Editing Alcibiades (section)

==Recall to Athens==
===Negotiations with the Athenian oligarchs===
Alcibiades seemed to assume that the "radical democracy" would never agree to his recall to Athens.<ref name="Buckley411">T. Buckley, ''Aspects of Greek History'', 411.</ref> He exchanged messages with the Athenian leaders at [[Samos]] and suggested that if they could install an [[oligarchy]] friendly to him he would return to Athens and bring with him Persian money and possibly the Persian fleet of 147 triremes.<ref name="Plut25">{{cite Plutarch|Alcibiades|25}}</ref> Alcibiades set about winning over the most influential military officers, and achieved his goal by offering them a threefold plan: the Athenian constitution was to be changed, the recall of Alcibiades was to be voted, and Alcibiades was to win over Tissaphernes and the King of Persia to the Athenian side. Most of the officers in the Athenian fleet accepted the plan and welcomed the prospect of a narrower constitution, which would allow them a greater part in determining policy. According to Thucydides, only one of the Athenian generals at Samos, [[Phrynichus (oligarch)|Phrynichus]], opposed the plan and argued that Alcibiades cared no more for the proposed oligarchy than for the traditional democracy.<ref name="Sealey359">R. Sealey, ''A History of the Greek City States'', 359.</ref> The involvement in the plot of another general, [[Thrasybulus]], remains unclear.{{efn|Kagan has suggested that Thrasybulus was one of the founding members of the scheme and was willing to support moderate oligarchy, but was alienated by the extreme actions taken by the plotters.<ref>Donald Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 385.</ref> Robert J. Buck, on the other hand, maintains that Thrasybulus was probably never involved in the plot, possibly because he was absent from Samos at the time of its inception.<ref>R.J. Buck, ''Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy'', 27–28.</ref>}}

These officers of the Athenian fleet formed a group of conspirators, but were met with opposition from the majority of the soldiers and sailors; these were eventually calmed down "by the advantageous prospect of the pay from the king".<ref name="Th8.48">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:48|8.48]].</ref> The members of the group assembled and prepared to send [[Pisander]], one of their number, on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians.<ref name="Th8.49">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:49|8.49]].</ref>

Phrynichus, fearing that Alcibiades if restored would avenge himself upon him for his opposition, sent a secret letter to the Spartan Admiral, Astyochus, to tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause by making Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an express revelation of the rest of the intrigue. Astyochus went up to Alcibiades and Tissaphernes at [[Magnesia on the Maeander|Magnesia]] and communicated to them Phrynichus's letter. Alcibiades responded in kind, sending to the authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he had done, and requiring that he should be put to death.<ref name="Th8.50">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:50|8.50]].</ref> Phrynichus in desperation wrote again to Astyochus, offering him a chance to destroy the Athenian fleet at Samos. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades who informed the officers at Samos that they had been betrayed by Phrynichus. Alcibiades however gained no credit, because Phrynichus had anticipated Alcibiades's letter and, before the accusations could arrive, told the army that he had received information of an enemy plan to attack the camp and that they should fortify Samos as quickly as possible.<ref name="Th8.51">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:51|8.51]].</ref>

Despite these events, Pisander and the other envoys of the conspirators arrived at Athens and made a speech before the people. Pisander won the argument, putting Alcibiades and his promises at the center. The Ecclesia deposed Phrynichus and elected Pisander and ten other envoys to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.<ref name="Th8.53">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:53|8.53]].</ref>

At this point, Alcibiades's scheme encountered a great obstacle. Tissaphernes would not make an agreement on any terms, wanting to follow his policy of neutrality.<ref name="Kagan136-138">D. Kagan, ''The Fall of the Athenian Empire'', 136–38.</ref> As Kagan points out, Tissaphernes was a prudent leader and had recognized the advantages of wearing each side out without direct Persian involvement.<ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 366.</ref> Alcibiades realized this and, by presenting the Athenians with stiffer and stiffer demands on Tissaphernes's behalf, attempted to convince them that he had persuaded Tissaphernes to support them, but that they had not conceded enough to him. Although the envoys were angered at the audacity of the Persian demands, they nevertheless departed with the impression that Alcibiades could have brought about an agreement among the powers if he had chosen to do so.<ref name = "Th8.56">Thucydides, ''The Peloponnesian War'', [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:56|8.56]].</ref> This [[wikt:fiasco|fiasco]] at the court of Tissaphernes, however, put an end to the negotiations between the conspirators and Alcibiades.<ref name="Kagan136-138" /> The group was convinced that Alcibiades could not deliver his side of the bargain without demanding exorbitantly high concessions of them and they accordingly abandoned their plans to restore him to Athens.<ref name="Th8.56" />

