normandy, 6 July 1944. Behind can be seen his cage of canaries which also travelled with him. B6542.jpg|thumbnail|right|General Montgomery with his pets, the puppies "Hitler" (left) and "Rommel", and a cage of canaries which also travelled with him (at Blay, his second HQ in France in July 1944)]]

Rommel attempted to turn the left flank of the Eighth Army at the [[Battle of Alam el Halfa]] from 31 August 1942. The German/Italian armoured corps infantry attack was stopped in very heavy fighting. Rommel's forces had to withdraw urgently lest their retreat through the British minefields be cut off.<ref>{{harvnb|Churchill|1986|pp=546–548}}</ref> Montgomery was criticised for not counter-attacking the retreating forces immediately, but he felt strongly that his methodical build-up of British forces was not yet ready. A hasty counter-attack risked ruining his strategy for an offensive on his own terms in late October, planning for which had begun soon after he took command.<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004c|p=388}}</ref> He was confirmed in the permanent rank of lieutenant-general in mid-October.<ref>{{London Gazette|issue=35746|page=4481|supp=y|date=13 October 1942}}</ref>

The conquest of Libya was essential for airfields to support [[Malta]] and to threaten the rear of Axis forces opposing Operation Torch. Montgomery prepared meticulously for the new offensive after convincing Churchill that the time was not being wasted. (Churchill sent a telegram to Alexander on 23 September 1942 which began, "We are in your hands and of course a victorious battle makes amends for much delay."<ref>{{harvnb|Churchill|1986|p=588}}</ref>) He was determined not to fight until he thought there had been sufficient preparation for a decisive victory, and put into action his beliefs with the gathering of resources, detailed planning, the training of troops—especially in clearing minefields and fighting at night<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004d|pp=13–14}}</ref>—and in the use of 252<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004d|p=9}}</ref> of the latest American-built [[Sherman tank]]s, 90 [[M7 Priest]] self-propelled howitzers, and making a personal visit to every unit involved in the offensive. By the time the offensive was ready in late October, Eighth Army had 231,000 men on its ration strength.<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004d|p=16}}</ref>

====El Alamein====
[[File:El Alamein 1942 - British infantry.jpg|thumb|left|Men of the [[9th Division (Australia)|9th Australian Division]] in a posed photograph during the [[Second Battle of El Alamein]]]]<!-- Do not confuse this photo (E 18474) with another (E 18908). -->

The [[Second Battle of El Alamein]] began on 23 October 1942, and ended 12 days later with one of the first large-scale, decisive Allied land victories of the war. Montgomery correctly predicted both the length of the battle and the number of casualties (13,500).<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004d|p=78}}</ref>

Historian Correlli Barnett has pointed out that the rain also fell on the Germans, and that the weather is therefore an inadequate explanation for the failure to exploit the breakthrough,<ref>{{harvnb|Barnett|1983|p=290}}</ref> but nevertheless the Battle of El Alamein had been a great success. Over 30,000 [[Prisoner of war|prisoners of war]] were taken,<ref>{{harvnb|Playfair|Flynn|Molony|Gleave|2004d|p=79}}</ref> including the German second-in-command, [[Ritter von Thoma|General von Thoma]], as well as eight other general officers.<ref>{{harvnb|Moorehead|1973|pp=140–41}}</ref>

====Tunisia====
[[File:The Campaign in North Africa 1940-1943- Personalities E22271.jpg|thumb|right|The British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] with military leaders during his visit to Tripoli. The group includes: Lieutenant-General [[Oliver Leese|Sir Oliver Leese]], General [[Harold Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis|Sir Harold Alexander]], General [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Sir Alan Brooke]] and General Sir Bernard Montgomery.]]

Montgomery was advanced to [[Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath|KCB]] and promoted to full general.<ref name="KCB+Gen"/> He kept the initiative, applying superior strength when it suited him, forcing Rommel out of each successive defensive position. On 6 March 1943, Rommel's attack on the over-extended Eighth Army at [[Medenine]] ([[Operation Capri]]) with the largest concentration of German armour in North Africa was successfully repulsed.<ref>Stout (1956), [https://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Medi-c11-3.html Chapter 11 – Tunisia. The Battle of Medenine]</ref> At the [[Mareth Line]], 20 to 27 March, when Montgomery encountered fiercer frontal opposition than he had anticipated, he switched his major effort into an outflanking inland pincer, backed by low-flying [[Royal Air Force|RAF]] fighter-bomber support.<ref name=odnb>{{cite ODNB|url=http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/31460?docPos=1|title=Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein|access-date=1 July 2012|doi=10.1093/ref:odnb/31460|year=2004}}</ref> For his role in North Africa he was awarded the [[Legion of Merit]] by the United States government in the rank of Chief Commander.<ref name="LM"/>

====Sicily====
[[File:Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.,.jpg|thumb|left|Montgomery visits Patton in Palermo, Sicily, July 1943.]]

The next major Allied attack was the [[Allied invasion of Sicily]] (Operation Husky). Montgomery considered the initial plans for the Allied invasion, which had been agreed in principle by [[General (United States)|General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the [[Supreme Allied Commander]] [[Allied Forces Headquarters]], and General Alexander, the [[15th Army Group]] commander, to be unworkable because of the dispersion of effort. He managed to have the plans recast to concentrate the Allied forces, having [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[George S. Patton|George Patton]]'s [[Seventh United States Army|US Seventh Army]] land in the Gulf of Gela (on the Eighth Army's left flank, which landed around [[Syracuse, Sicily|Syracuse]] in the south-east of Sicily) rather than near [[Palermo]] in the west and north of Sicily.<ref>{{harvnb|Mead|2007|p=306}}</ref> Inter-Allied tensions grew as the American commanders, Patton and [[Omar Bradley]] (then commanding [[II Corps (United States)|US II Corps]] under Patton), took umbrage at what they saw as Montgomery's attitudes and boastfulness.<ref name=odnb/> However, while they were considered three of the greatest soldiers of their time, due to their competitiveness they were renowned for "squabbling like three schoolgirls" thanks to their "bitchiness", "whining to their superiors" and "showing off".<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Roberts|first=Andrew|title=Generals at War|url=https://www.weeklystandard.com/andrew-roberts/generals-at-war|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181025070930/https://www.weeklystandard.com/andrew-roberts/generals-at-war|url-status=dead|archive-date=25 October 2018|date=30 May 2005|magazine=Weekly Standard|access-date=25 October 2018}}</ref>

====Italy====
[[File:Montgomery E010786478-v8.jpg|thumb|right|upright|Wartime photograph of General Montgomery with his [[Miles Messenger]] aircraft (location and date unknown)]]

[[File:The Campaign in Italy, September-december 1943- the Allied Advance To the Gustav Line- Personalities NA10338.jpg|thumb|left|From left to right: [[Freddie de Guingand]], [[Harry Broadhurst]], Montgomery, [[Bernard Freyberg, 1st Baron Freyberg|Sir Bernard Freyberg]], [[Miles Dempsey]] and [[Charles Walter Allfrey|Charles Allfrey]]]]

Montgomery's Eighth Army was then fully involved in the [[Allied invasion of Italy]] in early September 1943, becoming the first of the Allied forces to land in [[Western Europe]].{{sfn|Mead|2007|p=306}} Led by Lieutenant General Sir [[Miles Dempsey]]'s XIII Corps, the Eighth Army landed on the toe of Italy in [[Operation Baytown]] on 3 September, four years to the day after Britain declared war on Germany. They encountered little enemy resistance.<ref name=heath217>{{harvnb|Heathcote|1999|p=217}}</ref> The Germans had made the decision to fall back and did what they could to stall the Eighth Army's advance, including blowing up bridges, laying mines, and setting up booby-traps. All of these slowed the Army's advance north on the awful [[Italian roads]], although it was Montgomery who was later much criticised for the lack of progress.{{sfn|Mead|2007|p=306}} On 9 September the [[1st Airborne Division (United Kingdom)|British 1st Airborne Division]] landed at the key port of [[Taranto]] in the heel of Italy as part of [[Operation Slapstick]], capturing the port unopposed.<ref name=heath217/> On the same day the [[United States Army North|U.S. Fifth Army]] under Lieutenant General [[Mark W. Clark]] (which actually contained a large number of British troops) landed at [[Salerno]], near [[Naples]], as part of [[Operation Avalanche]] but soon found itself fighting for its very existence with the Germans launching several determined counterattacks to try and push the Allies back into the sea, with Montgomery's men being too far away to provide any real assistance.{{sfn|Mead|2007|p=306}} The situation was tense over the next few days but the two armies (both of which formed the 15th Army Group under General Alexander) finally began to meet on 16 September, by which time the crisis at Salerno was virtually over.{{sfn|Mead|2007|p=306}}

[[File:Speech by Montgomery to 21st Army corp.jpg|thumb|upright|The time has come to deal the enemy a terrific blow ...]]

