Editing Battle of Hürtgen Forest (section)

===First phase===
{{more citations needed section|date=November 2022}}
The 9th Infantry Division's ultimate objective were the Rur River crossings at [[Düren]]. On September 16, 1944, an attack by the 47th Infantry Regiment captured [[Schevenhütte]],{{sfn|MacDonald|1984|p=80}} on the northern fringes of the forest, with few casualties. The division had surprised the Germans, but lacked the strength to push on as two of their regiments were committed to the south. Attacks on and around the Höfen-Alzen ridge by the 39th and 60th Infantry Regiments were met with heavy resistance and pushed back. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 39th captured Lammersdorf, but could not dislodge enemies entrenched in the woods behind the village; the 3rd Battalion suffered heavy losses attacking Hill 554, near Lammersdorf. In these early engagements, the 9th Infantry Division was unable to eject the Germans from the periphery of the forest, and decided to push through it to the northeast and capture [[Hürtgen]] and Kleinhau. The engagement began on September 19, 1944. Repeated probes entered the forest toward their objective, but were beaten back by the terrain and Germans dug into prepared positions. On October 5, the 39th and 60th Infantry Regiments attacked towards the town of Schmidt while the 47th held a defensive position. The [[Monschau]]-Düren road was quickly cut, but both regiments were slowed by defenses and suffered significant casualties: The 60th's 2nd Battalion was reduced to a third after the first day. The 39th was halted at the Weisser Weh Creek; there were problems with narrow paths, air bursts in trees, and fire breaks which were blocked or [[enfiladed]]. Evacuation and supply was difficult or impossible. By 16 October, {{convert|3000|yd|m|abbr=on}} had been gained at the cost of 4,500 casualties. The [[U.S. 28th Infantry Division]]—a [[Pennsylvania]] [[United States National Guard|National Guard]] unit—arrived the same day to relieve the battered 9th. Cota established his division command post in the village of Rott on 25 October and began coordination with the V Corps staff for future operations as his units began to occupy the 9th's positions north of Lammersdorf.<ref name=":0"/>{{sfn|Miller|1989|p={{pn|date=February 2024}}}}

When Cota received the operations order for the attack he was perplexed and none too happy. It was far too directive and detailed and left little for him, his staff and his regimental commanders to do except execute it. It was basically the same plan that had been given to the 9th Infantry Division and that plan had failed. Hodges dictated that the 28th was to capture Vossenack and the treeline facing the village of Huertgen. Gerow directed that an entire regiment would assault Huertgen to the north; a second regiment would attack and capture Schmidt in the center and a third regiment attack south towards Rafflesbrand.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Bradbeer |first=Thomas G. |title=Major General Cota and the Battle of the Huertgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command? |url=https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/DCL_MGCota.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161221163133/http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/DCL_MGCota.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 21, 2016 |journal=United States Army Combined Arms Center}} {{PD-notice}}</ref> The 28th Division was reinforced with the attached 707th Tank Battalion, tracked [[M29 Weasel]] transport and air support. Of its three regiments, one was deployed to protect the northern flank, another to attack Germeter, and the third to capture Schmidt, the main objective. The area had terrible terrain with the [[Kall, Germany|Kall]] Trail running along a deep river ravine. The terrain was not suited to tanks, despite the need for armor to support the infantry.

[[File:Track in the Kall Valley.jpg|thumb|A track (from a U.S. armored vehicle) that was buried by U.S. troops on an upward slope of a pathway to assist in traction for other U.S. vehicles in the Kall Valley]]

