Editing Battle of Cold Harbor (section)

==Battle==

===May  31===
The cavalry forces that had fought at [[Battle of Old Church|Old Church]] continued to face each other on May 31. Lee sent a cavalry division under Maj. Gen. [[Fitzhugh Lee]] to reinforce Brig. Gen. [[Matthew Butler]] and secure the crossroads at Old Cold Harbor. As Union Brig. Gen. [[Alfred Thomas Torbert|Alfred T. A. Torbert]] increased pressure on the Confederates, Robert E. Lee ordered Anderson's First Corps to shift right from Totopotomoy Creek to support the cavalry. The lead brigade of Hoke's division also reached the crossroads to join Butler and Fitzhugh Lee. At 4 p.m. Torbert and elements of Brig. Gen. [[David McM. Gregg]]'s cavalry division drove the Confederates from the Old Cold Harbor crossroads and began to dig in. As more of Hoke's and Anderson's men streamed in, Union cavalry commander Maj. Gen. [[Philip Sheridan]] became concerned and ordered Torbert to pull back toward Old Church.<ref>Grimsley, pp. 196–199; Furgurson, pp. 81–82; Kennedy, pp. 291–293.</ref>

Grant continued his interest in Old Cold Harbor and ordered Wright's VI Corps to move in that direction from his right flank on Totopotomoy Creek. He ordered Sheridan to return to the crossroads and secure it "at all hazards." Torbert returned at 1 a.m. and was relieved to find that the Confederates had failed to notice his previous withdrawal.<ref>Trudeau, pp. 262–263; King, p. 296; Kennedy, p. 293; Grimsley, pp. 199–201.</ref>

===June 1===
[[File:Overland Campaign June 1.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Positions of the armies on the afternoon of June 1, 1864]]
[[File:ColdHarbor-June1.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Cold Harbor, June 1]]
Robert E. Lee's plan for June 1 was to use his newly concentrated infantry against the small cavalry forces at Old Cold Harbor. But his subordinates did not coordinate correctly. Anderson did not integrate Hoke's division with his attack plan and left him with the understanding that he was not to assault until the First Corps' attack was well underway, because the Union defenders were disorganized as well. Wright's VI Corps had not moved out until after midnight and was on a {{convert|15|mi|km}} march. Smith's XVIII Corps, having been mistakenly sent to the wrong location several miles away, did not reach Old Cold Harbor in time to assist Torbert.<ref>Kennedy, pp. 291–293; Grimsley, pp. 202–203; Trudeau, p. 265.</ref>

Anderson led his attack with the brigade formerly commanded by veteran Brig. Gen. [[Joseph B. Kershaw]], which was now under a less experienced [[South Carolina]] politician, Col. [[Laurence M. Keitt]]. Keitt's men approached the entrenched cavalry of Brig. Gen. [[Wesley Merritt]]. Armed with seven-shot [[Spencer repeating rifle|Spencer repeating carbines]], Merritt's men delivered heavy fire, mortally wounding Keitt and destroying his brigade's cohesion. Hoke obeyed what he understood to be his orders and did not join in the attack, which was quickly called back by Anderson.<ref>Jaynes, p. 152; Welcher, p. 986; Trudeau, pp. 266–267; Grimsley, p. 201; Furgurson, pp. 89–94.</ref>

By 9 a.m. Wright's lead elements arrived at the crossroads and began to extend and improve the entrenchments started by the cavalrymen. Although Grant had intended for Wright to attack immediately, his men were exhausted from their long march and they were unsure as to the strength of the enemy. Wright decided to wait until after Smith arrived, which occurred in the afternoon, and the XVIII Corps men began to entrench on the right of the VI Corps. The Union cavalrymen retired to the east.<ref>Furgurson, pp. 94–95; Welcher, pp. 986–987.</ref>

For the upcoming attack, Meade was concerned that the corps of Wright and Smith would not be sufficient, so he attempted to convince Warren to send reinforcements. He wrote to the V Corps commander, "Generals Wright and Smith will attack this evening. It is very desirable you should join this attack, unless in your judgment it is impracticable." Warren decided to send the division of Brig. Gen. [[Henry H. Lockwood]], which began to march at 6 p.m., but no adequate reconnaissance of the road network had been conducted and Lockwood was not able to reach the impending battle in time to make a difference. Meade was also concerned about his left flank, which was not anchored on the Chickahominy and was potentially threatened by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. He ordered Phil Sheridan to send scouting parties into the area, but Sheridan resisted, telling Meade that it would be impossible to move his men before dark.<ref>Rhea, pp. 229–230.</ref>