Clark's Fifth Army then began to advance to the west of the [[Apennine Mountains]] while Montgomery, with Lieutenant General [[Charles Walter Allfrey|Charles Allfrey]]'s V Corps having arrived to reinforce Dempsey's XIII Corps, advanced to the east. The [[Foggia Airfield Complex|Foggia airfields]] soon fell to Allfrey's V Corps, but the Germans fought hard in the defence of [[Termoli]] and [[Biferno]].{{sfn|Mead|2007|p=306}} Movement soon came to an almost complete halt in the early part of November when the Eighth Army came up against a new defensive line established by the Germans on the [[Sangro|River Sangro]], which was to be the scene of much bitter and heavy fighting  for the next month. While some ground was gained, it was often at the expense of heavy casualties and the Germans always managed to retreat to new defensive positions.{{sfn|Mead|2007|p=306}}

Montgomery abhorred what he considered to be a lack of coordination, a dispersion of effort, a strategic muddle and a lack of opportunism in the [[Italian campaign (World War II)|Allied campaign in Italy]], describing the whole affair as a "dog's breakfast".<ref name=odnb/>

=== Return to France ===

==== Normandy ====
{{See also|Operation Overlord}}

[[File:Simonds.jpg|left|thumb|Montgomery with officers of the [[First Canadian Army]]. From left, [[Major general|Major-General]] [[Christopher Vokes|Vokes]], General [[Harry Crerar|Crerar]], [[Field marshal (United Kingdom)|Field Marshal]] Montgomery, [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Brian Horrocks|Horrocks]], [[Lieutenant-general (Canada)|Lieutenant-General]] [[Guy Simonds|Simonds]], Major-General Spry, and Major-General [[Bruce Matthews (Canadian Army officer)|Matthews]]]]

As a result of his dissatisfaction with Italy, he was delighted to receive the news that he was to return to Britain in January 1944.<ref>{{harvnb|Hart|2007|p=8}}</ref> He was assigned to command the [[21st Army Group]] consisting of all Allied ground forces participating in [[Operation Overlord]], codename for the Allied invasion of [[Normandy]]. Overall direction was assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, American General Dwight D. Eisenhower.<ref name=heath217 /> Both Churchill and Eisenhower had found Montgomery difficult to work with in the past and wanted the position to go to the more affable General Sir Harold Alexander.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56">{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|p=56}}</ref> However Montgomery's patron, General Sir Alan Brooke, firmly argued that Montgomery was a much superior general to Alexander and ensured his appointment.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56" /> Without Brooke's support, Montgomery would have remained in Italy.<ref name="Keegan, 1994 p. 56" /> At St Paul's School on 7 April and 15 May Montgomery presented his strategy for the invasion. He envisaged a ninety-day battle, with all forces reaching the [[Seine]]. The campaign would pivot on an Allied-held [[Caen]] in the east of the Normandy bridgehead, with relatively static British and Canadian armies forming a shoulder to attract and defeat German counter-attacks, relieving the US armies who would move and seize the [[Cotentin Peninsula]] and [[Brittany]], wheeling south and then east on the right forming a pincer.<ref name=odnb />

[[File:The British Army in the United Kingdom 1939-45 H35960.jpg|thumb|right|General Montgomery inspects men of the 5th/7th Battalion, [[Gordon Highlanders]] of the [[51st (Highland) Division]], at Beaconsfield, February 1944.]]

During the ten weeks of the [[Invasion of Normandy|Battle of Normandy]], unfavourable autumnal weather conditions disrupted the Normandy landing areas.<ref name=odnb /> Montgomery's initial plan was for the Anglo-Canadian troops under his command to break out immediately from their beachheads on the Calvados coast towards Caen with the aim of taking the city on either D Day or two days later.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|pp=455–471}}</ref> Montgomery attempted to take Caen with the 3rd Infantry Division, the [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division]] and the 3rd Canadian Division, but was stopped from 6–8 June by the [[21st Panzer Division]] and [[12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend|12th SS Panzer Division ''Hitlerjugend'']], who hit the advancing Anglo-Canadian troops very hard.<ref name=badsey43>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=43}}</ref> The 12th Waffen SS Division ''Hitlerjugend'', as its name implies, was drawn entirely from the more fanatical elements of the [[Hitler Youth]], and commanded by the ruthless SS-''[[Brigadeführer]]'' [[Kurt Meyer]], aka "Panzer Meyer".<ref>{{harvnb|English|2014|p=51}}</ref> Rommel followed up this success by ordering the [[2nd Panzer Division]] to Caen while Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]] received permission from Hitler to have the elite [[1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler|1st SS Panzer Division ''Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler'']] and [[2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich|2nd SS Panzer Division ''Das Reich'']] sent to Caen as well.<ref name=badsey43 /> Montgomery thus had to face what Stephen Badsey called the "most formidable" of all the German divisions in France.<ref name=badsey43 />

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B5179.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|right|General Montgomery passes German POWs while being driven along a road in a jeep, shortly after arriving in Normandy, 8 June 1944. Two seem to have recognised him.]]

The failure to take Caen immediately has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with bitter nationalist overtones.<ref name="Powers pages 455-471">{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=471}}</ref> Broadly, there has been a "British school" which accepts Montgomery's post-war claim that he never intended to take Caen at once, and instead the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen were a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector to allow the Americans to stage the "break out operation" on the left flank of the German positions, which was all part of Montgomery's "Master Plan" that he had conceived long before the Normandy campaign.<ref name="Powers pages 455-471" /> By contrast, the "American school" argued that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was for the 21st Army Group to take Caen at once and move his tank divisions into the plains south of Caen, to then stage a breakout that would lead the 21st Army Group into the plains of northern France and hence into [[Antwerp]] and finally the [[Ruhr]].<ref>Powers, pp. 458, 471.</ref> Letters written by Eisenhower at the time of the battle make it clear that Eisenhower was expecting from Montgomery "the early capture of the important focal point of Caen". Later, when this plan had clearly failed, Eisenhower wrote that Montgomery had "evolved" the plan to have the US forces achieve the break-out instead.<ref>{{harvnb|Carafano|2008|p=22}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B5787.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery in conversation with Major-General [[Douglas Graham (British Army officer)|Douglas Graham]], GOC [[50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division]], pictured here in Normandy, 20 June 1944]]

