Editing Alvin Plantinga (section)

=== Problem of evil ===
{{Main|Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense}}
{{Theodicy}}

Plantinga proposed a "free-will defense" in a volume edited by [[Max Black]] in 1965,<ref>"Free Will Defense", in [[Max Black]] (ed), ''Philosophy in America''. Ithaca: Cornell UP / London: Allen & Unwin, 1965</ref> which attempts to refute the [[logical problem of evil]], the argument that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God.<ref name="BeebeIEP">{{harvnb|Beebe|2005}}</ref> Plantinga's argument (in a truncated form) states that "It is possible that God, even being omnipotent, could not create a world with free creatures who never choose evil. Furthermore, it is possible that God, even being omnibenevolent, would desire to create a world which contains evil if moral goodness requires free moral creatures."<ref>{{harvnb|Meister|2009|p=133}}</ref>

However, the argument's handling of [[natural evil]] has been disputed. According to the ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', the argument also "conflicts with important theistic doctrines" such as the notion of a [[heaven]] where free saved souls reside without doing evil, and the idea that God has free will yet is wholly good. Critics thus maintain that, if we take such doctrines to be (as Christians usually have), God could have created free creatures that always do right, contra Plantinga's claim.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H10 |title=Logical Problem of Evil |access-date=July 16, 2012}}</ref> [[J.&nbsp;L. Mackie]] saw Plantinga's free-will defense as incoherent.<ref>[[J.&nbsp;L. Mackie]] wrote: "[H]ow could there be logically contingent states of affairs, ''prior to the creation and existence of any created beings with free will'', which an omnipotent god would have to accept and put up with? This suggestion is simply incoherent. Indeed, by bringing in the notion of individual essences which determine—presumably non-causally—how Curly Smith, Satan, and the rest of us would choose freely or would act in each hypothetical situation, Plantinga has not rescued the free will defence but made its weaknesses all too clear". Mackie 1982, p. 174.</ref>

Plantinga's well-received book ''God, Freedom and Evil'', written in 1974, gave his response to what he saw as the incomplete and uncritical view of theism's criticism of [[theodicy]]. Plantinga's contribution stated that when the issue of a comprehensive doctrine of freedom is added to the discussion of the goodness of God and the omnipotence of God then it is not possible to exclude the presence of evil in the world after introducing freedom into the discussion. Plantinga's own summary occurs in his discussion titled "Could God Have Created a World Containing Moral Good but No Moral Evil", where he states his conclusion that, "...&nbsp;the price for creating a world in which they produce moral good is creating one in which they also produce moral evil."<ref>Plantinga, Alvin (1974). ''God, Freedom and Evil'', p. 49.</ref>