At 6:30&nbsp;p.m. the attack that Grant had ordered for the morning finally began. Both Wright's and Smith's corps moved forward. Wright's men made little progress south of the Mechanicsville Road, which connected New and Old Cold Harbor, recoiling from heavy fire. North of the road, Brig. Gen. [[Emory Upton]]'s brigade of Brig. Gen. [[David Allen Russell|David A. Russell]]'s division also encountered heavy fire from Brig. Gen. [[Thomas L. Clingman]]'s brigade, "A sheet of flame, sudden as lightning, red as blood, and so near that it seemed to singe the men's faces." Although Upton tried to rally his men forward, his brigade fell back to its starting point.<ref>Rhea, p. 241; Furgurson, p. 99; Grimsley, pp. 203–206; Welcher, p. 988; Trudeau, p. 269, states that Smith's assault began at 5 p.m.</ref>

To Upton's right, the brigade of Col. [[William S. Truex]] found a gap in the Confederate line, between the brigades of Clingman and Brig. Gen. [[William T. Wofford]], through a swampy, brush-filled ravine. As Truex's men charged through the gap, Clingman swung two regiments around to face them, and Anderson sent in Brig. Gen. [[Eppa Hunton]]'s brigade from his corps reserve. Truex became surrounded on three sides and was forced to withdraw, although his men brought back hundreds of [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgian]] prisoners with them.<ref>Grimsley, pp. 204–206; Welcher, p. 988.</ref>

While action continued on the southern end of the battlefield, the three corps of Hancock, Burnside, and Warren were occupying a 5-mile line that stretched southeast to Bethesda Church, facing the Confederates under A.P. Hill, Breckinridge, and Early. At the border between the IX and V Corps, the division of Maj. Gen. [[Thomas L. Crittenden]], recently transferred from the [[Western Theater of the American Civil War|West]] following his poor performance in the [[Battle of Chickamauga]], occupied a doglegged position with an angle that was parallel to the Shady Grove Road, separated from the V Corps by a marsh known as Magnolia Swamp. Two divisions of Early's Corps—Maj. Gen. [[Robert E. Rodes]] on the left, Maj. Gen. [[John B. Gordon]] on the right—used this area as their avenue of approach for an attack that began at 7 p.m. Warren later described this attack as a "feeler", and despite some initial successes, aided by the poor battle management of Crittenden, both Confederate probes were repulsed.<ref>Rhea, pp. 256–59; Grimsley, pp. 208–209.</ref>

At this same time, Warren's division under Lockwood had become lost wandering on unfamiliar farm roads. Despite having dispatched Lockwood explicitly, the V Corps commander wrote to Meade, "In some unaccountable way, [Lockwood] took his whole division, without my knowing it, away from the left of the line of battle, and turned up the dark 2 miles in my rear, and I have not yet got him back. All this time the firing should have guided him at least. He is too incompetent, and too high rank leaves us no subordinate place for him. I earnestly beg that he may at once be relieved of duty with this army." Meade relieved Lockwood and replaced him with Brig. Gen. [[Samuel W. Crawford]].<ref>Rhea, pp. 259–260; Furgurson, pp. 112–113.</ref>

By dark, the fighting had petered out on both ends of the line. The Union assault had cost it 2,200 casualties, versus about 1,800 for the Confederates, but some progress had been made. They almost broke the Confederate line, which was now pinned in place with Union entrenchments being dug only yards away. Several of the generals, including Upton and Meade, were furious at Grant for ordering an assault without proper reconnaissance.<ref>Jaynes, p. 154; Rhea, pp. 266–268; Trudeau, p. 273, states that the fighting stopped by 10 p.m.</ref>

===June 2===
[[File:ColdHarborBreastworks1864.jpg|thumb|Makeshift Confederate breastworks at the extreme left of their line]]
[[File:ColdHarborBattlefield1864crop1.jpg|thumb|Earthworks photographed after the battle]]

Although the June 1 attacks had been unsuccessful, Meade believed that an attack early on June 2 could succeed if he was able to mass sufficient forces against an appropriate location. He and Grant decided to attack Lee's right flank. Anderson's men had been heavily engaged there on June 1, and it seemed unlikely that they had found the time to build substantial defenses. And if the attack succeeded, Lee's right would be driven back into the [[Chickahominy River]]. Meade ordered Hancock's II Corps to shift southeast from Totopotomoy Creek and assume a position to the left of Wright's VI Corps. Once Hancock was in position, Meade would attack on his left from Old Cold Harbor with three Union corps in line, totaling 35,000 men: Hancock's II Corps, Wright's VI Corps, and Baldy Smith's XVIII Corps. Meade also ordered Warren and Burnside to attack Lee's left flank in the morning "at all hazards," convinced that Lee was moving troops from his left to fortify his right.<ref>Kennedy, p. 293; Grimsley, pp. 207–208; Welcher, p. 989.</ref>