As the campaign progressed, Montgomery altered his initial plan for the invasion and continued the strategy of attracting and holding German counter-attacks in the area north of Caen rather than to the south, to allow the U.S. First Army in the west to take [[Cherbourg]]. A memo summarising Montgomery's operations written by Eisenhower's chief of staff, General [[Walter Bedell Smith]] who met with Montgomery in late June 1944 says nothing about Montgomery conducting a "holding operation" in the Caen sector, and instead speaks of him seeking a "breakout" into the plains south of the Seine.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=461}}</ref> On 12 June, Montgomery ordered the 7th Armoured Division into an attack against the [[Panzer Lehr Division]] that made good progress at first, but ended when the Panzer Lehr was joined by the 2nd Panzer Division.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 44">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=44}}</ref> At the [[Battle of Villers-Bocage]] on 13 June, the British lost twenty [[Cromwell tank|Cromwell]] tanks to five [[Tiger I|Tiger]] tanks led by [[SS]] ''[[Obersturmführer]]'' [[Michael Wittmann]], in about five minutes.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 44" /><!--no mention of the counter-ambushes in the town or the Battle of the Box or the depletion of the 101st SS heavy tank battalion from 44 to 16 operational Tigers?--> Despite the setback at Villers Bocage, Montgomery was still optimistic as the Allies were landing more troops and supplies than they were losing in battle, and though the German lines were holding, the ''[[Wehrmacht]]'' and ''[[Waffen SS]]'' were suffering considerable attrition.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=45}}</ref> [[Air Chief Marshal]] [[Arthur Tedder, 1st Baron Tedder|Sir Arthur Tedder]] complained that it was impossible to move fighter squadrons to France until Montgomery had captured some airfields, something he asserted that Montgomery appeared incapable of doing.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=47}}</ref> The first [[V-1 flying bomb]] attacks on London, which started on 13 June, further increased the pressure on Montgomery from Whitehall to speed up his advance.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47" />

[[File:The British Army in the Normandy Campaign 1944 B5634.jpg|thumb|right|[[George VI|The King]] with Lieutenant-General [[Miles Dempsey]], GOC British Second Army, and General Montgomery, at his HQ in {{ill|Creullet castle|fr|Château de Creullet}}, 16 June 1944]]

On 18 June, Montgomery ordered Bradley to take Cherbourg while the British were to take Caen by 23 June.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 47" /> In Operation Epsom, the British VII Corps commanded by Sir Richard O'Connor attempted to outflank Caen from the west by breaking through the dividing line between the Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS to take the strategic Hill 112.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=48}}</ref> Epsom began well with O'Connor's assault force (the British 15th Scottish Division) breaking through and with the 11th Armoured Division stopping the counter-attacks of the 12th SS Division.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> General [[Friedrich Dollmann]] of Seventh Army had to commit the newly arrived II SS Corps to stop the British offensive.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> Dollmann, fearing that Epsom would be a success, committed suicide and was replaced by SS ''Oberstegruppenführer'' [[Paul Hausser]]. O'Connor, at the cost of about 4,000 men, had won a salient only {{convert|5|mi|km}} deep and {{convert|2|mi|km}} wide, but placed the Germans in an unviable long-term position.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> There was a strong sense of crisis in the Allied command, as the Allies had advanced only about {{convert|15|mi|km}} inland, at a time when their plans called for them to have already taken [[Rennes]], [[Alençon]] and [[St. Malo]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 48" /> After Epsom, Montgomery had to tell General [[Harry Crerar]] that the activation of the First Canadian Army would have to wait as there was only room at present, in the Caen sector, for the newly arrived XII Corps under Lieutenant-General [[Neil Ritchie]], which caused some tension with Crerar, who was anxious to get into the field.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=247}} Epsom had forced further German forces into Caen but all through June and the first half of July Rommel, Rundstedt, and Hitler were engaged in planning for a great offensive to drive the British into the sea; it was never launched and would have required the commitment of a large number of German forces to the Caen sector.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=246}}

It was only after several failed attempts to break out in the Caen sector that Montgomery devised what he later called his "master plan" of having the 21st Army Group hold the bulk of the German forces, thus allowing the Americans to break out.{{sfn|Copp|2004|p=84}} The Canadian historians [[Terry Copp]] and Robert Vogel wrote about the dispute between the "American school" and "British school" after having suffered several setbacks in June 1944:

{{Blockquote|Montgomery drew what was the indisputably correct conclusion from these events. If the British and Canadians could continue to hold the bulk of the German armoured divisions on their front through a series of limited attacks, they could wear down the Germans and create the conditions for an American breakout on the right.

This is what Montgomery proposed in his Directive of June 30th and, if he and his admirers had let the record speak for itself, there would be little debate about his conduct of the first stages of the Normandy campaign. Instead, Montgomery insisted that this Directive was a consistent part of a master plan that he had devised long before the invasion. Curiously, this view does a great disservice to 'Monty' for any rigid planning of operations before the German response was known would have been bad generalship indeed!"{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1983|p=86}}}}

Hampered by stormy weather and the [[bocage]] terrain, Montgomery had to ensure that Rommel focused on the British in the east rather than the Americans in the west, who had to take the Cotentin Peninsula and Brittany before the Germans could be trapped by a general swing east.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=458}}</ref> Montgomery told General Sir Miles Dempsey, the commander of Second British Army: "Go on hitting, drawing the German strength, especially some of the armour, onto yourself—so as to ease the way for Brad [Bradley]."<ref name="Urban, p. 283">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=283}}</ref> The Germans had deployed twelve divisions, of which six were Panzer divisions, against the British while deploying eight divisions, of which three were Panzer divisions, against the Americans.<ref name="Urban, p. 283" /> By the middle of July Caen had not been taken, as Rommel continued to prioritise prevention of the break-out by British forces rather than the western territories being taken by the Americans.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=53–56}}</ref> This was broadly as Montgomery had planned, albeit not with the same speed as he outlined at St Paul's, although as the American historian Carlo D'Este pointed out the actual situation in Normandy was "vastly different" from what was envisioned at the St. Paul's conference, as only one of four goals outlined in May had been achieved by 10 July.{{sfn|D'Este|1983|pp=322–323}}

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B7767.jpg|left|thumb|Prime Minister Churchill with General Montgomery at the latter's HQ in Normandy, July 1944]]

On 7 July, Montgomery began Operation Charnwood with a [[carpet bombing]] offensive that turned much of the French countryside and the city of Caen into a wasteland.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 53">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=53}}</ref> The British and Canadians succeeded in advancing into northern Caen before the Germans, who used the ruins to their advantage and stopped the offensive.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=53–54}}</ref> On 10 July, Montgomery ordered Bradley to take Avranches, after which U.S. Third Army would be activated to drive towards Le Mans and Alençon.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 56">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=56}}</ref> On 14 July 1944, Montgomery wrote to his patron Brooke, saying he had chosen on a "real show down on the eastern flanks, and to loose a Corps of three armoured divisions in the open country about the Caen-Falaise road&nbsp;... The possibilities are immense; with seven hundred tanks loosed to the South-east of Caen, and the armoured cars operating far ahead, anything can happen."<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|2004|p=689}}</ref> The [[French Resistance#Role in the liberation of France and casualties|French Resistance had launched Plan Violet]] in June 1944 to systematically destroy the telephone system of France, which forced the Germans to use their radios more and more to communicate, and as the code-breakers of Bletchley Park had broken many of the German codes, Montgomery had, thanks to "[[Ultra (cryptography)|Ultra]]" intelligence, a good idea of the German situation.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=72}}</ref> Montgomery thus knew German Army Group B had lost 96,400 men while receiving 5,200 replacements and the Panzer Lehr Division now based at St. Lô was down to only 40 tanks.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 56" /> Montgomery later wrote that he knew he had the Normandy campaign won at this point as the Germans had almost no reserves while he had three armoured divisions in reserve.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=57}}</ref>

An American break-out was achieved with [[Operation Cobra]] and the encirclement of German forces in the [[Falaise pocket]] at the cost of British losses with the diversionary [[Operation Goodwood]].{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=202}} On the early morning of 18 July 1944, Operation Goodwood began with British heavy bombers beginning carpet bombing attacks that further devastated what was left of Caen and the surrounding countryside.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=285–286}}</ref> A British tank crewman from the Guards Armoured Division later recalled: "At 0500 hours a distant thunder in the air brought all the sleepy-eyed tank crews out of their blankets. 1,000 Lancasters were flying from the sea in groups of three or four at {{convert|3000|ft|m}}. Ahead of them the pathfinders were scattering their flares and before long the first bombs were dropping."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=281}}</ref> A German tankman from the 21st Panzer Division at the receiving end of this bombardment remembered: "We saw little dots detach themselves from the planes, so many of them that the crazy thought occurred to us: are those leaflets?&nbsp;... Among the thunder of the explosions, we could hear the wounded scream and the insane howling of men who had [been] driven mad."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=282}}</ref> The British bombing had badly smashed the German front-line units. Initially, the three British armoured divisions assigned to lead the offensive, the 7th, 11th and the Guards, made rapid progress and were soon approaching the Borguebus ridge, which dominated the landscape south of Caen, by noon.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=282–283}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in Normandy 1944 B6934.jpg|thumb|right|General Montgomery stops his car to chat with troops during a tour of I Corps area near Caen, 11 July 1944.]]

