Editing Ahmad Shah Massoud (section)

==War in Afghanistan (1992–2001)==

===War in Kabul and other parts of the country (1992–1996)===
{{Main|Civil war in Afghanistan (1992–1996)}}

====Peace and power-sharing agreement (1992)====
With United Nations support, most Afghan political parties decided to appoint a legitimate national government to succeed communist rule, through an elite settlement.<ref name="Amin Saikal"/><ref name="Peter Tomsen 2">{{cite book|last=Tomsen|first=Peter|title=The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=NCoyhgdHHyAC}} |access-date=January 22, 2014|year=2011|publisher=PublicAffairs|isbn=9781586487812}}</ref> While the external Afghan party leaders were residing in Peshawar, the military situation around Kabul involving the internal commanders was tense. A 1991 UN peace process brought about some negotiations, but the attempted elite settlement did not develop.<ref name="Peter Tomsen 2"/> In April 1992, resistance leaders in Peshawar tried to negotiate a settlement. Massoud supported the Peshawar process of establishing a broad coalition government inclusive of all resistance parties, but Hekmatyar sought to become the sole ruler of Afghanistan, stating, "In our country coalition government is impossible because, this way or another, it is going to be weak and incapable of stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan."<ref name="Amin Saikal (3)">{{cite book|last=Amin Saikal|author-link=Amin Saikal|title=Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival|date=August 27, 2004|edition=2006 1st|page=215|publisher=I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.|isbn=1-85043-437-9}}</ref>

Massoud wrote:

<blockquote>All the parties had participated in the war, in jihad in Afghanistan, so they had to have their share in the government, and in the formation of the government. Afghanistan is made up of different nationalities. We were worried about a national conflict between different tribes and different nationalities. In order to give everybody their own rights and also to avoid bloodshed in Kabul, we left the word to the parties so they should decide about the country as a whole. We talked about it for a temporary stage and then after that the ground should be prepared for a general election.<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi (5)">{{cite book|last=Neamatollah Nojumi|title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region|edition=2002 1st|page=112|publisher=Palgrave|location=New York}}</ref></blockquote>

A recorded radio communication between the two leaders showed the divide as Massoud asked Hekmatyar:<ref name=autogenerated1>{{cite book|last=Marcela Grad|title=Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader|edition=March 1, 2009|publisher=Webster University Press}}</ref>

<blockquote>The Kabul regime is ready to surrender, so instead of the fighting we should gather. ... The leaders are meeting in Peshawar. ... The troops should not enter Kabul, they should enter later on as part of the government.</blockquote>

Hekmatyar's response:

<blockquote>We will march into Kabul with our naked sword. No one can stop us. ... Why should we meet the leaders?"
</blockquote>

Massoud answered:

<blockquote>"It seems to me that you don't want to join the leaders in Peshawar nor stop your threat, and you are planning to enter Kabul ... in that case I must defend the people.</blockquote>

At that point [[Osama bin Laden]], trying to mediate, urged Hekmatyar to "go back with your brothers" and to accept a compromise. Bin Laden reportedly "hated Ahmad Shah Massoud".<ref name="Faraj Ismail">{{cite book|last=Faraj Ismail in [[Peter Bergen]]'s|title=The Osama Bin Laden I know|page=93}}</ref> Bin Laden was involved in ideological and personal disputes with Massoud<ref name="Johnny Ryan">{{cite book|last=Johnny Ryan|title=Countering Militant Islamist Radicalisation on the Internet|page=133|publisher=Institute of European Affairs}}</ref> and had sided with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against Massoud in the inner-Afghan conflict since the late 1980s.<ref name="Steve Coll (2)">{{cite book|last=[[Steve Coll]]|title=[[Ghost Wars]]|pages=202–203}}</ref> But Hekmatyar refused to accept a compromise, confident that he would be able to gain sole power in Afghanistan.<ref name="Roy Gutman_37">{{Cite book|last=Roy Gutman|title=How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan|edition=1st ed., 2008 |page=37|publisher=Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.}}</ref>

On April 24, 1992, the leaders in Peshawar agreed on and signed the [[Peshawar Accord]], establishing the post-communist [[Islamic State of Afghanistan]] – which was a stillborn 'state' with a paralyzed 'government' right from its inception, until its final succumbing in September 1996.<ref name=photius,peshawar>[https://photius.com/countries/afghanistan/government/afghanistan_government_the_peshawar_accord~72.html 'The Peshawar Accord, April 25, 1992']. Website photius.com. Text from 1997, purportedly sourced on The Library of Congress Country Studies (US) and CIA World Factbook. Retrieved December 22, 2017.</ref> The creation of the Islamic State was welcomed though by the [[United Nations General Assembly|General Assembly of the United Nations]]<ref name="Max Planck Yearbook">{{cite book|title=Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law|edition=2005|page=400}}</ref> and the Islamic State of Afghanistan was recognized as the legitimate entity representing Afghanistan until June 2002, when its successor, the [[Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]], was established under the interim government of [[Hamid Karzai]].<ref name="Columbia World Dictionary">{{cite book|author1=Olivier Roy |author2=Antoine Sfeir |title=The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism|page=25|publisher=Columbia University Press}}</ref> Under the 1992 Peshawar Accord, the Defense Ministry was given to Massoud while the Prime Ministership was given to Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar refused to sign. With the exception of Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the other Peshawar resistance parties were unified under this peace and power-sharing accord in April 1992.

