Editing Balfour Declaration (section)

==== 1914–16: Initial Zionist–British Government discussions ====

In July 1914 war broke out in Europe between the [[Triple Entente]] (Britain, France, and the [[Russian Empire]]) and the [[Central Powers]] (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and, later that year, the [[Ottoman Empire]]).{{sfn|Schneer|2010|p=32}}

The [[Cabinet of the United Kingdom|British Cabinet]] first discussed Palestine at a meeting on 9{{nbsp}}November 1914, four days after Britain's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire, of which the [[Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem]]{{snd}}often referred to as Palestine{{sfn|Büssow|2011|p=5}}{{snd}}was a component. At the meeting [[David Lloyd George]], then [[Chancellor of the Exchequer]], "referred to the ultimate destiny of Palestine".{{sfn|Reid|2011|p=115}} The Chancellor, whose law firm Lloyd George, Roberts and Co had been engaged a decade before by the [[Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland]] to work on the [[Uganda Scheme]],{{sfn|Defries|2014|p=44}} was to become Prime Minister by the time of the declaration, and was ultimately responsible for it.{{sfn|Lewis|2009|pp=115–119}}

[[File:Future of Palestine Herbert Samuel memorandum 1915 CAB 37 123 43.jpg|thumb|left|Herbert Samuel's Cabinet memorandum, ''[[The Future of Palestine]]'', as published in the British Cabinet papers (CAB 37/123/43), as at 21{{nbsp}}January 1915]]

Weizmann's political efforts picked up speed,{{efn|group=qt|name=Weiz1|From Weizmann's memoirs: "The entry of Turkey into the fray and the remarks made by the Premier in his Guildhall speech were an additional impulse towards proceeding with the reconnoitring work at a higher speed&nbsp;... An opportunity offered itself to discuss the Jewish problems with Mr. C.&nbsp;P. Scott (Editor of the Manchester Guardian)… Mr.&nbsp;Scott, who has, I believe, given the whole problem a very careful and sympathetic attention, was good enough to promise that he would talk to Mr.&nbsp;Lloyd George on the subject&nbsp;... As it happened, Mr.&nbsp;Lloyd George, having several engagements for the week suggested that I should see Mr.&nbsp;Herbert Samuel, and an interview took place at his office. [Footnote: 10&nbsp;Dec. 1914]"{{sfn|Weizmann|1983|p=122}}}} and on 10{{nbsp}}December 1914 he met with [[Herbert Samuel]], a British Cabinet member and a secular Jew who had studied Zionism;{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|pp=79–81}} Samuel believed Weizmann's demands were too modest.{{efn|group=qt|Weizmann's memoirs: "He believed that my demands were too modest, that big things would have to be done in Palestine; he himself would move and would expect Jewry to move immediately the military situation was cleared up&nbsp;... The Jews would have to bring sacrifices and he was prepared to do so. At this point I ventured to ask in which way the plans of Mr.&nbsp;Samuel were more ambitious than mine. Mr.&nbsp;Samuel preferred not to enter into a discussion of his plans, as he would like to keep them 'liquid', but he suggested that the Jews would have to build railways, harbours, a university, a network of schools, etc.&nbsp;... He also thinks that perhaps the Temple may be rebuilt, as a symbol of Jewish unity, of course, in a modernised form."{{sfn|Weizmann|1983|p=122b}}}} Two days later, Weizmann met Balfour again, for the first time since their initial meeting in 1905; Balfour had been out of government ever since his electoral defeat in 1906, but remained a senior member of the [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservative Party]] in their role as [[Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition (United Kingdom)|Official Opposition]].{{efn|group=qt|Again from Weizmann's memoirs: "On the suggestion of Baron James, I went to see Sir Philip Magnus with whom I had a lengthy conversation, and he expressed his willingness to cooperate, provided that great discretion was used&nbsp;... I asked Sir Philip his opinion of the advisability of seeing Mr.&nbsp;Balfour, and he thought that an interview with Mr.&nbsp;Balfour would be of very great interest and value&nbsp;... At one of my visits to London I wrote to Mr.&nbsp;Balfour and got an appointment with him on Saturday the same week at 12&nbsp;o'clock in his house.[Footnote: 12&nbsp;Dec. 1914] I spoke to him practically in the same strain as I did to Mr.&nbsp;Samuel, but the whole turn of our conversation was more academic than practical."{{sfn|Weizmann|1983|p=126}}}}