If the British could take the Borguebus Ridge, the way to the plains of northern France would be wide open, and potentially Paris could be taken, which explains the ferocity with which the Germans defended the ridge. One German officer, Lieutenant Baron von Rosen, recalled that to motivate a Luftwaffe officer commanding a battery of four 88&nbsp;mm guns to fight against the British tanks, he had to hold his handgun to the officer's head "and asked him whether he would like to be killed immediately or get a high decoration. He decided for the latter."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=283–284}}</ref> The well dug-in 88&nbsp;mm guns around the Borguebus Ridge began taking a toll on the British Sherman tanks, and the countryside was soon dotted with dozens of burning Shermans.<ref name="Urban, p. 284">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=284}}</ref> One British officer reported with worry: "I see palls of smoke and tanks brewing up with flames belching forth from their turrets. I see men climbing out, on fire like torches, rolling on the ground to try and douse the flames."<ref name="Urban, p. 284" /> Despite Montgomery's orders to try to press on, fierce German counter-attacks stopped the British offensive.<ref name="Urban, p. 284" />

The objectives of Operation Goodwood were all achieved except the complete capture of the Bourgebus Ridge, which was only partially taken. The operation was a strategic Allied success in drawing in the last German reserves in Normandy towards the Caen sector away from the American sector, greatly assisting the American breakout in Operation Cobra. By the end of Goodwood on 25 July 1944, the Canadians had finally taken Caen while the British tanks had reached the plains south of Caen, giving Montgomery the "hinge" he had been seeking, while forcing the Germans to commit the last of their reserves to stop the Anglo-Canadian offensive.<ref name="Urban, p. 285">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=285}}</ref> "Ultra" decrypts indicated that the Germans now facing Bradley were seriously understrength, with Operation Cobra about to commence.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|p=75}}</ref> During Operation Goodwood, the British had 400 tanks knocked out, with many recovered returning to service. The casualties were 5,500 with {{convert|7|mi|km}} of ground gained.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Bradley recognised Montgomery's plan to pin down German armour and allow U.S. forces to break out:

{{Blockquote|The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we [the Americans] were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|p=72}}</ref>}}

The long-running dispute over what Montgomery's "master plan" in Normandy led historians to differ greatly about the purpose of Goodwood. The British journalist [[Mark Urban]] wrote that the purpose of Goodwood was to draw German troops to their left flank to allow the American forces to break out on the right flank, arguing that Montgomery had to lie to his soldiers about the purpose of Goodwood, as the average British soldier would not have understood why they were being asked to create a diversion to allow the Americans to have the glory of staging the breakout with Operation Cobra.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> By contrast, the American historian Stephen Power argued that Goodwood was intended to be the "breakout" offensive and not a "holding operation", writing: "It is unrealistic to assert that an operation which called for the use of 4,500 Allied aircraft, 700 artillery pieces and over 8,000 armored vehicles and trucks and that cost the British over 5,500 casualties was conceived and executed for so limited an objective."<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|pp=462–463}}</ref> Power noted that Goodwood and Cobra were supposed to take effect on the same day, 18 July 1944, but Cobra was cancelled owing to heavy rain in the American sector, and argued that both operations were meant to be breakout operations to trap the German armies in Normandy. American military writer Drew Middleton wrote that there is no doubt that Montgomery wanted Goodwood to provide a "shield" for Bradley, but at the same time Montgomery was clearly hoping for more than merely diverting German attention away from the American sector.<ref>{{cite news |last=Middleton |first=Drew |title=Mistake in the Master Plan |newspaper=The New York Times |date=22 January 1984 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/22/books/mistake-in-the-master-plan.html |access-date=6 June 2016}}</ref>{{sfn|D'Este|1983|p=396}} British historian [[John Keegan]] pointed out that Montgomery made differing statements before Goodwood about the purpose of the operation.<ref>{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|pp=191–192}}</ref> Keegan wrote that Montgomery engaged in what he called a "hedging of his bets" when drafting his plans for Goodwood, with a plan for a "break out if the front collapsed, if not, sound documentary evidence that all he had intended in the first place was a battle of attrition".<ref>{{harvnb|Keegan|1994|p=192}}</ref> Again Bradley confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical. The American magazine ''LIFE'' quoted Bradley in 1951:
{{Blockquote|While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.

While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasising the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure.<ref>''Life'' magazine, 16 April 1951, p. 99.</ref>}} With Goodwood drawing the Wehrmacht towards the British sector, U.S. First Army enjoyed a two-to-one numerical superiority. Bradley accepted Montgomery's advice to begin the offensive by concentrating at one point instead of a "broad front" as Eisenhower would have preferred.<ref name="Urban, p. 288">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=288}}</ref>

Operation Goodwood almost cost Montgomery his job, as Eisenhower seriously considered sacking him and only chose not to do so because to sack the popular "Monty" would have caused such a political backlash in Britain against the Americans at a critical moment in the war that the resulting strains in the Atlantic alliance were not considered worth it.<ref>{{harvnb|Powers|1992|p=469}}</ref> Montgomery expressed his satisfaction at the results of Goodwood when calling the operation off. Eisenhower was under the impression that Goodwood was to be a break-out operation. Either there was a miscommunication between the two men or Eisenhower did not understand the strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Lehrman|2016|p=146}}</ref> Bradley fully understood Montgomery's intentions. Both men would not give away to the press the true intentions of their strategy.<ref>{{harvnb|Baxter|1999|pp=74–75}}</ref>

[[File:General Montgomery with Generals Patton (left) and Bradley (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, Normandy, 7 July 1944. B6551.jpg|thumb|left|General Montgomery with Lieutenant Generals [[George S. Patton]] (left) and [[Omar Bradley]] (centre) at 21st Army Group HQ, 7 July 1944]]

Many American officers had found Montgomery a difficult man to work with, and after Goodwood, pressured Eisenhower to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Although the Eisenhower–Montgomery dispute is sometimes depicted in nationalist terms as being an Anglo-American struggle, it was the British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder who was pressing Eisenhower most strongly after Goodwood to fire Montgomery.<ref>{{harvnb|Weinberg|2004|p=690}}</ref> An American officer wrote in his diary that Tedder had come to see Eisenhower to "pursue his current favourite subject, the sacking of Monty".<ref name="Urban, p. 287">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=287}}</ref> With Tedder leading the "sack Monty" campaign, it encouraged Montgomery's American enemies to press Eisenhower to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> Brooke was sufficiently worried about the "sack Monty" campaign to visit Montgomery at his Tactical Headquarters (TAC) in France and as he wrote in his diary; "warned [Montgomery] of a tendency in the PM [Churchill] to listen to suggestions that Monty played for safety and was not prepared to take risks".<ref name="Urban, p. 285" /> Brooke advised Montgomery to invite Churchill to Normandy, arguing that if the "sack Monty" campaign had won the Prime Minister over, then his career would be over, as having Churchill's backing would give Eisenhower the political "cover" to fire Montgomery.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> On 20 July, Montgomery met Eisenhower and on 21 July, Churchill, at the TAC in France.<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> One of Montgomery's staff officers wrote afterwards that it was "common knowledge at Tac that Churchill had come to sack Monty".<ref name="Urban, p. 287" /> No notes were taken at the Eisenhower–Montgomery and Churchill–Montgomery meetings, but Montgomery was able to persuade both men not to sack him.<ref name="Urban, p. 288" />