====Escalating war over Kabul (1992)====
Although repeatedly offered the position of prime minister, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar refused to recognize the peace and power-sharing agreement. His [[Hezb-e Islami]] militia initiated a massive bombardment campaign against the Islamic State and the capital city Kabul. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from neighboring [[Pakistan]].<ref name="Neamatollah Nojumi">{{cite book|last=Neamatollah Nojumi|title=The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region|edition=2002 1st|publisher=Palgrave, New York}}</ref><ref name="Amin Saikal"/> The Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the [[Australian National University]], [[Amin Saikal]], writes in ''Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival'' that without Pakistan's support, Hekmatyar "would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul."<ref name="Amin Saikal"/> Saikal states that Pakistan wanted to install a favorable regime under Hekmatyar in Kabul so that it could use Afghan territory for access to [[Central Asia]].<ref name="Amin Saikal"/>

Hekmatyar's rocket bombardments and the parallel escalation of violent conflict between two militias, Ittihad and Wahdat, which had entered some suburbs of Kabul, led to a breakdown in law and order. Shia [[Iran]] and Sunni Wahabbi [[Saudi Arabia]], as competitors for regional [[hegemony]], encouraged conflict between the Ittihad and Wahdat factions. On the one side was the Shia Hazara [[Hezb-i Wahdat]] of [[Abdul Ali Mazari]] and on the other side, the Sunni Pashtun [[Ittihad-i Islami]] of [[Abdul Rasul Sayyaf]].<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)">{{cite web|date=July 6, 2005|url=https://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/06/blood-stained-hands|title=Blood-Stained Hands, Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity|publisher=[[Human Rights Watch]]|access-date=December 4, 2016|archive-date=January 13, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150113150933/http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/06/blood-stained-hands}}</ref>

According to Human Rights Watch, Iran was strongly supporting the Hezb-i Wahdat forces, with Iranian intelligence officials providing direct orders, while Saudi Arabia supported Sayyaf and his Ittihad-i Islami faction to maximize Wahhabi influence.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)"/> Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos, as described in reports by Human Rights Watch and the Afghanistan Justice Project.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)"/><ref name="Afghanistan Justice Project">{{cite web|year=2005|url=http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46725c962.pdf|title=Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978–2001|publisher=Afghanistan Justice Project}}</ref> Massoud's Jamiat commanders, the interim government, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) repeatedly tried to negotiate ceasefires, which broke down in only a few days.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (4)"/> Another militia, the [[Junbish-i Milli]] of former communist general [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]], was backed by [[Uzbekistan]].<ref name="Amin Saikal"/> Uzbek president [[Islam Karimov]] was keen to see Dostum controlling as much of Afghanistan as possible, especially in the north.<ref name="Amin Saikal"/> Dostum repeatedly changed allegiances.

The Afghanistan Justice Project (AJP) says, that "while [Hekmatyar's anti-government] Hizb-i Islami is frequently named as foremost among the factions responsible for the deaths and destruction in the bombardment of Kabul, it was not the only perpetrator of these violations."<ref name="Afghanistan Justice Project"/> According to the AJP, "the scale of the bombardment and kinds of weapons used represented disproportionate use of force" in a capital city with primarily residential areas by all the factions involved – including the government forces.<ref name="Afghanistan Justice Project"/> Crimes were committed by individuals within the different armed factions. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar released 10,000 dangerous criminals from the main prisons into the streets of Kabul to destabilize the city and cut off Kabul from water, food and energy supplies. The Iran-controlled Wahdat of [[Abdul Ali Mazari]], as well as the Ittihad of [[Abdul Rasul Sayyaf]] supported by Saudi Arabia, targeted civilians of the 'opposite side' in systematic atrocities. [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]] allowed crimes as a perceived payment for his troops.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (5)">{{cite web |year=1998 |url= https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0-01.htm |title= II. Background |publisher= Human Rights Watch}}</ref>

==== Afshar operation (February 1993) ====
"The major criticism of Massoud's human rights record" is the escalation of the [[Afshar Operation|Afshar military operation]] in 1993.<ref name="Roy Gutman 2"/> A report by the Afghanistan Justice Project describes Massoud as failing to prevent atrocities carried out by his forces and those of their factional ally, Ittihad-i Islami, against civilians on taking the suburb of Afshar during a [[Afshar operation|military operation]] against an anti-state militia allied to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. They shelled residential areas in the capital city in February 1993. Critics said that Massoud should have foreseen these problems.<ref name="Afghanistan Justice Project"/> A meeting convened by Massoud on the next day ordered a halt to killing and looting, but it failed to stop abuses.<ref name="Afghanistan Justice Project"/> [[Human Rights Watch]], in a report based largely on the material collected by the Afghanistan Justice Project, concurs that Massoud's Jamiat forces bear a share of the responsibility for human rights abuses throughout the war, including the indiscriminate targeting of civilians in Afshar, and that Massoud was personally implicated in some of these abuses.<ref>{{cite book |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=O9WpdkMh-XkC |page=100 }} |title=Blood-stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of ... |date=September 9, 2001 |access-date=August 13, 2014}}</ref> [[Roy Gutman]] has argued that the witness reports about Afshar cited in the AJP report implicated only the Ittihad forces, and that these had not been under Massoud's direct command.<ref name="Roy Gutman 2">Gutman, Roy (2008): ''How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan,'' Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 1st ed., Washington D.C., p. 222</ref>

Anthony Davis, who studied and observed Massoud's forces from 1981 to 2001, reported that during the observed period, there was "no pattern of repeated killings of enemy civilians or military prisoners" by Massoud's forces.<ref name="Roy Gutman 2"/> Edward Girardet, who covered Afghanistan for over three decades, was also in Kabul during the war. He states that while Massoud was able to control most of his commanders well during the anti-Soviet and anti-Taliban resistance, he was not able to control every commander in Kabul. According to this and similar testimonies, this was due to a breakdown of law and order in Kabul and a war on multiple fronts, which they say, Massoud personally had done all in his power to prevent:<ref name="Grad2"/>

{{blockquote|quote=Massoud was always talking to his people about not behaving badly; he told them that they were accountable to their God. But because of the rocket attacks on the city the number of troops had to be increased, so there were ten or twelve thousand troops from other sources that came in ... He [Massoud] not only did not order any [crimes], but he was deeply distressed by them. I remember once ... Massoud commented that some commanders were behaving badly, and said that he was trying to bring them to justice ...<ref name="Grad2"/>|author=Eng. Mohammad Eshaq|source=in ''Massoud'' (Webster University Press, 2009)}}