"It was during the final days of preparation before the attack that Cota made three crucial mistakes that would have far reaching effects on his division's assault into the Huertgen. The first was that neither he nor his staff directed subordinate units to conduct patrolling into the Huertgen Forest [...]; the second mistake was tied to the first. Cota had approved the extremely narrow Kall trail to serve as the division's main supply route [...]. Aerial reconnaissance could not confirm the trails condition due to the dense forest covering it but ground patrols would have provided much valuable information, both about the enemy and the trail. The third mistake was his decision not to use armor to support his infantry. Believing that the forest would not allow access and the required road network to support tanks, he kept all but two of his tank companies and all of his tank destroyer units in the rear to augment his division artillery. Had he discussed this with the commander of 9th Infantry Division, he would have learned that tanks could operate in many areas of the forest and with some training and prior coordination they could provide valuable support to the infantry."<ref name=":0" />

The attack by the 28th Division started on 2 November; the defenders were expecting it and were ready. The [[U.S. 109th Infantry Regiment]], assigned to capture the woods north of Germeter, was impeded after {{convert|300|yd|m}} by an unexpected minefield (the "Wild Pig"), pinned down by mortar and artillery fire and harassed by local [[counterattack]]s. Just {{convert|1|mi|km|spell=in}} was gained after two days, after which the 109th dug in and endured casualties. This initial attack was nearly all the ground the 109th would take during the battle. The [[110th Infantry Regiment (United States)|U.S. 110th Infantry Regiment]] had to clear the woods next to the Kall River, capture Simonskall, and maintain a supply route for the advance on Schmidt: Again, these were very difficult tasks due to weather, prepared defenses, determined defenders, and terrain. The weather prevented tactical air support until 5 November.

The [[U.S. 112th Infantry Regiment]], attacking from Germeter, took Vossenack and the neighboring ridge by the afternoon. The 112th was then halted by strong defenses and difficult terrain. The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 112th moved across the Kall Valley and captured Kommerscheidt and Schmidt, respectively, on 3 November. The German supply route to Monschau was cut, but American supply, reinforcement, and evacuation were very limited as the Kall Trail had poor terrain and was infiltrated by the Germans. At dawn on November 4, a strong German counter-attack by tanks of the [[116th Panzer Division]] and a chance encirclement by troops from the 89th Infantry Division rapidly expelled the 3rd Battalion from Schmidt, and they were unable to counter-attack. The battalion disintegrated after constant shelling and a fierce attack by the 116th Panzer Division and some men inadvertently fled east, to be captured by the Germans.{{sfn|Miller|1995|p=70}} The rest of the battalion retreated to Kommerscheidt to join the 112th's 1st Battalion. Realizing the gravity of the situation, eight [[M4 Sherman]]s of Company A, 707th Tank Battalion attempted to cross the Kall Valley, but only three actually made it across to support the beleaguered 112th. The 116th Panzer Division again attacked with tanks and infantry several times. The American tanks, along with infantry and air support, destroyed five German [[Panzer IV]] tanks. At Vossenack, the 112th's 2nd Battalion was nearly forced out of the town on November 6 by a fierce German counterattack, but were assisted by engineers in retaking the western part of the town. The Americans across the Kall Valley at Kommerscheidt held on until November 8, when an order to withdraw was given.{{sfn|Miller|1995|pp=83–84}} The positions at Schmidt and the Kall Trail were abandoned. It wasn't until February 1945 that the [[82nd Airborne Division]] permanently captured the Kall Trail and Schmidt.

A German regimental doctor, ''Hauptmann'' [[:de:Günter Stüttgen|Günter Stüttgen]], negotiated an unofficial ceasefire with the Americans at the Kall Bridge from 7–12 November, in order to attend to the wounded of both sides, numbering in the thousands.<ref>{{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20180701030447/http://fortblissbugle.com/monitor/2018/03march/030118/pdf/030118part1a.pdf Marcy Sanchez ''Fort Bliss Bugle'' (03 March 2018) WBAMC's Troop Command welcomes new CSM]}}, p. 7</ref> The lives of many American soldiers were saved by German medics.<ref name="Konejung Stiftung: Kultur">[http://www.konejung-stiftung.de/ATimeForHealing.htm Konejung Stiftung: Kultur]</ref>