With the success of Cobra, which was soon followed by unleashing Patton's Third Army, Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery: "Am delighted that your basic plan has begun brilliantly to unfold with Bradley's initial success."<ref name="Urban, p. 289">{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=289}}</ref> The success of Cobra was aided by Operation Spring, when the II Canadian Corps under General [[Guy Simonds]] (the only Canadian general whose skill Montgomery respected) began an offensive south of Caen that made little headway, but which the Germans regarded as the main offensive.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=69}}</ref> Once Third Army arrived, Bradley was promoted to take command of the newly created 12th Army Group, consisting of U.S. First and Third Armies. Following the American breakout, there followed the Battle of Falaise Gap. British, Canadian, and Polish soldiers of 21st Army Group commanded by Montgomery advanced south, while the American and French soldiers of Bradley's 12th Army Group advanced north to encircle the German Army Group B at Falaise, as Montgomery waged what Urban called "a huge battle of annihilation" in August 1944.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Montgomery began his offensive into the ''Suisse Normande'' region with [[Operation Bluecoat]], with Sir Richard O'Connor's VIII Corps and [[Gerard Bucknall]]'s XXX Corps heading south.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=73}}</ref> A dissatisfied Montgomery sacked Bucknall for being insufficiently aggressive and replaced him with General [[Brian Horrocks]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73" /> At the same time, Montgomery ordered Patton—whose Third Army was supposed to advance into Brittany—to instead capture [[Nantes]], which was soon taken.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 73" />

Hitler waited too long to order his soldiers to retreat from Normandy, leading Montgomery to write: "He [Hitler] refused to face the only sound military course. As a result the Allies caused the enemy staggering losses in men and materials."<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Knowing via "Ultra" that Hitler was not planning to retreat from Normandy, Montgomery, on 6 August 1944, ordered an envelopment operation against Army Group B—with the First Canadian Army under Harry Crerar to advance towards Falaise, British Second Army under Miles Dempsey to advance towards [[Argentan]], and Patton's Third Army to advance to [[Alençon]].<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 77">{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=77}}</ref> On 11 August, Montgomery changed his plan, with the Canadians to take Falaise and to meet the Americans at Argentan.<ref name="Badsey, 1990 p. 77" /> The First Canadian Army launched two operations, Operation Totalize on 7 August, which advanced only {{convert|9|mi|km}} in four days in the face of fierce German resistance, and Operation Tractable on 14 August, which finally took Falaise on 17 August.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|pp=79–80}}</ref> In view of the slow Canadian advance, Patton requested permission to take Falaise, but was refused by Bradley on 13 August. This prompted much controversy, many historians arguing that Bradley lacked aggression and that Montgomery should have overruled Bradley.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=80}}</ref>

The so-called [[Falaise pocket|Falaise Gap]] was closed on 22 August 1944, but several American generals, most notably Patton, accused Montgomery of being insufficiently aggressive in closing it. About 60,000 German soldiers were trapped in Normandy, but before 22 August, about 20,000 Germans had escaped through the Falaise Gap.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> About 10,000 Germans had been killed in the Battle of the Falaise Gap, which led a stunned Eisenhower, who viewed the battlefield on 24 August, to comment with horror that it was impossible to walk without stepping on corpses.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=84}}</ref> The successful conclusion of the Normandy campaign saw the beginning of the debate between the "American school" and "British school" as both American and British generals started to advance claims about who was most responsible for this victory.<ref name="Urban, p. 289" /> Brooke wrote in defence of his protégé Montgomery: "Ike knows nothing about strategy and is 'quite' unsuited to the post of Supreme Commander. It is no wonder that Monty's real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when 'national' spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape."<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|pp=289–290}}</ref> About Montgomery's conduct of the Normandy campaign, Badsey wrote:

{{Blockquote|Too much discussion on Normandy has centered on the controversial decisions of the Allied commanders. It was not good enough, apparently, to win such a complete and spectacular victory over an enemy that had conquered most of Europe unless it was done perfectly. Most of the blame for this lies with Montgomery, who was foolish enough to insist that it ''had'' been done perfectly, that Normandy—and all his other battles—had been fought accordingly to a precise master plan drawn up beforehand, from which he never deviated. It says much for his personality that Montgomery found others to agree with him, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. His handling of the Battle of Normandy was of a very high order, and as the person who would certainly have been blamed for losing the battle, he deserves the credit for winning it.<ref>{{harvnb|Badsey|1990|p=87}}</ref>}}

==== Replaced as Ground Forces Commander ====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-14059-0018, Berlin, Oberbefehlshaber der vier Verbündeten.jpg|thumb|right|The Supreme Commanders on 5 June 1945 in Berlin: Bernard Montgomery, [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[Georgy Zhukov]] and [[Jean de Lattre de Tassigny]]]]
Eisenhower took over Ground Forces Command on 1 September, while continuing as Supreme Commander, with Montgomery continuing to command the 21st Army Group, now consisting mainly of British and Canadian units. Montgomery vehemently opposed this change, although it had been agreed before the D-Day invasion,<ref name="weigley">{{cite book|author=Weigley, Russell F. |author-link=Russell Weigley |title=Eisenhower's Lieutenants |publisher=[[Indiana University Press]] |location=Bloomington, IN |year=1981 |page=253 |isbn=978-0-253-13333-5}}</ref> instead proposing that either he or Bradley should remain in the job of Ground Forces command. He argued that the two roles were fundamentally different and that Eisenhower possessed the skillset for the former but not the latter; as such, he was liable to neglect the duties of one or the other, rendering the force off-balance. Instead, there was a need for a single decisive master plan under a leader free from the more administrative and political duties of the Supreme Commander - Montgomery felt he was the best equipped to deliver this, but was clear that he would also have been willing to work under Bradley.{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=267-268}}

Eisenhower and many others failed to grasp this however, and would misinterpret this as Montgomery's pride being wounded at having command removed. As such, they would attempt to placate him by reassuring him of the areas remaining under his command,{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=267-287}} and Winston Churchill had Montgomery promoted to Field Marshal<ref>{{London Gazette|issue=36680|page=4055|supp=y|date=29 August 1944}}</ref> by way of compensation.<ref name="weigley"/> In addition, the British journalist Mark Urban points out that Montgomery seemed unable to grasp however that as the majority of the 2.2&nbsp;million Allied soldiers fighting against Germany on the Western Front were now American (the ratio was 3''':'''1) that it was politically unacceptable to American public opinion to have Montgomery remain as Land Forces Commander as: "Politics would not allow him to carry on giving orders to great armies of Americans simply because, in his view, [he was the best man for the job]".<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=290}}</ref>

==== Advance to the Rhine ====
By September, ports like [[Cherbourg]] were too far away from the front line, causing the Allies great logistical problems. Antwerp was the third largest port in Europe. It was a deep water inland port connected to the North Sea via the river [[Scheldt]]. The Scheldt was wide enough and dredged deep enough to allow the passage of ocean-going ships.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|p=129}}