===Reinstatement as an Athenian general===
{{See also|Athenian coup of 411 BC}}
In spite of the failure of the negotiations, the conspirators succeeded in overthrowing the democracy and imposing the oligarchic government of the [[The Four Hundred (oligarchy)|Four Hundred]], among the leaders of which were Phrynichus and Pisander. At Samos, however, a similar coup instigated by the conspirators did not go forward so smoothly. Samian democrats learned of the conspiracy and notified four prominent Athenians: the generals Leon and Diomedon, the [[trierarch]] Thrasybulus, and Thrasyllus, at that time a [[hoplite]] in the ranks. With the support of these men and the Athenian soldiers in general, the Samian democrats were able to defeat the 300 Samian oligarchs who attempted to seize power there.<ref name="Th8.73">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:73|8.73]].</ref> Further, the Athenian troops at Samos formed themselves into a political assembly, deposed their generals, and elected new ones, including Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The army, stating that they had not revolted from the city but that the city had revolted from them, resolved to stand by the democracy while continuing to prosecute the war against Sparta.<ref>Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:76|8.76]].</ref>

After a time, Thrasybulus persuaded the assembled troops to vote Alcibiades's recall, a policy that he had supported since before the coup. Then he sailed to retrieve Alcibiades and returned with him to Samos. The aim of this policy was to win away Persian support from the Spartans, as it was still believed that Alcibiades had great influence with Tissaphernes.<ref name="Th8.81">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:81|8.81]].</ref> Plutarch claims that the army sent for Alcibiades so as to use his help in putting down the tyrants in Athens.<ref name="Plut26">{{cite Plutarch|Alcibiades|26}}</ref> Kagan argues that this reinstatement was a disappointment to Alcibiades, who had hoped for a glorious return to Athens itself but found himself only restored to the rebellious fleet, where the immunity from prosecution he had been granted "protected him for the time being but not from a reckoning in the future"; furthermore, the recall, which Alcibiades had hoped to bring about through his own prestige and perceived influence, was achieved through the patronage of Thrasybulus.<ref name="Kagan389">Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 389.</ref>

In his first speech to the assembled troops, Alcibiades complained bitterly about the circumstances of his exile, but most of the speech was boasting of his influence with Tissaphernes. The primary motives of his speech were to make the oligarchs at Athens fear him and to increase his credit with the army at Samos. Upon hearing his speech the troops immediately elected him general alongside Thrasybulus and the others. He roused them so much that they proposed to sail at once for [[Piraeus]] and attack the oligarchs in Athens.<ref name = "Th8.82">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:82|8.82]].</ref> It was primarily Alcibiades, along with Thrasybulus, who calmed the people and showed them the folly of this proposal, which would have sparked civil war and would have led to the immediate defeat of Athens.<ref name="Plut26"/> Shortly after Alcibiades's reinstatement as an Athenian general, the government of the Four Hundred was overthrown and replaced by a broader oligarchy, which would eventually give way to democracy.<ref>Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:97|8.97]].</ref>

Presently Alcibiades sailed to Tissaphernes with a detachment of ships. According to Plutarch, the supposed purpose of this mission was to stop the Persian fleet from coming to the aid of the Peloponnesians.<ref name="Plut26"/> Thucydides is in agreement with Plutarch that the Persian fleet was at [[Aspendus]] and that Alcibiades told the troops he would bring the fleet to their side or prevent it from coming at all, but Thucydides further speculates that the real reason was to flaunt his new position to Tissaphernes and try to gain some real influence over him.<ref name="Th8.82" /> According to the historian, Alcibiades had long known that Tissaphernes never meant to bring the fleet at all.<ref name="Th8.88">Thucydides, [[s:History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 8#8:88|8.88]].</ref>

===Battles of Abydos and Cyzicus===
{{further|Battle of Abydos|Battle of Cyzicus}}
[[File:Battle of Cyzicus.svg|thumb|upright=1.35|The Athenian strategy at Cyzicus. ''Left'': Alcibiades's decoy force (blue) lures the Spartan fleet (black) out to sea. ''Right'': Thrasybulus and Theramenes bring their squadrons in behind the Spartans to cut off their retreat towards Cyzicus, while Alcibiades turns to face the pursuing force.]]

