Editing Battle of Tours (section)

==Battle (October 732)==
{{Location map many
|France
|label   = Battle of Tours
|lat     = 46.7178
|long    = 0.5408
|caption = The location of the battle in modern-day France
|float   = right
|width   = 250
}}
{{More citations needed section|date=October 2012}}

===Preparations and manœuvre===
By all accounts, the invading forces were caught off guard to discover a large force sitting directly in their path to Tours. Charles achieved the total surprise he had hoped for. He then chose not to attack but rather set up a defensive, [[phalanx]]-like formation.<ref name="Hanson"/> According to Arab sources, the Franks drew up in a large square, with hills and trees in their front to impede or break up Muslim cavalry charges.

For one week, the two armies engaged in minor skirmishes while the Umayyads waited for their full strength to arrive. 'Abd-al-Raḥmân, despite being a proven commander, had been outmanœuvred by allowing Charles to concentrate his forces and pick the field of battle. Furthermore, the Umayyads could not judge the size of Charles' army since he had used the forest to conceal his true numbers.

Charles' infantry was his best hope for victory. Seasoned and battle-hardened, most of them had fought under him for years, some as far back as 717. In addition to his army, he also had levies of militia which had not seen significant military use except for gathering food and harassing the Muslim army.

While many historians through the centuries have believed that the Franks were outnumbered at the onset of battle by at least two to one, some sources, such as the Mozarabic Chronicle of 754, contradict that assertion.<ref>{{harvnb|Collins|1989|pages=81,&nbsp;90}}</ref>

Charles correctly assumed that 'Abd-al-Raḥmân would feel compelled to give battle, and move on and try to loot Tours. Neither side wanted to attack. Abd-al-Raḥmân felt he had to sack Tours, which meant he had to go through the Frankish army on the hill in front of him. Charles' decision to stay in the hills proved crucial, as it forced the Umayyad cavalry to charge uphill and through trees, diminishing their effectiveness.

Charles had been preparing for this confrontation since the Battle of Toulouse a decade earlier.<ref name="Hanson" /> Gibbon believes, as do most historians, that Charles had made the best of a bad situation. Though allegedly outnumbered and without any heavy cavalry, he had tough, battle-hardened infantrymen who believed in him implicitly. At a time in the [[Middle Ages]] when permanent armies had been non-existent in Europe, Charles even took out a large loan from the [[Saint Gregory III|Pope]] after convincing him of the impending emergency, to properly train and maintain a full-size army largely composed of professional infantry. Moreover, as Davis points out, these infantrymen were heavily armed.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Davis|first=Paul K.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nv73QlQs9ocC&pg=PA104|title=100 Decisive Battles From Ancient Times to the Present|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2001|isbn=9780195143669|pages=104}}</ref>

Formed into a phalanx formation, they were able to withstand a cavalry charge better than might be expected, especially as Charles had secured the high ground – with trees before him to further impede any cavalry charges. The failure of Arab enemy intelligence extended to the fact that they were unaware of the specific level of reliability that the combat forces that he commanded were in possession of; however he had trained them for a decade. And while he was well aware of the Caliphate's strengths and weaknesses, he was aware they knew nothing about the Franks.

Furthermore, the Franks were dressed for the cold, whereas the Arabs wore very light clothing more suitable for North African winters than European winters.{{Citation needed|date=June 2017}}

The battle eventually became a waiting game in which the Muslims did not want to attack an army that could be numerically superior and wanted the Franks to come out into the open. The Franks formed up in a thick defensive formation and waited for them to charge uphill. The battle finally began on the seventh day, as 'Abd-al-Raḥmân did not want to wait any longer, with winter approaching.

===Engagement===
[[File:Young Folks' History of Rome illus442, Battle of Tours.png|thumb|upright|Frankish and Umayyad cavalry clash (illustration from the 19th century by [[Charlotte Mary Yonge]])]]

'Abd-al-Raḥmân trusted in the tactical superiority of his cavalry and had them charge repeatedly throughout the day. The disciplined Frankish soldiers withstood the assaults, though according to Arab sources, the Arab cavalry broke into the Frankish square several times. Despite this, the Franks did not break. The well-trained Frankish soldiers accomplished what was not thought possible at that time: infantry withstanding a heavy cavalry charge. Paul Davis says the core of Charles' army was a professional infantry that was both highly disciplined and well-motivated, "having campaigned with him all over Europe".

===Contemporary accounts===
The [[Mozarabic Chronicle of 754]] "describes the battle in greater detail than any other Latin or Arabic source".<ref name="Watson">{{harvnb|Watson|1993}}</ref> It says of the encounter that,
{{blockquote|text=While Abd ar-Rahman was pursuing Odo, he decided to despoil Tours by destroying its palaces and burning its churches. There he confronted the consul of Austrasia by the name of Charles, a man who, having proved himself to be a warrior from his youth and an expert in things military, had been summoned by Odo. After each side had tormented the other with raids for almost seven days, they finally prepared their battle lines and fought fiercely. The northern peoples remained as immobile as a wall, holding together like a glacier in the cold regions. In the blink of an eye, they annihilated the Arabs with the sword. The people of Austrasia, greater in a number of soldiers and formidably armed, killed the king, Abd ar-Rahman, when they found him, striking him on the chest. But suddenly, within sight of the countless tents of the Arabs, the Franks despicably sheathed their swords postponing the fight until the next day since night had fallen during the battle. Rising from their own camp at dawn, the Europeans saw the tents and canopies of the Arabs all arranged just as they had appeared the day before. Not knowing that they were empty and thinking that inside them there were Saracen forces ready for battle, they sent officers to reconnoiter and discovered that all the Ishmaelite troops had left. They had indeed fled silently by night in tight formation, returning to their own country.|author=Wolf (trans.)|source=''Chronicle of 754'', p. 145}}