On 3 September 1944 Hitler ordered Fifteenth Army, which had been stationed in the Pas de Calais region and was withdrawing north into the Low Countries, to hold the mouth of the river Scheldt to deprive the Allies of the use of Antwerp.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 148">{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=148}}</ref> Von Rundstedt, the German commander of the Western Front, ordered General [[Gustav-Adolf von Zangen]], the commander of 15th Army, that: "The attempt of the enemy to occupy the West Scheldt in order to obtain the free use of the harbor of Antwerp must be ''resisted to the utmost''" (emphasis in the original).{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=11}} Rundstedt argued with Hitler that as long as the Allies could not use the port of Antwerp, the Allies would lack the logistical capacity for an invasion of Germany.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=11}}

The ''[[Witte Brigade]]'' (White Brigade) of the Belgian resistance had captured the [[Port of Antwerp]] before the Germans could destroy key port facilities,<ref name="auto">''Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign: 13 September – 6 November 1944''; by Mark Zuehlke; pp. 45–50; D & M Publishers, 2009; {{ISBN|978-1926685809}}</ref> and on 4 September, Antwerp was captured by Horrocks with its harbour mostly intact.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=149}}</ref> The British declined to immediately advance over the [[Albert Canal]], and an opportunity to destroy the German Fifteenth Army was lost.<ref name="auto"/> The Germans had mined the river Scheldt, the mouth of the Scheldt was still in German hands making it impossible for the Royal Navy to clear the mines in the river, and therefore the port of Antwerp was still useless to the Allies.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=16, 42–43}}

On 5 September, SHAEF's naval commander, Admiral Sir [[Bertram Ramsay]], had urged Montgomery to make clearing the mouth of the Scheldt his number-one priority. Alone among the senior commanders, only Ramsay saw opening Antwerp as crucial.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=16}} Thanks to "Ultra," Montgomery was aware of Hitler's order by 5 September.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 148"/>

On 9 September, Montgomery wrote to Brooke that "one good Pas de Calais port" would be sufficient to meet all the logistical needs of the 21st Army Group, but only the supply needs of the same formation.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> At the same time, Montgomery noted that "one good Pas de Calais port" would be insufficient for the American armies in France, which would thus force Eisenhower, if for no other reasons than logistics, to favour Montgomery's plans for an invasion of northern Germany by the 21st Army Group, whereas if Antwerp were opened up, then all of the Allied armies could be supplied.{{sfn|Copp|1981|p=150}}

The importance of ports closer to Germany was highlighted with the liberation of the city of Le Havre, which was assigned to [[John Crocker]]'s I Corps.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> To take Le Havre, two infantry divisions, two tank brigades, most of the artillery of the Second British Army, the specialised armoured "gadgets" of Percy Hobart's 79th Armoured Division, the battleship {{HMS|Warspite|03|6}} and the monitor {{HMS|Erebus|I02|6}} were all committed.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> On 10 September 1944, Bomber Command dropped 4,719 tons of bombs on Le Havre, which was the prelude to [[Operation Astonia]], the assault on Le Havre by Crocker's men, which was taken two days later.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> The Canadian historian [[Terry Copp]] wrote that the commitment of this much firepower and men to take only one French city might "seem excessive", but by this point, the Allies desperately needed ports closer to the front line to sustain their advance.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/>

In September 1944, Montgomery ordered Crerar and his First Canadian Army to take the French ports on the English Channel, namely Calais, Boulogne and Dunkirk,<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150">{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=150}}</ref> and to clear the Scheldt, a task that Crerar stated was impossible as he lacked enough troops to perform both operations at once.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|pp=151–152}}</ref> Montgomery refused Crerar's request to have British XII Corps under Neil Ritchie assigned to help clear the Scheldt as Montgomery stated he needed XII Corps for Operation Market Garden.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|p=152}}</ref> On 6 September 1944, Montgomery told Crerar that "I want Boulogne badly" and that city should be taken no matter what the cost.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/> On 22 September 1944, Simonds's II Canadian Corps took Boulogne, followed up by taking Calais on 1 October 1944.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|pp=100, 112}} Montgomery was highly impatient with Simonds, complaining that it had taken Crocker's I Corps only two days to take Le Havre while it took Simonds two weeks to take Boulogne and Calais, but Simonds noted that at Le Havre, three divisions and two brigades had been employed, whereas at both Boulogne and Calais, only two brigades were sent in to take both cities.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|1981|pp=150–151}}</ref> After an attempt to storm the [[Leopold Canal (Belgium)|Leopold Canal]] by the 4th Canadian Division had been badly smashed by the German defenders, Simonds ordered a stop to further attempts to clear the river Scheldt until his mission of capturing the French ports on the English Channel had been accomplished; this allowed the German Fifteenth Army ample time to dig into its new home on the Scheldt.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|p=124}} The only port that was not captured by the Canadians was Dunkirk, as Montgomery ordered the 2nd Canadian Division on 15 September to hold his flank at Antwerp as a prelude for an advance up the Scheldt.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1984|p=129}}

[[File:King George VI listens as Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery outlines his future strategy at his mobile headquarters in Holland, 13 October 1944. TR2393.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|right|Holland, 13 October 1944: Montgomery outlines his future strategy to King [[George VI]] in his mobile headquarters.]]

Montgomery pulled away from the First Canadian Army (temporarily commanded now by Simonds as Crerar was ill), the British 51st Highland Division, 1st Polish Division, British 49th (West Riding) Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, and sent all of these formations to help the Second British Army to expand the Market Garden salient with Operations Constellation, [[Operation Aintree|Aintree]], and towards the end of October [[Operation Pheasant|Pheasant]].{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=18}} However, Simonds seems to have regarded the Scheldt campaign as a test of his ability, and he felt he could clear the Scheldt with only three Canadian divisions, despite having to take on the entire Fifteenth Army, which held strongly fortified positions in a landscape that favoured the defence.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=19–20}} Simonds never complained about the lack of air support (made worse by the cloudy October weather), shortages of ammunition or having insufficient troops, regarding these problems as challenges for him to overcome, rather than a cause for complaint.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=19–20}} As it was, Simonds made only slow progress in October 1944 during the fighting in the [[Battle of the Scheldt]], although he was praised by Copp for imaginative and aggressive leadership who managed to achieve much, despite all of the odds against him.<ref>{{harvnb|Copp|2006|p=289}}</ref> Montgomery had little respect for the Canadian generals, whom he dismissed as mediocre, with the exception of Simonds, whom he consistently praised as Canada's only "first-rate" general in the entire war.<ref name="Copp, 1981 p. 150"/>

[[File:THE POLISH ARMY IN THE NORTH-WEST EUROPE CAMPAIGN, 1944-1945 B12101.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|left|Montgomery in conversation with Major General [[Stanisław Maczek]] during his visit to the [[1st Armoured Division (Poland)|1st Polish Armoured Division]] Headquarters in Breda, 25 November 1944]]

Admiral Ramsay, who proved to be a far more articulate and forceful champion of the Canadians than their own generals, starting on 9 October demanded of Eisenhower in a meeting that he either order Montgomery to make supporting the First Canadian Army in the Scheldt fighting his number one priority or sack him.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Ramsay in very strong language argued to Eisenhower that the Allies could only invade Germany if Antwerp was opened, and that as long as the three Canadian divisions fighting in the Scheldt had shortages of ammunition and artillery shells because Montgomery made the Arnhem salient his first priority, then Antwerp would not be opened anytime soon.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Even Brooke wrote in his diary: "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp".{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} On 9 October 1944, at Ramsay's urging, Eisenhower sent Montgomery a cable that emphasised the "supreme importance of Antwerp", that "the Canadian Army will not, repeat not, be able to attack until November unless immediately supplied with adequate ammunition", and warned that the Allied advance into Germany would totally stop by mid-November unless Antwerp was opened by October.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Montgomery replied by accusing Ramsay of making "wild statements" unsupported by the facts, denying the Canadians were having to ration ammunition, and claimed that he would soon take the Ruhr thereby making the Scheldt campaign a sideshow.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=42}} Montgomery further issued a memo entitled "Notes on Command in Western Europe" demanding that he once again be made Land Forces Commander.  This led to an exasperated Eisenhower telling Montgomery that the question was not the command arrangement but rather his (Montgomery's) ability and willingness to obey orders.  Eisenhower further told Montgomery to either obey orders to immediately clear the mouth of the Scheldt or be sacked.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=43}}