Alcibiades was recalled by the "intermediate regime" of The Five Thousand, the government which succeeded the Four Hundred in 411, but it is most likely that he waited until 407 BC to actually return to the city.<ref name="Cartwright301">Cartwright-Warner, ''A Historical Commentary on Thucydides'', 301.</ref> Plutarch tells us that, although his recall had already been passed on motion of [[Critias]], a political ally of his, Alcibiades was resolved to come back with glory.<ref name="Plut27">{{cite Plutarch|Alcibiades|27}}</ref> While this was certainly his goal, it was again a means to an end, that end being to avoid prosecution upon his return to Athens.

The next significant part he would play in the war would occur at the [[Battle of Abydos]]. Alcibiades had remained behind at Samos with a small force while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus led the greater part of the fleet to the [[Hellespont]]. During this period, Alcibiades succeeded in raising money from [[Caria]] and the neighboring area, with which he was able to pay the rowers and gain their favor.<ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 406.</ref> After the Athenian victory at [[Battle of Cynossema|Cynossema]], both fleets summoned all their ships from around the Aegean to join them for what might be a decisive next engagement. While Alcibiades was still en route, the Athenians fought off the arrival of the Rhodian admiral [[Dorieus (Rhodian athlete and naval commander)|Dorieus]] who appeared with 14 ships and was forced into [[Rhoeteium]].<ref>Xenophon, ''Hellenica'', 1.1.2–5. See Kelly, ''Xenophon’s Hellenika: a Commentary'', 70–5.</ref> The Spartans sailed to assist him and the two fleets clashed at [[Abydos, Hellespont|Abydos]], where the Peloponnesians had set up their main naval base. The battle was evenly matched, and raged for a long time, but the balance tipped towards the Athenians when Alcibiades sailed into the Hellespont with eighteen triremes.<ref name="Plut27"/><ref name="Hellenica1.4.1">Xenophon, ''Hellenica'', 1.1.[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0206 5].</ref> The Persian satrap [[Pharnabazus (5th century BC)|Pharnabazus]], who had replaced Tissaphernes as the sponsor of the Peloponnesian fleet, moved his land army to the shore to defend the ships and sailors who had beached their ships. Only the support of the Persian land army and the coming of night saved the Peloponnesian fleet from complete destruction.<ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 408</ref>

Shortly after the battle, Tissaphernes had arrived in the Hellespont and Alcibiades left the fleet at Sestos to meet him, bringing gifts and hoping once again to try to win over the Persian governor. Evidently Alcibiades had gravely misjudged his standing with the satrap, and he was arrested on arrival.<ref name="Plut27"/> Within a month he would escape with another Athenian, [[Mantitheos]], and resume command.<ref name="Plut28">{{cite Plutarch|Alcibiades|28}}</ref><ref>Xenophon, ''Hellenica'', 1.1.10. See Kelly, ''Xenophon’s Hellenika: a Commentary'', 77–78.</ref> It was now obvious, however, that he had no influence with the Persians; from now on his authority would depend on what he actually could accomplish rather than on what he promised to do.<ref name = "Kagan410">Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 410.</ref>

After an interlude of several months in which the Peloponnesians constructed new ships and the Athenians besieged cities and raised money throughout the Aegean, the next major sea battle took place the spring of 410 BC at [[Cyzicus]]. Alcibiades had been forced to flee from [[Sestos]] to Cardia to protect his small fleet from the rebuilt Peloponnesian navy, but as soon as the Athenian fleet was reunited there its commanders led it to Cyzicus, where the Athenians had intelligence indicating that Pharnabazus and [[Mindarus]], the Peloponnesian fleet commander, were together plotting their next move. Concealed by storm and darkness, the combined Athenian force reached the vicinity without being spotted by the Peloponnesians.<ref name="Plut28"/> Here the Athenians devised a plot to draw the enemy into battle. According to [[Diodorus Siculus]], Alcibiades advanced with a small squadron in order to draw the Spartans out to battle, and, after he successfully deceived Mindarus with this ploy, the squadrons of Thrasybulus and Theramenes came to join him, cutting off the Spartans' retreat.{{efn|In the case of the battle of Cyzicus, Robert J. Littman, professor at [[Brandeis University]], points out the different accounts given by Xenophon and Diodorus. According to Xenophon, Alcibiades's victory was due to the luck of a rainstorm, while, according to Diodorus, it was due to a carefully conceived plan. Although most historians prefer the accounts of Xenophon,<ref name="Littman271">R.J. Littman, ''The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus'', 271.</ref> Jean Hatzfeld remarks that Diodorus's accounts contain many interesting and unique details.<ref name="Hatzfeld271">J. Hatzfeld, ''Alcibiade'', 271</ref>}}<ref name="Diodorus50">Diodorus, XIII, [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084%3Abook%3D13%3Achapter%3D50 50–51].</ref>