Hancock's men marched almost all night and arrived too worn-out for an immediate attack that morning. Grant agreed to let the men rest and postponed the attack until 5 p.m., and then again until 4:30&nbsp;a.m. on June 3. But Grant and Meade did not give specific orders for the attack, leaving it up to the corps commanders to decide where they would hit the Confederate lines and how they would coordinate with each other. No senior commander had reconnoitered the enemy position. Baldy Smith wrote that he was "aghast at the reception of such an order, which proved conclusively the utter absence of any military plan." He told his staff that the whole attack was, "simply an order to slaughter my best troops."<ref>Jaynes, p. 156; Furgurson, pp. 120–121; Grimsley, p. 207; Trudeau, pp. 276–277; King, p. 297; Welcher, p. 989.</ref>

Robert E. Lee took advantage of the Union delays to bolster his defenses. When Hancock departed Totopotomoy Creek, Lee was free to shift Breckinridge's division to his far right flank, where he would once again face Hancock. Breckinridge drove a small Union force off Turkey Hill, which dominated the southern part of the battlefield. Lee also moved troops from A.P. Hill's Third Corps, the divisions of Brig. Gens. [[William Mahone]] and [[Cadmus M. Wilcox]], to support Breckinridge, and stationed cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee to guard the army's right flank. The result was a curving line on low ridges, {{convert|7|mi|km}} long, with the left flank anchored on Totopotomoy Creek, the right on the Chickahominy River, making any flanking moves impossible.<ref>Welcher, p. 989; Salmon, p. 295; Grimsley, p. 208.</ref>

Lee's engineers used their time effectively and constructed the "most ingenious defensive configuration the war had yet witnessed." Barricades of earth and logs were erected. Artillery was posted with converging fields of fire on every avenue of approach, and stakes were driven into the ground to aid gunners' range estimates. A newspaper correspondent wrote that the works were, "Intricate, zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protecting flanks of lines, lines built to enfilade an opposing line, ... [It was] a maze and labyrinth of works within works." Heavy skirmish lines suppressed any ability of the Union to determine the strength or exact positions of the Confederate entrenchments.<ref>McPherson, p. 735; Jaynes, p. 156; Grimsley, pp. 209–210.</ref>

Although they did not know the details of their objectives, the Union soldiers who had survived the frontal assaults at Spotsylvania Court House seemed to be in no doubt as to what they would be up against in the morning. Grant's aide, Lt. Col. Horace Porter, wrote in his memoirs that he saw many men writing their names on papers that they pinned inside their uniforms, so their bodies could be identified. (The accuracy of this story is disputed as Porter is the only source.) One blood-spattered diary from a Union soldier found after the battle included a final entry: "June 3. Cold Harbor. I was killed."<ref>Foote, p. 290; Salmon, p. 296; Grimsley, p. 210; Trudeau, pp. 280, 297.</ref>

===June 3===
[[File:ColdHarbor-June3.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Cold Harbor, June 3]]
<!-- [[File:CH01 Battle of Cold Harbor.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Cold Harbor, June 3 (additional map)]] Probably superfluous, definitely disrupts page layout due to verticality of these images -->

At 4:30&nbsp;a.m. on June 3, the three Union corps began to advance through a thick ground fog. Massive fire from the Confederate lines quickly caused heavy casualties and the survivors were pinned down. Although the results varied in different parts of the line, the overall repulse of the Union advance resulted in the most lopsided casualties since the assault on Marye's Heights at the [[Battle of Fredericksburg]] in 1862.<ref>Salmon, p. 296; Trudeau, p. 284; Catton, p. 267.</ref>