A month later, Samuel circulated a memorandum entitled ''[[The Future of Palestine]]'' to his Cabinet colleagues. The memorandum stated: "I am assured that the solution of the problem of Palestine which would be much the most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist movement throughout the world would be the annexation of the country to the British Empire".{{sfn|Kamel|2015|p=106}} Samuel discussed a copy of his memorandum with Nathan Rothschild in February 1915, a month before the latter's death.{{sfn|Cooper|2015|p=148}} It was the first time in an official record that enlisting the support of Jews as a war measure had been proposed.{{sfn|Huneidi|2001|p=83}}

Many further discussions followed, including the initial meetings in 1915–16 between Lloyd George, who had been appointed [[Minister of Munitions]] in May 1915,{{sfn|Billauer|2013|p=21}} and Weizmann, who was appointed as a scientific advisor to the ministry in September 1915.{{sfn|Lieshout|2016|p=198}}{{sfn|Billauer|2013|p=21}} Seventeen years later, in his ''War Memoirs'', Lloyd George described these meetings as being the "fount and origin" of the declaration; historians have rejected this claim.{{efn|group=qt|Weizmann had been asked to produce a [[Acetone–butanol–ethanol fermentation|new process for the production of acetone]] in order to reduce the cost of [[cordite]] production;{{sfn|Lewis|2009|pp=115–119}} the popular suggestion that this role influenced the decision to release the declaration has been described as "fanciful",{{sfn|Defries|2014|p=50}} a "legend", a "myth",{{sfn|Cohen|2014|p=47}} and "a product of [Lloyd George's] imagination".{{sfn|Lewis|2009|p=115}} From Lloyd George's ''War Memoirs'', which created this myth: "But by the spring of 1915 the position in the American acetone market had become extremely delicate&nbsp;... In the survey we made of all the various prospective requirements, it soon became clear that the supplies of wood alcohol for the manufacture of acetone would prove quite insufficient to meet the increasing demands, particularly in 1916&nbsp;... While I was casting about for some solution of the difficulty, I ran against the late C.&nbsp;P. Scott, Editor of the Manchester Guardian&nbsp;... I took his word about Professor Weizmann and invited him to London to see me&nbsp;... He could produce acetone by a fermentation process on a laboratory scale, but it would require some time before he could guarantee successful production on a manufacturing scale. In a few weeks' time he came to me and said: "The problem is solved."... When our difficulties were solved through Dr.&nbsp;Weizmann's genius I said to him: 'You have rendered great service to the State, and I should like to ask the Prime Minister to recommend you to His Majesty for some honour.' He said: 'There is nothing I want for myself.' 'But is there nothing we can do as a recognition of your valuable assistance to the country?' I asked. &nbsp;He replied: 'Yes, I would like you to do something for my people.' He then explained his aspirations as to the repatriation of the Jews to the sacred land they had made famous. That was the fount and origin of the famous declaration about the National Home for Jews in Palestine. As soon as I became Prime Minister I talked the whole matter over with Mr.&nbsp;Balfour, who was then Foreign Secretary. As a scientist he was immensely interested when I told him of Dr.&nbsp;Weizmann's achievement. We were anxious at that time to gather Jewish support in neutral countries, notably in America. Dr.&nbsp;Weizmann was brought into direct contact with the Foreign Secretary. This was the beginning of an association, the outcome of which, after long examination, was the famous Balfour Declaration&nbsp;..."{{sfn|Lloyd George|1933|p=50}}}}