A chastised Montgomery told Eisenhower on 15 October 1944 that he was now making clearing the Scheldt his "top priority", and the ammunition shortages in the First Canadian Army, a problem which he denied even existed five days earlier, were now over as supplying the Canadians was henceforth his first concern.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=43}} Simonds, now reinforced with British troops and Royal Marines, cleared the Scheldt by taking [[Walcheren]] island, the last of the German "fortresses" on the Scheldt, on 8 November 1944.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=127}} With the Scheldt in Allied hands, Royal Navy minesweepers removed the German mines in the river, and Antwerp was finally opened to shipping on 28 November 1944.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=127}} Reflecting Antwerp's importance, the Germans spent the winter of 1944–45 firing V-1 flying bombs and V-2 rockets at it in an attempt to shut down the port, and the German offensive in December 1944 in the Ardennes had as its ultimate objective the capture of Antwerp.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=127}} Urban wrote that Montgomery's most "serious failure" in the entire war was not the well publicised [[Battle of Arnhem]], but rather his lack of interest in opening up Antwerp, as without it the entire Allied advance from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps stalled in the autumn of 1944 for logistical reasons.<ref>{{harvnb|Urban|2005|p=298}}</ref>

==== Operation Market Garden ====
Montgomery was able to persuade Eisenhower to allow him to test his strategy of a single thrust to the [[Ruhr Area|Ruhr]] with [[Operation Market Garden]] in September 1944. The offensive was strategically bold,<ref name="Lanning"/> although [[Lieutenant General]] [[Humfrey Gale]], the "senior administrative and logistics officer"<ref name="Buckley">{{cite book |last=Buckley |first=John |date=2013 |title=Monty's Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, 1944-5 |location=New Haven |publisher=Yale University Press |page=213 |isbn=978-0-300-13449-0}}</ref> for SHAEF ([[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]]) considered Montgomery's narrow-thrust strategy to be "logistically unrealistic",<ref name="Buckley"/> and in his opinion "a ruse merely to demonstrate later that he had been prevented from winning the war quickly by Eisenhower's caution."<ref name="Buckley"/> At a strategy meeting on 10 September 1944, Montgomery became so belligerent that Eisenhower was prompted into saying "Steady, Monty! You can't speak to me like that. I'm your boss."<ref name="Buckley"/> Following the Allied breakout from Normandy, Eisenhower favored pursuing the German armies northwards and eastwards to the [[Rhine]] on a broad front. Eisenhower relied on speed, which in turn depended on logistics, which were "stretched to the limit".{{sfn|Pogue|1954|pp=254–255}} SHAEF did provide Montgomery with additional resources, principally additional [[locomotive]]s and [[rolling stock]], and priority for air supply.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=255}} Eisenhower's decision to launch Market Garden was influenced by his desire to keep the retreating Germans under pressure, and by the pressure from the United States to use the [[First Allied Airborne Army]] as soon as possible.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=269}}

Montgomery's plan for Operation Market Garden (17–25 September 1944) was to outflank the [[Siegfried Line]] and cross the Rhine, setting the stage for later offensives into the Ruhr region. The 21st Army Group would attack north from Belgium, {{convert|60|mi|km}} through the Netherlands, across the Rhine and consolidate north of Arnhem on the far side of the Rhine. The risky plan required three Airborne Divisions to capture numerous intact bridges along a single-lane road, on which an entire Corps had to attack and use as its main supply route. The offensive failed to achieve its objectives.<ref>A Bridge Too Far, Cornelius Ryan.</ref>

Both Churchill and Montgomery claimed that the operation was nearly or 90% successful, "since they had got nine-tenths of the way to Arnhem",<ref name="Beevor">{{cite book |last=Beevor |first=Antony |date=2019 |title=Arnhem: The Battle for the Bridges, 1944 |location=London |publisher=Penguin Books |page=365 |isbn=978-0-670-91867-6}}</ref> prompting Air Chief Marshal Tedder to derisively comment that "one jumps off a cliff with an even higher success rate, until the last few inches."<ref name="Beevor"/> However, in Montgomery's equivocal acceptance of responsibility he blames lack of support, and also refers to the [[Battle of the Scheldt]], which was undertaken by Canadian troops not involved in Market Garden. Montgomery later said:

{{blockquote|It was a bad mistake on my part—I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp ... I reckoned the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong ... In my—prejudiced—view, if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job, it would have succeeded ''in spite of'' my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain Market Garden's unrepentant advocate.{{sfn|Montgomery|1958|pp=243, 298}}}}

In the aftermath of Market Garden, Montgomery made holding the Arnhem salient his first priority, arguing that the Second British Army might still be able to break through and reach the wide open plains of northern Germany, and that he might be able to take the Ruhr by the end of October.{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|pp=12, 14}} The Germans under ''[[Generalfeldmarschall]]'' [[Walther Model]] attempted to [[Battle of the Nijmegen salient|retake the Nijmegen salient]] in early October, but were beaten back. In the meantime, the First Canadian Army finally achieved the task of clearing the mouth of the river Scheldt, despite the fact that, in the words of Copp and Vogel, "Montgomery's Directive required the Canadians to continue to fight alone for almost two weeks in a battle which everyone agreed could only be won with the aid of additional divisions".{{sfn|Copp|Vogel|1985|p=14}}

==== Battle of the Bulge ====
On 16 December 1944, at the start of the [[Battle of the Bulge]], Montgomery's 21st Army Group was on the northern flank of the allied lines. Bradley's [[Twelfth United States Army Group|US 12th Army Group]] was to Montgomery's south, with [[William Hood Simpson|William Simpson]]'s [[Ninth United States Army|U.S. Ninth Army]] adjacent to 21st Army Group, [[Courtney Hodges]]' [[First United States Army|U.S. First Army]] holding the Ardennes and Patton's U.S. Third Army further south.<ref name=speer459>{{harvnb|Speer|1970|p=459}}</ref>

[[File:The British Army in North-west Europe 1944-45- the Prime Minister in Germany BU2239.jpg|thumb|left|Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery talking with Lieutenant General Simpson, GOC U.S. Ninth Army and Major General [[John B. Anderson (United States Army officer)|John Anderson]], GOC [[XVI Corps (United States)|U.S. XVI Corps]]. Behind are General Bradley and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.]]

[[SHAEF]] believed the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of launching a major offensive, and that no offensive could be launched through such rugged terrain as the Ardennes Forest. Because of this, the area was held by refitting and newly arrived American formations.<ref name=speer459/> The Wehrmacht planned to exploit this by making a surprise attack through the Ardennes Forest whilst bad weather grounded Allied air power, splitting the Allied Armies in two. They would then turn north to recapture the port of Antwerp.<ref>{{cite web |last=von Luttchau |first=Charles V. P. |title=The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes |url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_20.htm |publisher=U.S. Army Center for Military History |access-date=17 November 2019 |archive-date=25 July 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100725042713/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_20.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> If the attack were to succeed in capturing Antwerp, the whole of 21st Army Group, along with U.S. Ninth Army and most of U.S. First Army would be trapped without supplies behind German lines.<ref>{{cite book |last=Cole |first=Hugh M. |chapter=Chapter V: The Sixth Panzer Army Attack |chapter-url=http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_5.htm |title=The Ardennes |series=United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations |publisher=[[Office of the Chief of Military History]] |location=Washington, D.C. |year=1965 |access-date=17 November 2019 |archive-date=7 August 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100807183545/http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_5.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The attack initially advanced rapidly, splitting U.S. 12th Army Group in two, with all of U.S. Ninth Army and the bulk of U.S. First Army on the northern shoulder of the German 'bulge'. The 12th Army Group commander, Bradley, was located in Luxembourg, making command of the U.S. forces north of the bulge problematic. As Montgomery was the nearest army group commander on the ground, on 20 December, Eisenhower temporarily transferred command of U.S. Ninth Army and U.S. First Army to Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Bradley was "concerned because it might discredit the American command" but that it might mean Montgomery would commit more of his reserves to the battle. In practice the change led to "great resentment on the part of many Americans, particularly at Headquarters, 12th Army Group, and Third Army".<ref>{{cite book|series=United States Army in World War II. European Theater of Operations | title=The Supreme Command|first=Forrest C.|last=Pogue|publisher=U.S. Department of the Army|year=1954| url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme|chapter-url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Supreme/USA-E-Supreme-20.html|chapter=Chapter XX. Winter Counteroffensives |location=Washington DC|id=CMH Pub. 7-1 |page=378|via=Hyperwar Foundation}}</ref>