==== Further war over Kabul (March–December 1993) ====
In 1993, Massoud created the Cooperative Mohammad Ghazali Culture Foundation (''Bonyad-e Farhangi wa Ta'wani Mohammad-e Ghazali'') to further humanitarian assistance and politically independent Afghan culture.<ref name="Grad2"/> The Ghazali Foundation provided free medical services during some days of the week to residents of Kabul who were unable to pay for medical treatment.<ref name="Grad2"/> The Ghazali Foundation's department for distribution of auxiliary goods was the first partner of the Red Cross. The Ghazali Foundation's department of family consultation was a free advisory board, which was accessible seven days a week for the indigent. Although Massoud was responsible for the financing of the foundation, he did not interfere with its cultural work. A council led the foundation and a jury, consisting of impartial university lecturers, decided on the works of artists. The Ghazali foundation enabled Afghan artists to exhibit their works at different places in Kabul, and numerous artists and authors were honoured for their works; some of them neither proponents of Massoud nor the Islamic State government.{{citation needed|date=October 2012}}

In March 1993, Massoud resigned his government position in exchange for peace, as requested by Hekmatyar, who considered him as a personal rival.<ref name="Grad2"/><ref name="Amin Saikal (3)"/><ref name=autogenerated3>{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+af0126%29|title=The Islamabad and Jalalabad Accords, March–April 1993|publisher=[[Library of Congress]]}}</ref> According to the [[Islamabad Accord]], [[Burhanuddin Rabbani]], belonging to the same party as Massoud, remained president, while Gulbuddin Hekmatyar took the long-offered position of prime minister. Two days after the Islamabad Accord went into effect, his allies in [[Hezb-e Wahdat]] renewed rocket attacks in Kabul.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/>

Both the Wahhabi Pashtun [[Ittehad-i Islami]] of [[Abdul Rasul Sayyaf]] backed by Saudi Arabia and the Shia Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat supported by Iran remained involved in heavy fighting against each other.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/> Hekmatyar was afraid to enter Kabul proper, and chaired only one cabinet meeting. The author [[Roy Gutman]] of the [[United States Institute of Peace]] wrote in ''How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan'':

<blockquote>Hekmatyar had become prime minister ... But after chairing one cabinet meeting, Hekmatyar never returned to the capital, fearing, perhaps, a [[lynching]] by Kabulis infuriated over his role in destroying their city. Even his close aides were embarrassed. Hekmatyar spokesman Qutbuddin Helal was still setting up shop in the prime minister's palace when the city came under Hezb[-i Islami] rocket fire late that month. "We are here in Kabul and he is rocketing us. Now we have to leave. We can't do anything," he told Massoud aides.<ref name=autogenerated6>{{Cite book|last=Roy Gutman|title=How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan|edition=1st ed., 2008 |page=58|publisher=Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.}}</ref></blockquote>

Hekmatyar, who was generally opposed to coalition government and struggled for undisputed power, had conflicts with other parties over the selection of cabinet members. His forces started major attacks against Kabul for one month.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/><ref name="Amin Saikal (3)"/> The President, [[Burhanuddin Rabbani]], was attacked when he attempted to meet Hekmatyar.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/> Massoud resumed his responsibilities as minister of defense.

In May 1993, a new effort was made to reinstate the Islamabad Accord.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/> In August, Massoud reached out to Hekmatyar in an attempt to broaden the government.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/><ref name="Amin Saikal (2)">{{cite book|last=Amin Saikal|author-link=Amin Saikal|title=Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival|date=August 27, 2004|edition=2006 1st|page=216|publisher=I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London & New York|isbn=1-85043-437-9}}</ref> By the end of 1993, Hekmatyar and the former communist general and militia leader, [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]], were involved in secret negotiations encouraged by Pakistan's secret [[Inter-Services Intelligence]], Iran's intelligence service, and Uzbekistan's [[Islam Karimov|Karimov]] administration.<ref name="Amin Saikal (2)"/><ref name=autogenerated5>{{Cite book|last=Roy Gutman|title=How We Missed the Story: Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan|edition=1st ed., 2008|page=59|publisher=Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC.}}</ref> They planned a coup to oust the Rabbani administration and to attack Massoud in his northern areas.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/><ref name="Roy Gutman (2)"/>

==== War in Kabul, Taliban arise in the south (1994) ====
In January 1994, Hekmatyar and Dostum mounted a bombardment campaign against the capital and attacked Massoud's core areas in the northeast.<ref name="Library of Congress Country Studies"/><ref name="Roy Gutman (2)"/> [[Amin Saikal]] writes, Hekmatyar had the following objectives in all his operations:

<blockquote>The first was to make sure that Rabbani and Massoud were not allowed to consolidate power, build a credible administration, or expand their territorial control, so that the country would remain divided into small fiefdoms, run by various Muajhideen leaders and local warlords or a council of such elements, with only some of them allied to Kabul. The second was to ensure the Rabbani government acquired no capacity to dispense patronage, and to dissuade the Kabul population from giving more than limited support to the government. The third was to make Kabul an unsafe city for representatives of the international community and to prevent the Rabbani government from attracting the international support needed to begin the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan and generate a level of economic activity which would enhance its credibility and popularity.<ref name=autogenerated7>{{cite book|last=Amin Saikal|author-link=Amin Saikal|title=Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival|date=August 27, 2004|edition=2006 1st|pages=216–217|publisher=I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., London & New York|isbn=1-85043-437-9}}</ref></blockquote>

By mid-1994, Hekmatyar and Dostum were on the defensive in Kabul against Islamic State forces led by Massoud. <br />Southern Afghanistan had been neither under the control of foreign-backed militias nor of the government in Kabul, but was ruled by local Pashtun leaders, such as [[Gul Agha Sherzai]], and their militias. In 1994, the [[Taliban]] (a movement originating from [[Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam]]-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in Afghanistan as a politico-religious force, reportedly in opposition to the [[tyranny]] of the local governor.<ref name="Matinuddin, Kamal 1999 pp.25">Matinuddin, Kamal, ''The Taliban Phenomenon, Afghanistan 1994–1997'', [[Oxford University Press]], (1999), pp. 25–26</ref> When the Taliban took control of Kandahar in 1994, they forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders who had presided over a situation of complete lawlessness and atrocities.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (5)"/> In 1994, the Taliban took power in several provinces in southern and central Afghanistan.

