Editing Battle of Navarino (section)

===Preliminary moves===
[[File:Navarino Bay in Peloponnese.jpg|thumb|Satellite picture of the [[Peloponnese]]. Navarino Bay is visible in the inset in the lower left.]]
[[File:Plan de la Bataille de Navarin.png|thumb|Map of Navarino Bay. The diagram of the order of battle contains inaccuracies]]Vice-Admiral Codrington's instructions were to impose and enforce an armistice on both sides and to interdict the flow of reinforcements and supplies from Asia Minor and Egypt to Ottoman forces in Greece. He was to use force only as a last resort.<ref>''Letter to his senior officers from Codrington Sept 8 1827'' reproduced in James (1837) 473 London</ref>

On 29 August, the Ottomans formally rejected the Treaty of London's stipulations, triggering the dispatch of Allied representatives to Nafplion. On 2 September, the Greek provisional government accepted the armistice. This freed Codrington to concentrate on coercing the Ottoman side.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 58–60</ref>

Navarino Bay is a large [[natural harbour]] on the west coast of [[Messinia]] in the south-west Peloponnese. It is approximately 5&nbsp;km long (between the headlands) and 3&nbsp;km wide. The bay is sheltered from the open sea by a long, narrow islet, [[Sphacteria]]. This islet leaves two entrances to the bay. Because of a sandbank, the northern one is very narrow and shallow, 100&nbsp;m wide and just 1&nbsp;m deep in places, impassable to large boats. The southern one is much wider, 1,500&nbsp;m, with an effective passage of 1,000&nbsp;m width because of rocks. The southern entrance was at that time guarded by the Ottoman-held [[New Navarino fortress]] ([[Pylos]]). During the Greek insurgency, the bay was used by the Ottoman navy as its main operational base in the Peloponnese.

A large Ottoman–Egyptian fleet, which had been warned by the British and French to stay away from Greece, left Alexandria on 5 August 1827 and joined other Ottoman units at Navarino on 8 September.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 56</ref> In response, Codrington arrived with his squadron off Navarino on 12 September. In talks on 25 September with Ibrahim Pasha and the Ottoman admiral, he extracted no explicit verbal promises that they would cease offensive operation. However, Codrington did get the pasha to commit a ceasefire until further instructions from the sultan were given.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mazower |first=Mark |title=The Greek Revolution: 1821 and the making of modern Europe |publisher=[[Penguin Books]] |year=2022 |isbn=9780143110934 |edition=1st |location=United States of America |pages=411 |language=en-us}}</ref> After these talks, Codrington withdrew to the nearby British-controlled Ionian island of [[Zante]] (Zakynthos), leaving a frigate off Navarino to keep watch on the Ottoman fleet.

But the Ottomans soon violated these understandings. Ibrahim was outraged that, while he was expected to observe a ceasefire, Codrington seemingly allowed the Greeks to continue military operations onn his vessels unhindered. The Greeks' British commanders were on the offensive at the entrance of the strategically vital [[Gulf of Corinth]]. Church's army laid siege to the Ottoman-held port of [[Patras]], while Cochrane organised a revolt behind Ottoman lines in [[Epirus]]. By sea, [[Frank Abney Hastings]], a former British naval officer now serving with the Greeks, used a steam-powered warship, the {{ship||Karteria|Greek warship|2}}, to launch a daring night raid on 29/30 September at [[Itea (Phocis)|Itea]] on the northern shore of the gulf, sinking nine Ottoman gunboats. The problem for Codrington was that these officers were acting on their own initiative, largely ignoring the often contradictory directives of their employer, the Greek provisional government. Recognising that appeals to the latter were ineffective, Codrington despatched aides directly to the British commanders to demand that they cease operations, but with little result.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 82–83</ref>
[[File:Action between the Asia, Dartmouth and the Turkish and Egyptian Fleet, 1-6 Oct 1827 PW4841.jpg|thumb|right|Codrington's squadron prevents the Ottoman reinforcements from reaching Patras on 4 October.]]
After a vain protest to Codrington, Ibrahim decided to act. On 1 October, he despatched a naval squadron to reinforce the Patras garrison. It was intercepted by Codrington's squadron at the entrance to the gulf, and forced to return to Navarino, shadowed by Codrington. Ibrahim tried again on the night of 3/4 October, this time leading the squadron in person. Using the darkness, he succeeded in slipping past the British picket ship unobserved, but was prevented from entering the gulf by a strong headwind. His squadron was obliged to anchor in the lee of [[Cape Pappas]] and wait out the storm. This gave Codrington time to catch up, and the British squadron, after a whole day of fighting the wind, arrived off Pappas on the evening of 4 October. Codrington fired a series of warning broadsides, and Ibrahim reluctantly decided to turn back.<ref>Woodhouse (1965) 83–86</ref>

In the meantime, Ibrahim's scorched-earth policy continued unabated on land. The fires of burning villages and fields were clearly visible from Allied ships standing offshore. A British landing party reported that the population of Messinia was close to mass starvation.<ref>''Report to Codrington from Capt Hamilton ({{HMS|Cambrian|1797|6}})'', reproduced in James (1837) VI. 476</ref>

On 13 October, Codrington was joined off Navarino by a French squadron under Rigny and a Russian squadron under [[Lodewijk van Heiden|L. van Heiden]]. On 18 October, after futile attempts to contact Ibrahim Pasha, Codrington, in conference with his Allied colleagues, took the fateful decision to enter Navarino Bay and anchor his ships face-to-face with the Ottoman/Egyptian fleet. It was decided that with winter approaching, it was impracticable to maintain an effective blockade of Navarino, and that in any event, the population of the Peloponnese had to be safeguarded.<ref>''Protocol of conference of Allied commanders 18 Oct 1827'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 489</ref> Although this was a highly provocative act, Codrington claimed that there was no intention to engage in battle, but only to make a show of force to induce the Ottomans to respect the armistice and to desist from atrocities against the civilian population.<ref>''Codrington's report on battle to Admiralty 21 Oct 1827'' reproduced in James (1837) VI. 486–488</ref>[[File:Admiral Edward Codrington.jpg|thumb|Vice-Admiral Sir [[Edward Codrington]], Allied commander-in-chief at the Battle of Navarino]]