Editing Battle of Verdun (section)

===French preparations===
[[File:East bank of the Meuse, Verdun, February to March 1916.png|thumb|{{centre|East bank of the Meuse, February–March 1916}}]]
In 1915, {{nowrap|237 guns}} and {{cvt|647|LT}} of ammunition in the forts of the RFV had been removed, leaving only the heavy guns in retractable turrets. The conversion of the RFV to a conventional linear defence, with trenches and barbed wire began but proceeded slowly, after resources were sent west from Verdun for the Second Battle of Champagne {{nowrap|(25 September to 6 November 1915).}} In October 1915, building began on trench lines known as the first, second and third positions and in January 1916, an inspection by General [[Noël Édouard, vicomte de Curières de Castelnau|Noël de Castelnau]], Chief of Staff at [[Grand Quartier Général (1914–1919)|French General Headquarters]] (GQG), reported that the new defences were satisfactory, except for small deficiencies in three areas.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=265–266}} The fortress garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews and some of the forts had been readied for demolition. The maintenance garrisons were responsible to the central military bureaucracy in Paris and when the XXX Corps commander, Major-General [[Paul Chrétien]], attempted to inspect Fort Douaumont in January 1916, he was refused entry.{{sfn|Holstein|2010|p=36}}

Douaumont was the largest fort in the RFV and by February 1916, the only artillery left in the fort were the {{nowrap|75 mm}} and {{nowrap|155 mm turret}} guns and light guns covering the ditch. The fort was used as a barracks by {{nowrap|68 technicians}} under the command of Warrant Officer Chenot, the {{lang|fr|Gardien de Batterie}}. One of the rotating {{cvt|155|mm|order=flip}} turrets was partially manned and the other was left empty.{{sfn|Holstein|2010|p=36}} The Hotchkiss machine-guns were stored in boxes and four {{nowrap|75 mm guns}} in the [[casemate]]s had already been removed. The drawbridge had been jammed in the down position by a German shell and had not been repaired. The {{lang|fr|coffres}} (wall bunkers) with Hotchkiss revolver-cannons protecting the moats, were unmanned and over {{cvt|5000|kg|lb+LT|order=flip}} of explosives had been placed in the fort to demolish it.{{sfn|Holstein|2010|p=35}} Colonel [[Émile Driant]] was stationed at Verdun and criticised Joffre for removing the [[artillery]] guns and infantry from fortresses around [[Verdun]]. Joffre did not listen but Colonel Driant received the support of the Minister for War [[Joseph Gallieni]]. The formidable Verdun defences were a shell and were now threatened by a German offensive; Driant was to be proved correct by events.

[[File:West bank of the Meuse, Verdun, 1916.png|thumb|{{centre|West bank of the Meuse, 1916}}]]
In late January 1916, French intelligence obtained an accurate assessment of German military capacity and intentions at Verdun but Joffre considered that an attack would be a diversion, because of the lack of an obvious strategic objective.{{sfn|Foley|2007|p=217}} By the time of the German offensive, Joffre expected a bigger attack elsewhere but finally yielded to political pressure and ordered the VII Corps to Verdun on 23 January, to hold the north face of the west bank. XXX Corps held the salient east of the Meuse to the north and north-east and II Corps held the eastern face of the Meuse Heights; Herr had {{frac|8|1|2}} divisions in the front line, with {{frac|2|1|2}} divisions in close reserve. {{lang|de|[[Army Group Centre (France)|Groupe d'armées du centre]]}} (GAC, General [[Fernand de Langle de Cary|De Langle de Cary]]) had the I and XX corps with two divisions each in reserve, plus most of the 19th Division; Joffre had {{nowrap|25 divisions}} in the French strategic reserve.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|p=267}} French artillery reinforcements had brought the total at Verdun to {{nowrap|388 field}} guns and {{nowrap|244 heavy}} guns, against {{nowrap|1,201 German}} guns, two thirds of which were heavy and super heavy, including {{cvt|14|in}} and {{nowrap|202 mortars,}} some being {{cvt|16|in}}. Eight specialist flame-thrower companies were also sent to the 5th Army.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=215, 217}}

[[File:Woëvre.png|thumb|{{centre|The Woëvre region of Lorraine (in green)}}]]
Castelnau met De Langle de Cary on 25 February, who doubted the east bank could be held. Castelnau disagreed and ordered General [[Frédéric-Georges Herr]] the corps commander, to hold the right (east) bank of the Meuse at all costs. Herr sent a division from the west bank and ordered XXX Corps to hold a line from Bras to Douaumont, Vaux and [[Eix]]. Pétain took over command of the defence of the RFV at {{nowrap|11:00 p.m.,}} with Colonel Maurice de Barescut as chief of staff and Colonel [[Bernard Serrigny]] as head of operations, only to hear that Fort Douaumont had fallen. Pétain ordered the remaining Verdun forts to be re-garrisoned.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=272–273}}

Four groups were established, under the command of Generals [[Adolphe Guillaumat]], Balfourier and [[Denis Auguste Duchêne|Denis Duchêne]] on the right bank and [[Georges de Bazelaire]] on the left bank. A "line of resistance" was established on the east bank from Souville to Thiaumont, around Fort Douaumont to Fort Vaux, Moulainville and along the ridge of the Woëvre. On the west bank, the line ran from [[Cumières-le-Mort-Homme|Cumières]] to [[Mort Homme]], Côte 304 and Avocourt. A "line of panic" was planned in secret as a final line of defence north of Verdun, through forts Belleville, St Michel and [[Moulainville]].{{sfn|Mason|2000|pp=107–109}} I Corps and XX Corps arrived from 24 to 26 February, increasing the number of divisions in the RFV to {{frac|14|1|2}}. By 6 March, the arrival of the XIII, XXI, XIV and XXXIII corps had increased the total to {{frac|20|1|2}} divisions.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|p=274}}