====Taliban siege of Kabul (1995–1996)====
Hizb-i Islami had bombarded Kabul from January 1994 until February 1995 when the [[Taliban]] expelled Hizb from its Charasiab headquarters, after which the Taliban relaunched the bombardment of Kabul and started to besiege the town.<ref>[http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46725c962.pdf 'Casting Shadows: War crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978–2001'.] Afghanistan Justice Project. 2005. o. 71.</ref>

By early 1995, Massoud initiated a nationwide [[political process]] with the goal of national [[Democratic consolidation|consolidation]] and [[democratic election]]s.{{Clarify|reason=What is the relevance of the "three parts"? Who ("personalities") appeared in that conference (summoned by Massoud)? What 'agreement' was endeavoured? When and where was the conference? What did the "nationwide proces" consist of except that conference? What is meant with "national [[Democratic consolidation|(democratic) consolidation]]" in a country totally ripped up by a multisided war? |date=June 2018}}{{Better source needed|reason=M.Grad is a dubious, possibly unreliable source – see [[Talk:Ahmad Shah Massoud]]|date=June 2018}}<ref name="Grad2"/> He arranged a conference in three parts uniting political and cultural personalities, governors, commanders, clergymen and representatives, in order to reach a lasting agreement.{{Clarify|reason=What is the relevance of the "three parts"? Who ("personalities") appeared in that conference (summoned by Massoud)? What 'agreement' was endeavoured? When and where was the conference? What did the "nationwide proces" consist of except that conference? What is meant with "national (democratic) consolidation" in a country totally ripped up by a multisided war? |date=June 2018}}{{Citation needed|date=June 2018}}{{Better source needed|reason=M.Grad is a dubious, possibly unreliable source – see [[Talk:Ahmad Shah Massoud]]|date=June 2018}} Massoud's favourite for candidacy to the presidency was Dr. [[Mohammad Yusuf (prime minister)|Mohammad Yusuf]], the first democratic prime minister under [[Zahir Shah]], the former king. In the first meeting representatives from 15 different Afghan provinces met, in the second meeting there were already 25 provinces participating.

Massoud also invited the [[Taliban]] to join the peace process wanting them to be a partner in providing stability to Afghanistan during such a process.<ref name="Grad2"/> But the Taliban, which had emerged over the course of 1994 in southern Afghanistan, were already at the doors of the capital city. Against the advice of his security personnel, Massoud went to talk to some Taliban leaders in Maidan Shar, Taliban territory. The Taliban declined to join the peace process leading toward general elections. When Massoud returned to Kabul unharmed, the Taliban leader who had received him as his guest paid with his life: he was killed by other senior Taliban for failing to assassinate Massoud while the possibility had presented itself.{{citation needed|date=October 2012}} The [[Taliban]], placing Kabul under a two-year siege and bombardment campaign from early 1995 onward, in later years committed [[massacres]] against civilians, compared by [[United Nations]] observers to those that happened during the [[War in Bosnia]].<ref name="Newsday 2001">{{cite news|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/2001/10/12/taliban-massacres-outlined-for-un/|title=Taliban massacres outlined for UN|author=Newsday|date=October 2001|newspaper=Chicago Tribune|access-date=January 21, 2011}}</ref><ref name="papillonsartpalace.com">{{cite web|url=http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/massacre.htm |title=Confidential UN report details mass killings of civilian villagers |access-date=October 12, 2001 |author=Newsday |year=2001 |url-status=usurped |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040605195902/http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/massacre.htm |archive-date=June 5, 2004 }}</ref>

Neighboring Pakistan exerted strong influence over the Taliban. A publication with the George Washington University describes: "Initially, the Pakistanis supported ... Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ... When Hekmatyar failed to deliver for Pakistan, the administration began to support a new movement of religious students known as the Taliban."<ref name="The National Security Archive">{{cite web|year=2003|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/|title=The September 11th Sourcebooks Volume VII: The Taliban File|publisher=gwu.edu}}</ref> Many analysts like [[Amin Saikal]] describe the Taliban as developing into a [[proxy war|proxy]] force for Pakistan's regional interests.<ref name="Amin Saikal"/> The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995 but were defeated by forces of the Islamic State government under Ahmad Shah Massoud.<ref name="amnesty.org">{{cite web |publisher=Amnesty International |title=Afghanistan: Further Information on Fear for Safety and New Concern: Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings: Civilians in Kabul |date=November 16, 1995 |url=https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/176000/asa110151995en.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/176000/asa110151995en.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live}}</ref> [[Amnesty International]], referring to the Taliban offensive, wrote in a 1995 report:

{{blockquote|This is the first time in several months that Kabul civilians have become the targets of rocket attacks and shelling aimed at residential areas in the city.<ref name="amnesty.org"/>|[[Amnesty International]]|1995}}

The Taliban's early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses.<ref name="Human Rights Watch (5)"/> The Taliban's first major offensive against the important western city of [[Herat]], under the rule of Islamic state ally [[Ismail Khan]], in February 1995 was defeated when Massoud airlifted 2,000 of his own core forces from Kabul to help defend Herat.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid">{{cite book|last=Ahmed Rashid|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|year=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/36 36]|publisher=Yale Nota Bene Books|isbn=978-0300089028|url=https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/36}}</ref> [[Ahmed Rashid]] writes: "The Taliban had now been decisively pushed back on two fronts by the government and their political and military leadership was in disarray. Their image as potential peacemakers was badly dented, for in the eyes of many Afghans they had become nothing more than just another warlord party."<ref name="Ahmed Rashid"/> International observers already speculated that the Taliban as a country-wide organization might have "run its course".<ref name="Human Rights Watch">{{cite news|url=https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm|title=Pakistan's Support of the Taliban |publisher=Human Rights Watch|year=2000}}</ref>

[[Mullah Omar]] consolidated his control of the Taliban and with foreign help rebuilt and re-equipped his forces.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (3)">{{cite book|last=Ahmed Rashid|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|year=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/39 39]|publisher=Yale Nota Bene Books|isbn=978-0300089028|url=https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/39}}</ref> [[Pakistan]] increased its support to the Taliban.<ref name="Amin Saikal"/><ref name="George Washington University">{{cite web|year=2007|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#17|title=Documents Detail Years of Pakistani Support for Taliban, Extremists|publisher=[[George Washington University]]}}</ref> Its military advisers oversaw the restructuring of Taliban forces. The country provided armored pick-up trucks and other military equipment.<ref name="Human Rights Watch"/> Saudi Arabia provided the funding.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (7)">{{cite book|last=Ahmed Rashid|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|year=2001|publisher=Yale Nota Bene Books|isbn=978-0300089028|url=https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash}}</ref> Furthermore, there was a massive influx of 25,000 new Taliban fighters, many of them recruited in Pakistan.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (3)"/> This enabled the Taliban to capture Herat to the west of Kabul in a surprise attack against the forces of Ismail Khan in September 1995. A nearly one-year siege and bombardment campaign against Kabul was again defeated by Massoud's forces.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (7)"/>

