Editing Army Ballistic Missile Agency (section)

=== Jupiter versus Thor ===
[[File:Thor IRBM.jpg|thumb|upright=1.0|right|Thor was designed from the start to be a countervalue weapon, aimed at Soviet cities. Unlike Jupiter, Thor was designed to be transported by aircraft, specifically the [[Douglas C-124 Globemaster II]].]]

ABMA's work on the Jupiter progressed throughout the [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy's]] brief involvement, especially work on the INS. The goal had originally been to match Redstone's accuracy at the Jupiter's much extended range, but as development continued it became clear the ABMA team could improve on that considerably. This led to a period in which "The Army would lay down a particular accuracy, and wait for our arguments whether it was possible. We had to promise a lot, but were fortunate".{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=131}}

This process ultimately delivered a design intended to provide {{cvt|0.8|km}} accuracy at the full range, a radius one fourth that of the best INS designs being used by the Air Force. The system was so accurate that a number of observers expressed their skepticism about the Army's goals, with the [[Weapons Systems Evaluation Group]] (WSEG) suggesting they were hopelessly optimistic.{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=131}}

The Army's desire for accuracy was a side-effect of their mission concept for nuclear weapons. They saw the weapons as part of a large-scale battle in Europe, in which both sides would use nuclear weapons during a limited war that did not include the use of strategic weapons on each other's cities. In that case, "if wars were to be kept limited, such weapons would have to be capable of hitting only tactical targets". This approach saw support of a number of influential theorists, notably [[Henry Kissinger]], and was seized on as a uniquely Army mission.{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=132}}

Although the Air Force had started their own IRBM to compete with Jupiter, development was [[lackadaisical]]. They had the much more impressive [[SM-65 Atlas|Atlas]] to worry about, and even that saw relatively little interest in a force dominated by [[Strategic Air Command]]'s bomber-centric strategic vision.{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=129}} [[Curtis LeMay]], leader of SAC, was generally uninterested in Atlas, considering it useful only as a way to blast holes in the Soviet defensive systems to let his bombers through.{{sfn|Neufeld|1990|p=142}} But as the Jupiter program began to progress they became increasingly concerned that it would enter service before Atlas, potentially handing the Army some sort of strategic role in the short term.

The Air Force vision of war was significantly different from the Army's, consisting of a [[Massive retaliation|massive attack on the Soviet Union]] in the event of any sort of major military action, the so-called "Sunday punch".{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=127}}{{efn|In 1949, a Rear Admiral described the Air Force's policy as "ruthless and barbaric... random mass slaughter of men, women and children... militarily unsound... morally wrong... contrary to our fundamental ideals.{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=127}}}} The possibility of a major war that did not escalate to the point where strategic weapons were used was a serious concern to Air Force planners. If the Soviets became convinced the U.S. would respond to tactical nuclear use in kind, and that such use would not automatically unleash SAC, they might be more willing to chance a war in [[Europe]] where they might maintain superiority.

The Air Force began to agitate against Jupiter, saying that the Army's vision of a low-scale nuclear war was destabilizing, while claiming that their own Thor missile did not represent this sort of destabilizing force as it was purely strategic. They may also have been motivated by the WSEG's comments that if the Jupiter team's accuracy claims were true, "they would indicate that Jupiter is the most promising weapon for development".{{sfn|Mackenzie|1993|p=123}}