The most effective performance of the day was on the Union left flank, where Hancock's corps was able to break through a portion of Breckinridge's front line and drive those defenders out of their entrenchments in [[hand to hand combat|hand-to-hand fighting]]. Several hundred prisoners and four guns were captured. However, nearby Confederate artillery was brought to bear on the entrenchments, turning them into a death trap for the Federals. Breckinridge's reserves counterattacked these men from the division of Brig. Gen. [[Francis C. Barlow]] and drove them off. Hancock's other advanced division, under Brig. Gen. [[John Gibbon]], became disordered in swampy ground and could not advance through the heavy Confederate fire, with two brigade commanders (Cols. [[Peter A. Porter (colonel)|Peter A. Porter]] and H. Boyd McKeen) lost as casualties. One of Gibbon's men, complaining of a lack of reconnaissance, wrote, "We felt it was murder, not war, or at best a very serious mistake had been made."<ref>Rhea, pp. 360–361; Grimsley, pp. 211–212; Trudeau, pp. 285–286, 289–290; King, p. 304.</ref>

In the center, Wright's corps was pinned down by the heavy fire and made little effort to advance further, still recovering from their costly charge on June 1. The normally aggressive Emory Upton felt that further movement by his division was "impracticable." Confederate defenders in this part of the line were unaware that a serious assault had been made against their position.<ref>Grimsley, pp. 214–215; Trudeau, pp. 286, 290; King, p. 305.</ref>

[[File:3g05970v.jpg|thumb|left|7th New York Heavy Artillery (serving as infantry) preparing to leave the trenches and charge the Confederate line, sketched by [[Alfred Waud]]]]
[[File:Unburied_Dead_on_Battlefield._(19948752786).jpg|thumb|left|"Unburied Dead on Battlefield" by [[John Reekie]]; issued as Stero #914 being taken on the 1862 Battlefield of Gaines Mills aka First Cold Harbor April 1865; taken near the Adams Farm where 7th New York artillery was stationed June 1864 see [https://civilwartalk.com/threads/april-1865-gaines-mills-cold-harbor-picture.88976/ Civil war Talk].]]

On the Union right, Smith's men advanced through unfavorable terrain and were channeled into two ravines. When they emerged in front of the Confederate line, rifle and artillery fire mowed them down. A Union officer wrote, "The men bent down as they pushed forward, as if trying, as they were, to breast a tempest, and the files of men went down like rows of blocks or bricks pushed over by striking against one another." A Confederate described the carnage of double-canister artillery fire as "deadly, bloody work." The artillery fire against Smith's corps was heavier than might have been expected because Warren's V Corps to his right was reluctant to advance and the Confederate gunners in Warren's sector concentrated on Smith's men instead.<ref>Rhea, pp. 353, 356; Grimsley, p. 215; Trudeau, pp. 286, 290–291.</ref>

The only activity on the northern end of the field was by Burnside's IX Corps, facing Jubal Early. He launched a powerful assault at 6 a.m. that overran the Confederate skirmishers but mistakenly thought he had pierced the first line of earthworks and halted his corps to regroup before moving on, which he planned for that afternoon.<ref>Welcher, p. 992; Grimsley, pp. 215–216.</ref>

At 7 a.m. Grant advised Meade to vigorously exploit any successful part of the assault. Meade ordered his three corps commanders on the left to assault at once, without regard to the movements of their neighboring corps. But all had had enough. Hancock advised against the move. Smith, calling a repetition of the attack a "wanton waste of life," refused to advance again. Wright's men increased their rifle fire but stayed in place. By 12:30&nbsp;p.m. Grant conceded that his army was done. He wrote to Meade, "The opinion of the corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of further advance for the present." Union soldiers still pinned down before the Confederate lines began entrenching, using cups and bayonets to dig, sometimes including bodies of dead comrades as part of their improvised earthworks.<ref>Rhea, pp. 374–379; Grimsley, pp. 216–217.</ref>

Meade inexplicably bragged to his wife the next day that he was in command for the assault. But his performance had been poor. Despite orders from Grant that the corps commanders were to examine the ground, their reconnaissance was lax and Meade failed to supervise them adequately, either before or during the attack. He was able to motivate only about 20,000 of his men to attack—the II Corps and parts of the XVIII and IX—failing to achieve the mass he knew he required to succeed. His men paid heavily for the poorly coordinated assault. Estimates of casualties that morning are from 3,000 to 7,000 on the Union side, no more than 1,500 on the Confederate.<ref>Rhea, p. 234; Catton, p. 265. See additional casualty estimates in the [[#Aftermath|'''Aftermath''' section]].</ref> Grant commented after the war:

{{Blockquote
|text=I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared.
|source=Ulysses S. Grant, ''Personal Memoirs''<ref>Grant, vol. 2, pp. 276–277.</ref>
}}