Massoud and Rabbani meanwhile kept working on an internal Afghan peace process – successfully. By February 1996, all of Afghanistan's armed factions – except for the Taliban – had agreed to take part in the peace process and to set up a peace council to elect a new interim president.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (5)">{{cite book|last=Ahmed Rashid|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|year=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/43 43]|publisher=Yale Nota Bene Books|isbn=978-0300089028|url=https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/43}}</ref> Many Pashtun areas under Taliban control had representatives also advocating for a peace agreement with the Islamic State government.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (2)">{{cite book|last=Ahmed Rashid|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|year=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/41 41]|publisher=Yale Nota Bene Books|isbn=978-0300089028|url=https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/41}}</ref> But Taliban leader Mullah Omar and the Kandaharis surrounding him wanted to expand the war.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (2)" /> At that point the Taliban leadership and their foreign supporters decided they needed to act quickly before the government could consolidate the new understanding between the parties. The Taliban moved against Jalalabad, under the control of the Pashtun Jalalabad Shura, to the east of Kabul. Part of the Jalalabad Shura was bribed with millions of dollars by the Taliban's foreign sponsors, especially Saudi Arabia, to vacate their positions.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (4)">{{cite book|last=Ahmed Rashid|author-link=Ahmed Rashid|title=Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia|year=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/48 48]|publisher=Yale Nota Bene Books|isbn=978-0300089028|url=https://archive.org/details/talibanmilitant000rash/page/48}}</ref> The Taliban's battle for Jalalabad was directed by Pakistani military advisers. Hundreds of Taliban crossed the Afghan-Pakistani border moving on Jalalabad from Pakistan and thereby suddenly placed to the east of Kabul.<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (4)" /> This left the capital city Kabul "wide open"<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (4)" /> to many sides as Ismail Khan had been defeated to the west, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had vacated his positions to the south and the fall and surrender of Jalalabad had suddenly opened a new front to the east.

{{anchor|Withdrawal north from Kabul}}
At that point Massoud decided to conduct a strategic retreat through a northern corridor, according to Ahmed Rashid, "knowing he could not defend [Kabul] from attacks coming from all four points of the compass. Nor did he want to lose the support of Kabul's population by fighting for the city and causing more bloodshed."<ref name="Ahmed Rashid (4)" /> On September 26, 1996, as the Taliban with military support by Pakistan and financial support by Saudi Arabia prepared for another major offensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul.<ref>Coll, ''Ghost Wars'' (New York: Penguin, 2005), 14.</ref> The Taliban marched into Kabul on September 27, 1996, and established the [[Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001)|Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]]. Massoud and his troops retreated to the northeast of Afghanistan which became the base for the still internationally recognized Islamic State of Afghanistan.<ref>{{cite news|author=Barry Bearak |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/03/world/as-the-taliban-finish-off-foes-iran-is-looming.html |title=As the Taliban Finish Off Foes, Iran Is Looming |location=Tajikistan; Iran; Afghanistan |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=October 3, 1998 |access-date=July 17, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Barry Bearak |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/09/world/afghan-lion-fights-taliban-with-rifle-and-fax-machine.html |title=Afghan 'Lion' Fights Taliban With Rifle and Fax Machine |location=Afghanistan |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=November 9, 1999 |access-date=July 17, 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=John F. Burns |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/08/world/afghan-driven-from-kabul-makes-stand-in-north.html |title=Afghan Driven From Kabul Makes Stand in North |location=Gulbahar (Afghanistan); Afghanistan |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=October 8, 1996 |access-date=July 17, 2014}}</ref>

===Resistance against the Taliban (1996–2001)===
{{Main|Civil war in Afghanistan (1996–2001)}}
[[File:1996afghan (1).png|thumb|Map of the situation in Afghanistan in late 1996; Massoud (red), [[Abdul Rashid Dostum|Dostum]] (green), [[Taliban]] (yellow)]]

====United Front against the Taliban====
Ahmad Shah Massoud created the [[United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan|United Front]] (Northern Alliance) against the Taliban advance. The United Front included forces and leaders from different political backgrounds as well as from all ethnicities of Afghanistan. From the Taliban conquest in 1996 until November 2001, the United Front controlled territory in which roughly 30% of Afghanistan's population was living, in provinces such as [[Badakhshan Province|Badakhshan]], [[Kapisa Province|Kapisa]], [[Takhar Province|Takhar]] and parts of [[Parwan Province|Parwan]], [[Kunar Province|Kunar]], [[Nuristan Province|Nuristan]], [[Laghman Province|Laghman]], [[Samangan Province|Samangan]], [[Kunduz Province|Kunduz]], [[Ghōr Province|Ghōr]] and [[Bamyan Province|Bamyan]].