The Spartan fleet suffered losses in the flight and reached the shore with the Athenians in close pursuit. Alcibiades' troops, leading the Athenian pursuit, landed and attempted to pull the Spartan ships back out to sea. The Peloponnesians fought to prevent their ships from being towed away, and Pharnabazus's troops came up to support them.<ref name="Hellenica1.17">Xenophon, ''Hellenica'', 1.1.[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0206 17–23].</ref> Thrasybulus landed his own force to temporarily relieve pressure on Alcibiades, and meanwhile ordered [[Theramenes]] to join up with Athenian land forces nearby and bring them to reinforce the sailors and marines on the beach. The Spartans and Persians, overwhelmed by the arrival of multiple forces from several directions, were defeated and driven off, and the Athenians captured all the Spartan ships which were not destroyed.<ref name="Diodorus74" /><ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 410–13.</ref> A letter dispatched to Sparta by Hippocrates, vice-admiral under Mindarus, was intercepted and taken to Athens; it ran as follows: "The ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know not what to do".<ref name="Hellenica1.17" /> A short time later Sparta petitioned for peace, but their appeals were ultimately rejected by the Athenians.<ref name="Diodorus52-53">Diodorus, ''Library'', [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084&query=chapter%3D%23304&layout=&loc=13.51.1 52–53].</ref>

===Further military successes===
[[File:Gallipoli peninsula from space.png|thumb|upright=1.35|Satellite image of the Thracian Chersonese (now known as the [[Gallipoli Peninsula]]) and surrounding area. Alcibiades traveled to the Chersonese in 408 BC and attacked the city of Selymbria on the north shore of the [[Propontis]].]]

After their victory, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus began the siege of [[Chalcedon]] in 409 BC with about 190 ships.<ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 429</ref> Although unable to attain a decisive victory or induce the city to surrender, Alcibiades was able to win a small tactical land battle outside of the city gates and Theramenes concluded an agreement with the Chalcedonians.<ref name="Diodorus66"/> Afterwards they concluded a temporary alliance with Pharnabazus which secured some much needed immediate cash for the army, but despite this Alcibiades was still forced to depart in search for more booty to pay the soldiers and oarsmen of the fleet.

In pursuit of these funds he traveled to the [[Thracian Chersonese]] and attacked [[Selymbria]]. He plotted with a pro-Athenian party within the city and offered the Selymbrians reasonable terms, imposing strict discipline on his men to see that they were observed. He did the Selymbrians's city no injury whatsoever, but merely took a sum of money from it, set a garrison there and left.<ref name="Plut30">{{cite Plutarch|Alcibiades|30}}</ref> Epigraphical evidence indicates the Selymbrians surrendered hostages until the treaty was ratified in Athens.<ref name="Kern151" /> His performance is judged as skillful by historians, since it saved time, resources, and lives and still fully achieved his goal.<ref name="Kern151" /><ref>Kagan, ''The Peloponnesian War'', 410</ref>

From here Alcibiades joined in the siege of [[Byzantium]] along with Theramenes and Thrasyllus. A portion of the citizens of the city, demoralized and hungry, decided to surrender the city to Alcibiades for similar terms as the Selymbrians had received. On the designated night the defenders left their posts, and the Athenians attacked the Peloponnesian garrison in the city and their boats in the harbor. The portion of the citizenry that remained loyal to the Peloponnesians fought so savagely that Alcibiades issued a statement in the midst of the fighting which guaranteed their safety and this persuaded the remaining citizens to turn against the Peloponnesian garrison, which was nearly totally destroyed.<ref name="Diodorus66">Diodorus, ''Library'', xiii, 67.[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Diod.+13.66&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0084 1]</ref>