Editing Al-Qaeda (section)

=== Command structure ===
Most of al-Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Al Qaeda|url=https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda|access-date=March 3, 2021|website=Anti-Defamation League|archive-date=April 3, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210403025553/https://www.adl.org/resources/profiles/al-qaeda|url-status=live}}</ref> Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not [[Military operation|operationally]] managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation.<ref name=WilsonLeaders2015/> "...{{spaces}}Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over al Qaeda's vast, networked structure. Al Qaeda's core leadership seeks to centralize the organization's messaging and strategy rather than to manage the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to consult with al Qaeda's core leadership before carrying out large-scale attacks." Al-Qaeda central (AQC) is a conglomerate of expert committees, each in supervision of distinct tasks and objectives. Its membership is mostly composed of [[Islam in Egypt#Islamic political movements|Egyptian Islamist]] leaders who participated in the [[anti-communist]] [[Afghan Jihad]]. Assisting them are hundreds of Islamic field operatives and commanders, based in various regions of the [[Muslim World]]. The central leadership assumes control of the doctrinal approach and overall propaganda campaign; while the regional commanders were empowered with independence in military strategy and political maneuvering. This novel hierarchy made it possible for the organisation to launch wide-range offensives.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=J. Tompkins, Crossett|first1=Paul, Chuck|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SPZdWxjMd6cC|title=Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II: 1962–2009|last2=Spitaletta, Marshal|first2=Jason, Shana|publisher=United States Army Special Operations Command|year=2012|location=Fort Bragg, North Carolina|pages=544, 545|chapter=19- Al-Qaeda: 1988–2001}}</ref>

When asked in 2005 about the possibility of al-Qaeda's connection to the [[July 7, 2005 London bombings]], [[Metropolitan Police Commissioner]] [[Sir Ian Blair]] said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working{{spaces}}... but this has the hallmark of that approach{{spaces}}... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training{{spaces}}... to provide expertise{{spaces}}... and I think that is what has occurred here."<ref name="foxnewsblair">{{Cite news|title=Cops: London Attacks Were Homicide Blasts|date=July 15, 2005|url=https://www.foxnews.com/story/cops-london-attacks-were-homicide-blasts|publisher=Fox News|access-date=June 15, 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080420155421/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162476,00.html|archive-date=April 20, 2008|url-status=live}}</ref> On August 13, 2005, ''[[The Independent]]'' newspaper, reported that the July{{spaces}}7 bombers had acted independently of an al-Qaeda mastermind.<ref>{{Cite news|title=London bombings: the truth emerges|url=http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece|first1=Jason|last1=Bennetto|first2=Ian|last2=Herbert|work=The Independent|location=UK|date=August 13, 2005|access-date=December 3, 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061026100045/http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article305547.ece|archive-date=October 26, 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal.<ref>Al-Bahri, Nasser, ''Guarding bin Laden: My Life in al-Qaeda''. p. 185. Thin Man Press. London. {{ISBN|9780956247360}}</ref> However, the author [[Adam Curtis]] argued that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the [[1998 US embassy bombings]] in East Africa. Curtis wrote:

{{blockquote|The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares">[https://archive.org/details/ThePowerOfNightmares ''The Power of Nightmares''], BBC Documentary.</ref>}}

During the 2001 trial, the [[United States Department of Justice|US Department of Justice]] needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him [[trial in absentia|''in absentia'']] under the [[Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act]]. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of [[Jamal al-Fadl]], who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden.<ref>{{cite web|last1=McCloud|first1=Kimberly|title=WMD Terrorism and Usama bin Laden|url=http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm|work=CNS Reports|publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies|access-date=May 4, 2011|author2=Osborne, Matthew|date=March 7, 2001|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110506145417/http://cns.miis.edu/reports/binladen.htm|archive-date=May 6, 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of a [[plea bargain]] agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments.<ref name="first informant">{{Harvnb|McGeary|2001}}.</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/|title=Witness: Bin Laden planned attack on U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia|publisher=CNN|date=February 13, 2001|access-date=June 12, 2007|archive-date=January 4, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070104203956/http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/13/Embassy.bombings.trial/|url-status=live}}</ref> Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl, said:

{{blockquote|There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.<ref name="The Power of Nightmares" />}}