Meanwhile, the Taliban imposed their repressive regime in the parts of Afghanistan under their control.<ref name="Physicians for Human Rights">{{cite web|year=1998|url=http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/talibans-war-on-women.pdf|title=The Taliban's War on Women. A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan|publisher=[[Physicians for Human Rights]]|access-date=August 25, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070702234326/http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/documents/reports/talibans-war-on-women.pdf|archive-date=July 2, 2007}}</ref> Hundreds of thousands of people fled to Northern Alliance territory, Pakistan and Iran.<ref name="NPR">{{Cite news|url=https://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/aug/afghanistan/|work=[[NPR.org]]|title=Re-Creating Afghanistan: Returning to Istalif|date=August 1, 2002|access-date=April 3, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131023072254/http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/aug/afghanistan/|archive-date=October 23, 2013}}</ref> Massoud's soldiers held some 1,200 Taliban prisoners in the Panjshir Valley, 122 of them foreign Muslims who had come to Afghanistan to fight a jihad.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20010117wednesday.html|title=Holy Warriors: Killing for the Glory of God, in a Land Far From Home|date=January 17, 2001 |last=Miller|first=Judith|work=The New York Times |access-date=April 21, 2014}}</ref> In 1998, after the defeat of Abdul Rashid Dostum's faction in Mazar-i-Sharif, Ahmad Shah Massoud remained the only main leader of the United Front in Afghanistan and the only leader who was able to defend vast parts of his area against the Taliban. Most major leaders including the Islamic State's President [[Burhanuddin Rabbani]], [[Abdul Rashid Dostum]], and others, were living in exile. During this time, commentators remarked that "The only thing standing in the way of future Taliban massacres is Ahmad Shah Massoud."<ref name="National Geographic">{{cite web|year=2007|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpQI6HKV-ZY| archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211117/xpQI6HKV-ZY| archive-date=2021-11-17 | url-status=live|title=Inside the Taliban|publisher=[[National Geographic Channel|National Geographic]]}}{{cbignore}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|year=2007 |url=http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/episode/inside-the-taliban-3274/Overview |title=Inside the Taliban |publisher=[[National Geographic Channel|National Geographic]] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813110219/http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/episode/inside-the-taliban-3274/Overview |archive-date=August 13, 2011 }}</ref>

[[File:Guerre en Afghanistan (octobre 2001).PNG|thumb|left|Map of the situation in Afghanistan August 2001&nbsp;– October 2001]]

Massoud stated that the Taliban repeatedly offered him a position of power to make him stop his resistance. He declined, declaring the differences between their ideology and his own pro-democratic outlook on society to be insurmountable.<ref name="Interview"/>

Massoud wanted to convince the Taliban to join a political process leading toward democratic elections in a foreseeable future.<ref name="Interview">{{cite web|year=2001 |url=http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/balcerowicz/texts/Ahmad_Shah_Masood_en.htm|title=The Last Interview with Ahmad Shah Massoud|publisher=Piotr Balcerowicz|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060925043421/http://www.orient.uw.edu.pl/balcerowicz/texts/Ahmad_Shah_Masood_en.htm|archive-date=September 25, 2006}}</ref> He also predicted that without assistance from Pakistan and external extremist groups, the Taliban would lose their hold on power.<ref name="St. Petersburg Times">{{cite web|year=2002|url=http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/09/911/The_man_who_would_hav.shtml|title=The man who would have led Afghanistan|work=[[St. Petersburg Times]]}}</ref>

In early 2001, the United Front employed a new strategy of local military pressure and global political appeals.<ref name="Steve Coll: Ghost Wars">{{cite book|last=Steve Coll|author-link=Steve Coll|title=Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001|edition=February 23, 2004|page=720|publisher=Penguin Press HC}}</ref> Resentment was increasingly gathering against Taliban rule from the bottom of Afghan society including the Pashtun areas.<ref name="Steve Coll: Ghost Wars" /> At the same time, Massoud was very wary not to revive the failed Kabul government of the early 1990s.<ref name="Steve Coll: Ghost Wars" /> Already in 1999 the United Front leadership ordered the training of police forces specifically to keep order and protect the civilian population in case the United Front would be successful.<ref name="autogenerated2">{{cite book|last=Marcela Grad|title=Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader|publisher=Webster University Press|edition=March 1, 2009|page=310|author-link=}}</ref>

====Cross-factional negotiations====
[[File:Massoud and Qadir 2.PNG|thumb|Ahmad Shah Massoud (right) with Pashtun anti-Taliban leader [[Abdul Qadir (Afghan leader)|Abdul Qadir]] (left) in November 2000]]

From 1999 onward, a renewed process was set into motion by the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Pashtun [[Abdul Haq (Afghan leader)|Abdul Haq]] to unite all the ethnicities of Afghanistan. Massoud united the Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbeks as well as several Pashtun commanders under his United Front. Besides meeting with Pashtun tribal leaders and acting as a point of reference, Abdul Haq received increasing numbers of Pashtun Taliban themselves who were secretly approaching him.<ref name=PeterTomsen>{{cite book|last=Tomsen|first=Peter|title=Wars of Afghanistan|year=2011|publisher=PublicAffairs|isbn=978-1586487638|page=565}}</ref> Some commanders who had worked for the Taliban military apparatus agreed to the plan to topple the Taliban regime<ref name="Edwards">{{cite web|url=http://lucymorganedwards.com/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120715060706/http://lucymorganedwards.com/|archive-date=July 15, 2012|title=The Afghan Solution|publisher=Lucy Morgan Edwards|quote=The central theme of the book is Edward's investigation into a major Afghan-led plan for toppling the Taliban: a plan which existed for two years prior to 9/11, and which had buy-in from senior tribal leaders, commanders within the military axis of the Taliban, possibly the Haqqani network, Commander Massoud and senior Taliban who were willing to bring about a new order. The ex-King was to provide the 'glue' around which these different groups would coalesce.}}</ref> as the Taliban lost support even among the Pashtuns. Senior diplomat and Afghanistan expert [[Peter Tomsen]] wrote that ''"[t]he 'Lion of Kabul' [Abdul Haq] and the 'Lion of Panjshir' [Ahmad Shah Massoud] would make a formidable anti-Taliban team if they combined forces. Haq, Massoud, and Karzai, Afghanistan's three leading moderates, could transcend the Pashtun – non-Pashtun, north-south divide."''<ref name=PeterTomsen2>{{Cite book|last=Tomsen|first=Peter|title=Wars of Afghanistan|year=2011|publisher=PublicAffairs|isbn=978-1586487638|page=566}}</ref> [[Steve Coll]] referred to this plan as a "grand Pashtun-Tajik alliance".<ref name=autogenerated10>{{cite book|last=Steve Coll|author-link=Steve Coll|title=Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001|edition=February 23, 2004|page=558|publisher=Penguin Press HC}}</ref> The senior Hazara and Uzbek leaders took part in the process just like later Afghan president [[Hamid Karzai]]. They agreed to work under the banner of the exiled Afghan king [[Zahir Shah]] in Rome.