With the British and American forces under Montgomery's command holding the northern flank of the German assault, General Patton's Third Army, which was {{convert|90|mi|km}} to the south, turned north and fought its way through the severe weather and German opposition to relieve the besieged American forces in [[Bastogne]]. Four days after Montgomery took command of the northern flank, the bad weather cleared and the [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] and RAF<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/worldwarii.cfm |title=The RAF in WWII |publisher=The Royal Air Force |date=7 May 1945 |access-date=21 October 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151019073942/http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/worldwarii.cfm |archive-date=19 October 2015 |url-status=dead  }}</ref> resumed operations, inflicting heavy casualties on German troops and vehicles. Six days after Montgomery took command of the northern flank, Patton's Third Army relieved the besieged American forces in Bastogne. Unable to advance further, and running out of fuel, the Wehrmacht abandoned the offensive.<ref name=speer459/><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm |title=The Battle of the Bulge |date=20 June 1999 |publisher=US Army |access-date=5 February 2017 |archive-date=6 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206183021/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/ardennes/aral.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>

Morelock states that Montgomery was preoccupied with leading a "single thrust offensive" to Berlin as the overall commander of Allied ground forces, and that he accordingly treated the Ardennes counteroffensive "as a sideshow, to be finished with the least possible effort and expenditure of resources."{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=65}}

Montgomery subsequently wrote of his actions:
{{Blockquote|The first thing to do was to see the battle on the northern flank as one whole, to ensure the vital areas were held securely, and to create reserves for counter-attack. I embarked on these measures: I put British troops under command of the Ninth Army to fight alongside American soldiers, and made that Army take over some of the First Army Front. I positioned British troops as reserves behind the First and Ninth Armies until such time as American reserves could be created.<ref>''The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery'' (1958) p. 308</ref> }}

After the war [[Hasso von Manteuffel]], who commanded the [[5th Panzer Army]] in the Ardennes, was imprisoned awaiting trial for war crimes. During this period he was interviewed by [[B. H. Liddell Hart]], a British author who has since been accused of putting words in the mouths of German generals, and attempting to "rewrite the historical record".<ref>In Pursuit of Military Excellence; The Evolution of Operational Theory'; by Shimon Naveh, pg 108-109. (London: Francass, 1997). {{ISBN|0-7146-4727-6}};</ref><ref>Liddell Hart and the Weight of History; by John Mearsheimer; pages 8-9, 203-204; Cornell University Press; 2010; {{ISBN|978-0-8014-7631-0}}</ref><ref>A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953, by Alaric Searle; War In History 1998 5: 327; published by SAGE for the University of Salford, Manchester; {{doi|10.1177/096834459800500304}}; available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/ and https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/096834459800500304</ref><ref>"Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A 'Pupil's' Retrospective" (PDF); Strategic Studies Institute.; by Jay Luvaas; 1990; pg 12-13</ref> After conducting several interviews via an interpreter, Liddell Hart in a subsequent book attributed to Manteuffel the following statement about Montgomery's contribution to the battle in the Ardennes:

{{blockquote|The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.{{sfn|Delaforce|2004|p=318}}}}

However, American historian [[Stephen E. Ambrose|Stephen Ambrose]], writing in 1997, maintained that "Putting Monty in command of the northern flank had no effect on the battle".{{sfn|Caddick-Adams|2015|p=644}} Ambrose wrote that: "Far from directing the victory, Montgomery had gotten in everyone's way, and had botched the counter-attack."{{sfn|Baxter|1999|p=111}} General Omar Bradley blamed Montgomery's "stagnating conservatism" for his failure to counter-attack when ordered to do so by Eisenhower.{{sfn|Morelock|2015|p=92}}

Command of U.S. First Army reverted to 12th Army Group on 17 January 1945,<ref>''The Supreme Command'', Forrest C Pogue, Chapter XX – The Winter Counteroffensives, pp. 378, 395</ref> whilst command of U.S. Ninth Army remained with 21st Army Group for the coming operations to cross the Rhine.<ref>''United States Army in World War II''; Part 3, Volume 4, United States. Dept. of the Army – Office of Military History; 1947; p. 439</ref>

==== Crossing the Rhine ====
[[File:Operationvarsity.jpg|thumb|Montgomery (left), [[Air Marshal]] [[Arthur Coningham (RAF officer)|Sir Arthur Coningham]] (centre) and the Commander of the [[Second Army (United Kingdom)|British Second Army]], Lieutenant-General [[Miles Dempsey|Sir Miles Dempsey]], talking after a conference in which Montgomery gave the order for the Second Army to begin [[Operation Plunder]]]]
[[File:Montgomery receives Order of Victory HD-SN-99-02756.JPG|thumb|Montgomery was awarded the [[Order of Victory]] on 5 June 1945. [[Dwight Eisenhower]], [[Georgy Zhukov]] and [[Sir Arthur Tedder]] were also present.]]

In February 1945, Montgomery's 21st Army Group advanced to the Rhine in [[Operation Veritable]] and [[Operation Grenade]]. It crossed the Rhine on 24 March 1945, in [[Operation Plunder]], which took place two weeks after [[U.S. First Army]] had crossed the Rhine after capturing the [[Ludendorff Bridge]] during the [[Battle of Remagen]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Last/USA-E-Last-11.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150426074853/http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-Last/USA-E-Last-11.html|url-status=dead|title=HyperWar: The Last Offensive [Chapter 11]|archive-date=26 April 2015|website=www.ibiblio.org}}</ref>

21st Army Group's river crossing was followed by the encirclement of the [[Ruhr Pocket]]. During this battle, U.S. Ninth Army, which had remained part of 21st Army Group after the Battle of the Bulge, formed the northern arm of the envelopment of German [[Army Group B]], with U.S. First Army forming the southern arm. The two armies linked up on 1 April 1945, encircling 370,000 German troops, and on 4 April 1945, Ninth Army reverted to Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-u-s-ninth-armys-breakout-crossing-the-roer-and-the-rhine/|title=The U.S. Ninth Army's Breakout: Crossing the Roer and the Rhine|date=30 December 2018|publisher=Warfare History Network|access-date=16 March 2018|archive-date=6 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180606183843/http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/the-u-s-ninth-armys-breakout-crossing-the-roer-and-the-rhine/|url-status=dead}}</ref>

By the war's end, the remaining formations of 21st Army group, First Canadian Army and British Second Army, had liberated the northern part of the Netherlands and captured much of north-west Germany, occupied [[Hamburg]] and [[Rostock]] and sealed off the Danish peninsula.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://militarymaps.narod.ru/eur_oper_e.html#may45|title=Second World War Military Situation Maps 1944–1945|access-date=26 May 2013}}</ref>

On 4 May 1945, on [[Lüneburg Heath]], Montgomery accepted the [[German surrender at Lüneburg Heath|surrender of German forces in north-west Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands]].<ref name="heath218">{{harvnb|Heathcote|1999|p=218}}</ref>