Charles Martel's family composed, for the fourth book of the ''[[Chronicle of Fredegar#Continuations|Continuations of Fredegar's Chronicle]]'', a stylized summary of the battle:

{{blockquote|text=Prince Charles boldly drew up his battle lines against them [the Arabs] and the warrior rushed in against them. With Christ's help, he overturned their tents and hastened to battle to grind them small in slaughter. The king Abdirama having been killed, he destroyed [them], driving forth the army, he fought and won. Thus did the victor triumph over his enemies.|author=Fouracre|source=''Continuations of Fredegar'', p. 149}}

This source details further that "he (Charles Martel) came down upon them like a great man of battle". It goes on to say Charles "scattered them like the stubble".

The Latin word used for "warrior", ''{{lang|la|belligerator}}'', "is from the [[Books of the Maccabees|Book of Maccabees]], chapters 15 and 16", which describe huge battles.<ref>Fouracre, 2000, p. 149.</ref>

It is thought that [[Bede]]'s ''[[Ecclesiastical History of the English People]]'' (Book V, Chapter XXIV) includes a reference to the Battle of Tours: "...{{nbsp}}a dreadful plague of Saracens ravaged France with miserable slaughter, but they not long after in that country received the punishment due to their wickedness".<ref>Bede, 1847, p. 291.</ref>

===Strategic analysis===
Gibbon makes the point{{Citation needed|date=December 2016}} that 'Abd-al-Raḥmân did not move at once against Charles Martel, and was surprised by him at Tours as Charles had marched over the mountains while avoiding the roads to surprise the Muslim invaders. Thus, Charles selected the time and place they would fight.

'Abd-al-Raḥmân was a good general, but failed to do two things he should have done before the battle:
* He either assumed that the Franks would not come to the aid of their Aquitanian rivals, or was indifferent, and he thus failed to assess their strength before the invasion.
* He failed to scout the movements of the [[Frankish Empire|Frankish]] army.

These failures disadvantaged the Muslim army in the following ways:
* The invaders were burdened with riches that they stole that played a role in the battle.
* They had casualties before they fought the battle.
* Weaker opponents such as Odo were not bypassed, whom they could have picked off at will later, while moving at once to force battle with the real power in Europe and at least partially pick the battlefield.

While some military historians point out that leaving enemies in your rear is not generally wise, the Mongols proved that indirect attack, and bypassing weaker foes to eliminate the strongest first, can be a devastatingly effective mode of invasion. In this case, those enemies were virtually no danger, given the ease with which the Muslims destroyed them. The real danger was Charles, and the failure to scout Gaul adequately was disastrous.

According to [[Edward Shepherd Creasy|Creasy]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.genealogieonline.nl/en/demmers-harmeijer-extended-family/I12884.php|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180903150853/https://www.genealogieonline.nl/en/demmers-harmeijer-extended-family/I12884.php|url-status=dead|archive-date=2018-09-03|title=Charles "the Hammer" Martel King of the Franks|last=Henny|first=Carlisle|website=genealogieonline}}</ref> both western and Muslim histories agree the battle was hard fought, and that the Umayyad heavy cavalry had broken into the square, but agreed that the Franks were in formation still strongly resisting.

Charles could not afford to stand idly by while Frankish territories were threatened. He would have to face the Umayyad armies sooner or later, and his men were enraged by the utter devastation of the Aquitanians and wanted to fight. But Sir Edward Creasy noted that,

{{blockquote|text=When we remember that Charles had no standing army, and the independent spirit of the Frank warriors who followed his standard, it seems most probable that it was not in his power to adopt the cautious policy of watching the invaders, and wearing out their strength by delay. So dreadful and so widespread were the ravages of the Saracenic light cavalry throughout Gaul, that it must have been impossible to restrain for any length of time the indignant ardor of the Franks. And, even if Charles could have persuaded his men to look tamely on while the Arabs stormed more towns and desolated more districts, he could not have kept an army together when the usual period of a military expedition had expired.<ref>{{harvnb|Creasy|Speed|2001|page=163}}</ref>}}

Both [[Henry Hallam|Hallam]] and [[William E. Watson|Watson]]<ref name="Watson" /> argue that had Charles failed, there was no remaining force to protect Western Europe. Hallam perhaps said it best: "It may justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its subsequent scenes: with [[Battle of Marathon|Marathon]], [[Battle of Gaugamela|Arbela]], the [[Battle of the Metaurus|Metaurus]], [[Battle of the Catalaunian Plains|Châlons]] and [[Battle of Leipzig|Leipzig]]."<ref>quoted in {{harvnb|Creasy|Speed|2001|page=viii}}</ref>

Strategically, and tactically, Charles probably made the best decision he could in waiting until his enemies least expected him to intervene, and then marching by stealth to catch them by surprise at a battlefield of his choosing. Probably he and his own men did not realize the seriousness of the battle they had fought, as one historian put it: "few battles are remembered over 1,000 years after they are fought, but the Battle of [Tours-Poitiers] is an exception ... Charles Martel turned back a Muslim raid that had it been allowed to continue, might have conquered Gaul."<ref>{{harvnb|Bennett|Bradsbury|DeVries|Dickie|2013|page=19}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Collins|1989|pages=87–91}}</ref>