Editing Battle of Cambrai (1917) (section)

==Aftermath==

===Analysis===

[[File:Battle of cambrai 1 - front lines.png|thumb|left|{{centre|Front lines before and after the battle}}]]
The success of the first day was greeted in Britain by the ringing of church bells.{{sfnm|1a1=Miles|1y=1991|1p=278|2a1=Smithers|2y=2014|2p=198}} The massed use of tanks, despite being a further increase on previous deployments, was not new but the success of the attack and the resulting Allied press enthusiasm was unprecedented.{{sfnm|1a1=Littledale|1y=1918|1pp=836–848|2a1=Miles|2y=1991|2p=278}} The particular effectiveness of the tanks at Cambrai was the initial passage through barbed wire defences, which had been previously "supposed by the Germans to be impregnable".{{sfn|Sheldon|2009|pp=9–10}}

The victory showed that even the most elaborate field fortifications could be overcome by a surprise attack, using a combination of new methods and equipment, reflecting a general increase in the British capacity to combine infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft in attacks.{{sfn|Sheldon|2009|p=ix}} The German revival after the shock of the British advance improved German morale but the potential for similar attacks meant that the Germans had to divert resources to anti-tank defences and weapons, an extra demand that the Germans could ill afford to meet,

{{quote|Wherever the ground offers suitable going for tanks, surprise attacks like this may be expected. That being the case, there can be no more mention, therefore, of quiet fronts.|[[Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria|Crown Prince Rupprecht]]{{sfn|Sheldon|2009|p=312}}}}

The German counter-attack showed the effectiveness of artillery, trench mortars and evolving [[Stormtroopers (Imperial Germany)|storm troop]] tactics, adopted from methods introduced by Hutier and his artillery commander, Colonel [[Georg Bruchmüller]], against the Russians.{{sfnm|1a1=Miles|1y=1991|1p=16|2a1=Sheldon|2y=2009|2p=ix}}<!--such tactics evolved in all the armies and began in early 1915 at 2nd Artois--> From the German perspective, questions arose regarding battlefield [[logistics|supply]] beyond rail heads and the suitability of the [[MG 08]] [[machine gun]] for rapid movement.{{sfn|Sheldon|2009|p=xi}} By the end of the battle, the British retained some of the ground captured in the north and the Germans a smaller amount taken in the south. The British conducted several investigations, including a [[Public inquiry|Court of Enquiry]].{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=297–298}}<!-- PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE. This hidden text (for now) needs much more detailed and cited support before it is added back to visible main space. | Several factors have contributed to the popular perception of the battle as a tank battle, "largely from" (not what sources say exactly, not Hammond, nor Liddell Hart, nor Fuller) writing by [[Basil Liddell Hart]] and J. F. C. Fuller; the latter erroneously claimed credit for the plan. Liddell Hart, whose position as Military Correspondent of the ''[[Daily Telegraph]]'' and ''[[The Times]]'' newspapers {{nowrap|(1925–1939)}} gave him great public influence, was a critic of [[Douglas Haig]] and attempted to use the battle to indicate a "new" form of doctrine.-->

===Casualties===

According to the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, the British forces in France, in the period of the Battle of Cambrai suffered {{nowrap|75,681 casualties,}} {{nowrap|10,042 killed}} or died of wounds, {{nowrap|48,702 wounded}} and {{nowrap|16,987 missing}} or prisoners of war.{{sfn|Stat|1922|p=326}} Wilfrid Miles, the official historian, gave British losses in the Third Army, Tank Corps and the RFC from 20 November to 8 December {{nowrap|as 44,207,}} {{nowrap|40,000 of}} them in the main battle. On the first day, {{nowrap|179 tanks}} were lost, {{nowrap|65 being}} knocked out, {{nowrap|71 suffering}} mechanical defects and {{nowrap|43 by}} other causes. the British took {{nowrap|11,105 prisoners,}} {{nowrap|98 field}} guns and howitzers and {{nowrap|forty heavy}} guns and howitzers, {{nowrap|456 machine-guns}} and {{nowrap|74 trench}} mortars. The British recorded casualties on the basis of a daily head count and during the war the Germans counted the number of patients in hospital every ten days, which omitted lightly wounded, expected to return to service in a few days, not evacuated from the corps area.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=90, 273–274}} After the war the Germans compiled the "''Sanitätsbericht''" (1934) the German Army Medical report of the World War 1914–1918, in which the Germans suffered {{nowrap|54,720 casualties}} at Cambrai, {{nowrap|8,817 killed}} and died of wounds, {{nowrap|22,931 wounded}} and {{nowrap|22,972 missing}} and prisoners of war.{{sfn|Sanitätsbericht|1934|p=55}}