In November 2000, leaders from all ethnic groups were brought together in Massoud's headquarters in northern Afghanistan, travelling from other parts of Afghanistan, Europe, the United States, Pakistan and India to discuss a [[Loya Jirga]] for a settlement of Afghanistan's problems and to discuss the establishment of a post-Taliban government.<ref name="Corbis">{{cite web|year=2001|url=http://www.corbisimages.com/stock-photo/rights-managed/AAEC001272/council-of-afghan-opposition?popup=1|title=Council of Afghan opposition|publisher=Corbis}}</ref><ref name="Grad_65">{{cite book|last=Marcela Grad|title=Massoud: An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader|edition=March 1, 2009|page=65|publisher=Webster University Press}}</ref> In September 2001, an international official who met with representatives of the alliance remarked, ''"It's crazy that you have this today ... Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara ... They were all ready to buy in to the process".''<ref name="The New Statesman">{{cite magazine|year=2011|url=http://www.newstatesman.com/international-politics/2011/11/haq-afghanistan-taliban-kabul|title=The lost lion of Kabul|magazine=The New Statesman}}</ref>

In early 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud with leaders from all ethnicities of Afghanistan addressed the [[European Parliament]] in [[Brussels]], asking the international community to provide humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan.<ref name="EU Parliament (2)">{{cite web|year=2001|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1iCsEnXdIw| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100606113827/http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e1iCsEnXdIw| archive-date=2010-06-06 |title=Massoud in the European Parliament 2001|publisher=EU media}}</ref> He stated that the Taliban and [[al-Qaeda]] had introduced "a very wrong perception of [[Islam]]" and that without the support of Pakistan and Bin Laden the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for up to a year.<ref name="EU Parliament"/> On that visit to Europe, he also warned the U.S. about Bin Laden.<ref name="nineeleven">{{cite news|last=Boettcher|first=Mike|url=https://www.cnn.com/2003/US/11/06/massoud.cable/index.html|title=How much did Afghan leader know?|publisher=CNN.com|date=November 6, 2003|access-date=June 11, 2011|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100916032857/http://articles.cnn.com/2003-11-06/us/massoud.cable_1_bin-qaeda-sheikh-osama?_s=PM:US|archive-date=September 16, 2010}}</ref>

====The areas of Massoud====
Life in the areas under direct control of Massoud was different from the life in the areas under Taliban or Dostum's control. In contrast to the time of chaos in which all structures had collapsed in Kabul, Massoud was able to control most of the troops under his direct command well during the period starting in late 1996.<ref name="Girardet">{{cite book|last=Edward Girardet in |title=Massoud. An Intimate Portrait of the Legendary Afghan Leader|edition=2009 1st |pages=167–187|publisher=Webster University Press}}</ref>{{full citation needed|date=October 2012}} Massoud always controlled the [[Panjshir Province|Panjshir]], [[Takhar Province|Takhar]], parts of [[Parwan]] and [[Badakhshan]] during the war. Some other provinces (notably [[Kunduz]], [[Baghlan]], [[Nuristan]] and the north of [[Kabul]]) were captured by his forces from the Taliban and lost again from time to time as the frontlines varied.

Massoud created democratic institutions which were structured into several committees: political, health, education and economic.<ref name="Grad2"/> Still, many people came to him personally when they had a dispute or problem and asked him to solve their problems.<ref name="Grad2"/>

In September 2000, Massoud signed the Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan Women drafted by Afghan women. The declaration established gender equality in front of the law and the right of women to political participation, education, work, freedom of movement and speech. In the areas of Massoud, women and girls did not have to wear the Afghan burqa by law. They were allowed to work and to go to school. Although it was a time of war, girls' schools were operating in some districts. In at least two known instances, Massoud personally intervened against cases of forced marriage in favour of the women to make their own choice.<ref name="Grad2"/>

While it was Massoud's stated personal conviction that men and women are equal and should enjoy the same rights, he also had to deal with Afghan traditions which he said would need a generation or more to overcome. In his opinion, that could only be achieved through education.<ref name="Grad2"/> Author [[Pepe Escobar]] wrote in ''[[Asia Times]]'':<ref name="Escobar2001">{{Cite web |url=https://asiatimes.com/2001/09/masoud-from-warrior-to-statesman/
|title=Masoud: From warrior to statesman
|last= Escobar|first=Pepe  |work=Asia Times
|quote=The most striking contrast between Masoud's Islam and the Taliban's ultra-hardcore version regards the situation of women. For Masoud, on paper, women could even compete in free elections. He asked a recent visitor for a copy of the Swiss constitution: for him, this is a typical example of democracy that could work in Afghanistan, with different ethnic groups and different languages.
|date=September 12, 2001 |access-date=February 21, 2022}}</ref>
{{blockquote|Massoud is adamant that in Afghanistan women have suffered oppression for generations. He says that "the cultural environment of the country suffocates women. But the Taliban exacerbate this with oppression." His most ambitious project is to shatter this cultural prejudice and so give more space, freedom and equality to women – they would have the same rights as men.<ref name="Grad2"/>|Pepe Escobar|in 'Massoud: From Warrior to Statesman'}}

Humayun Tandar, who took part as an Afghan diplomat in the 2001 [[International Conference on Afghanistan]] in Bonn, said that "strictures of language, ethnicity, region were [also] stifling for Massoud. That is why ... he wanted to create a unity which could surpass the situation in which we found ourselves and still find ourselves to this day."<ref name="Grad2"/> This applied also to strictures of religion. Jean-José Puig describes how Massoud often led prayers before a meal or at times asked his fellow Muslims to lead the prayer but also did not hesitate to ask the Jewish [[Princeton University|Princeton]] Professor Michael Barry or his Christian friend Jean-José Puig: "Jean-José, we believe in the same God. Please, tell us the prayer before lunch or dinner in your own language."<ref name="Grad2"/>

====International relations====
U.S. policy regarding Massoud, the Taliban and Afghanistan remained ambiguous and differed between the various U.S. government agencies.