At 11 a.m. on June 3, the Confederate [[postmaster general]], [[John Henninger Reagan]], arrived with a delegation from Richmond. He asked Robert E. Lee, "General, if the enemy breaks your line, what reserve have you?" Lee provided an animated response: "Not a regiment, and that has been my condition ever since the fighting commenced on the Rappahannock. If I shorten my lines to provide a reserve, he will turn me; if I weaken my lines to provide a reserve, he will break them."<ref>Grimsley, p. 220; Foote, p. 293.</ref> Modern scholarship has shown Lee had ample reserves unengaged. His comments likely were to persuade Richmond to send more troops.<ref>Rhea, p. 273.</ref>

===June 4–12===
[[File:Coehorn at Cold Harbor.jpg|thumb|left|Union [[Coehorn|Coehorn mortars]] in action, drawn by [[Alfred Waud]]]]
Grant and Meade launched no more attacks on the Confederate defenses at Cold Harbor. The two opposing armies faced each other for nine days of trench warfare, in some places only yards apart. Sharpshooters worked continuously, killing many. Union artillery bombarded the Confederates with a battery of eight [[Coehorn|Coehorn mortars]]; the Confederates responded by depressing the trail of a 24-pound [[howitzer]] and lobbing shells over the Union positions. Although there were no more large-scale attacks, casualty figures for the entire battle were twice as large as from the June 3 assault alone.<ref>Catton, p. 267; Furgurson, pp. 181–182; Trudeau, p. 298.</ref>

The trenches were hot, dusty, and miserable, but conditions were worse between the lines, where thousands of wounded Federal soldiers suffered horribly without food, water, or medical assistance. Grant was reluctant to ask for a formal truce that would allow him to recover his wounded because that would be an acknowledgment he had lost the battle. He and Lee traded notes across the lines from June 5 to 7 without coming to an agreement, and when Grant formally requested a two-hour cessation of hostilities, it was too late for most of the unfortunate wounded, who were now bloated corpses. Grant was widely criticized in the Northern press for this lapse of judgment.<ref>King, p. 311: "Under the accepted rules of warfare of the 19th century, the losing side in a battle was supposed to send a flag of truce to the victor to ask for a cease-fire that would allow both sides to recover their dead and wounded." Grimsley, p. 220; Trudeau, pp. 304–306.</ref>

{{Quote box
|align=right
|width=30%
|quote=Every corpse I saw was as black as coal. It was not possible to remove them. They were buried where they fell. ... I saw no live man lying on this ground. The wounded must have suffered horribly before death relieved them, lying there exposed to the blazing southern sun o' days, and being eaten alive by beetles o' nights.
|source=Union artillery officer, Frank Wilkeson<ref>Grimsley, p. 221.</ref>
}}

On June 4 Grant tightened his lines by moving Burnside's corps behind Matadequin Creek as a reserve and moving Warren leftward to connect with Smith, shortening his lines about {{convert|3|mi|km}}. On June 6 Early probed Burnside's new position but could not advance through the impassable swamps.<ref>Furgurson, pp. 206–208.</ref>
Grant realized that, once again in the campaign, he was in a stalemate with Lee and additional assaults were not the answer. He planned three actions to make some headway. First, in the [[Shenandoah Valley]], Maj. Gen. [[David Hunter]] was making progress against Confederate forces, and Grant hoped that by interdicting Lee's supplies, the Confederate general would be forced to dispatch reinforcements to the Valley. Second, on June 7 Grant dispatched his cavalry under Sheridan (the divisions of Brig. Gens. [[David McM. Gregg]] and [[Wesley Merritt]]) to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad near [[Charlottesville, Virginia|Charlottesville]]. Third, he planned a stealthy operation to withdraw from Lee's front and move across the James River. Lee reacted to the first two actions as Grant had hoped. He pulled Breckinridge's division from Cold Harbor and sent it toward [[Lynchburg, Virginia|Lynchburg]] to parry Hunter. By June 12 he followed this by assigning Jubal Early permanent command of the Second Corps and sending them to the Valley as well. And he sent two of his three cavalry divisions in pursuit of Sheridan, leading to the [[Battle of Trevilian Station]]. However, despite anticipating that Grant might shift across the James, Lee was taken by surprise when it occurred. On June 12 the Army of the Potomac finally disengaged to march southeast to cross the James and threaten [[Petersburg, Virginia|Petersburg]], a crucial rail junction south of Richmond.<ref>McPherson, p. 737; Trudeau, pp. 305–306; Eicher, pp. 686–687; Salmon, pp. 258–259; Grimsley, p. 223; Esposito, text for map 136.</ref>