In 1997, U.S. State Department's [[Robin Raphel]] suggested to Massoud he should surrender to the Taliban. He soundly rejected the proposal.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Secrets tumble out of Afghan war closet|url=https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/secrets-tumble-out-of-afghan-war-closet/2281567|access-date=August 19, 2021|website=www.aa.com.tr}}</ref>

At one point in the war, in 1997, two top foreign policy officials in the Clinton administration flew to northern Afghanistan in an attempt to convince Massoud not to take advantage of a strategic opportunity to make crucial gains against the Taliban.<ref name="U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher">{{cite web |year=2004 |url=http://rohrabacher.house.gov/911-represented-dramatic-failure-policy-and-people |title=9/11 Represented a Dramatic Failure of Policy and People |publisher=U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher |access-date=March 6, 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130306015402/http://rohrabacher.house.gov/911-represented-dramatic-failure-policy-and-people |archive-date=March 6, 2013 }}</ref>{{unreliable source?|date=October 2012}}

In 1998, a U.S. [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] analyst, Julie Sirrs, visited Massoud's territories privately, having previously been denied official permission to do so by her agency. She reported that Massoud had conveyed warnings about strengthened ties between the Taliban and foreign Islamist terrorists. Returning home, she was sacked from her agency for insubordination, because at that time the U.S. administration had no trust in Massoud.<ref name="U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher"/>

In the meantime, the only collaboration between Massoud and another U.S. intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), consisted of an effort to trace [[Osama bin Laden]] following the [[1998 United States embassy bombings|1998 embassy bombings]].<ref name="risen">Risen, James. ''State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration'', 2006</ref> The U.S. and the European Union provided no support to Massoud for the fight against the Taliban.

A change of policy, lobbied for by CIA officers on the ground who had visited the area of Massoud, regarding support to Massoud, was underway in the course of 2001. According to Steve Coll's book ''Ghost Wars''<ref name="Steve Coll: Ghost Wars" /> (who won the 2005 [[Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction]]):

{{blockquote|The CIA officers admired Massoud greatly. They saw him as a [[Che Guevara]] figure, a great actor on history's stage. Massoud was a poet, a military genius, a religious man, and a leader of enormous courage who defied death and accepted its inevitability, they thought. ... In his house there were thousands of books: Persian poetry, histories of the Afghan war in multiple languages, biographies of other military and guerilla leaders. In their meetings Massoud wove sophisticated, measured references to Afghan history and global politics into his arguments. He was quiet, forceful, reserved, and full of dignity, but also light in spirit. The CIA team had gone into the Panshjir as unabashed admirers of Massoud. Now their convictions deepened.<ref name="Steve Coll: Ghost Wars"/> |[[Steve Coll]]|in ''Ghost Wars''}}

U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher also recalled:

<blockquote>[B]etween Bush's inauguration and 9/11, I met with the new national security staff on 3 occasions, including one meeting with Condoleezza Rice to discuss Afghanistan. There were, in fact, signs noted in an overview story in The Washington Post about a month ago that some steps were being made to break away from the previous administration's Afghan policy.<ref name="U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher"/></blockquote>

CIA lawyers, working with officers in the Near East Division and Counterterrorist Center, began to draft a formal, legal presidential finding for Bush's signature authorizing a new covert action program in Afghanistan, the first in a decade that sought to influence the course of the Afghan war in favour of Massoud.<ref name="Steve Coll: Ghost Wars"/> This change in policy was finalized in August 2001 when it was too late.

After Pakistan had funded, directed and supported the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan, Massoud and the United Front received some assistance from India.<ref>Peter Pigott: {{Google books |id=XaQPHbHb_fkC |page=54 |title=Canada in Afghanistan }}</ref> The assistance provided by India was extensive, including uniforms, ordnance, mortars, small armaments, refurbished Kalashnikovs, combat and winter clothes, as well as funds.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-india-secretly-armed-ahmad-shah-massouds-northern-alliance/article29310513.ece |title=How India secretly armed Afghanistan's Northern Alliance |last=Sudharshan |first=V |date=September 1, 2021 |newspaper=The Hindu |access-date=August 15, 2021 }}</ref>  India was particularly concerned about Pakistan's Taliban strategy and the Islamic militancy in its neighborhood; it provided U.S.$70 million in aid including two [[Mil Mi-17|Mi-17]] helicopters, three additional helicopters in 2000 and US$8 million worth of high-altitude equipment in 2001.<ref>Duncan Mcleod: {{Google books |id=EqDdfZwSc3EC |page=93 |title=India and Pakistan }}</ref> Also In the 1990s, India had run a field hospital at Farkor on the Tajik-Afghan border to treat wounded fighters from the then Northern Alliance that was battling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
It was at the very same hospital that the Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Masood was pronounced dead after being assassinated just two days before the 9/11 terror strikes in 2001.<ref name="timesofindia.indiatimes.com">{{cite web|url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-airlifts-military-hospital-to-Tajikistan-to-strengthen-geo-strategic-footprint-in-Central-Asia/articleshow/19606798.cms|title=India airlifts military hospital to Tajikistan to strengthen geo-strategic footprint in Central Asia|author=Rajat Pandit|date=April 18, 2013|work=The Times of India}}</ref> Furthermore, the alliance supposedly also received minor aid from [[Tajikistan]], Russia and [[Iran]] because of their opposition to the Taliban and the Pakistani control over the Taliban's Emirate. Their support remained limited to the most needed things. Meanwhile, Pakistan engaged up to 28,000 Pakistani nationals and regular Pakistani army troops to fight alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces against Massoud.<ref name="National Geographic"/><ref name="History Commons">{{cite web|year=2010|url=http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=ahmed_shah_massoud|title=History Commons|publisher=[[History Commons]]|access-date=August 24, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140125130822/http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=ahmed_shah_massoud|archive-date=January 25, 2014}}</ref>

In April 2001, the president of the [[European Parliament]], [[Nicole Fontaine]] (who called Massoud the "pole of liberty in Afghanistan"), invited Massoud with the support of French and Belgian politicians to address the European Parliament in [[Brussels]], Belgium. In his speech, he asked for humanitarian aid for the people of Afghanistan. Massoud further went on to warn that his intelligence agents had gained limited knowledge about a large-scale terrorist attack on U.S. soil being imminent.<ref>{{cite web|publisher=History Commons|url=http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a040601massoudspeech&scale=0|title=April 6, 2001: Rebel Leader Warns Europe and US About Large-Scale Imminent Al-Qaeda Attacks|access-date=February 2, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161220142831/http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a040601massoudspeech&scale=0|archive-date=December 20, 2016}}</ref>