Editing Iran–Iraq War (section)

==Domestic situation==
===Iraq===
At first, Saddam attempted to ensure that the Iraqi population suffered from the war as little as possible. There was rationing, but civilian projects begun before the war continued. At the same time, the already extensive [[personality cult]] around Saddam reached new heights while the regime tightened its control over the military.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

After the Iranian victories of the spring of 1982 and the Syrian closure of Iraq's main pipeline, Saddam did a volte-face on his policy towards the home front: a policy of austerity and total war was introduced, with the entire population being mobilised for the war effort. All Iraqis were ordered to donate blood and around 100,000 Iraqi civilians were ordered to clear the reeds in the southern marshes. Mass demonstrations of loyalty towards Saddam became more common.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Saddam also began implementing a policy of discrimination against Iraqis of Iranian origin.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

In the summer of 1982, Saddam began a [[state terrorism|campaign of terror]]. More than 300 Iraqi Army officers were executed for their failures on the battlefield. In 1983, a major crackdown was launched on the leadership of the Shia community. Ninety members of the al-Hakim family, an influential family of Shia clerics whose leading members were the émigrés [[Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim]] and [[Abdul Aziz al-Hakim]], were arrested, and six were hanged.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

The crackdown on Kurds saw the executions of 8,000 members of the [[Barzani Kurds|Barzani clan]], whose head ([[Massoud Barzani]]) also led the Kurdistan Democratic Party. From 1983 onwards, a campaign of increasingly brutal repression was started against the Iraqi Kurds, characterised by Israeli historian [[Efraim Karsh]] as having "assumed genocidal proportions" by 1988. The [[Anfal campaign]] was intended to pacify Iraqi Kurdistan permanently.<ref name="efraimkarsh" /> By 1983, the Barzanis had allied with Iran.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Entessar|first=Nader|title=Kurdish Ethnonationalism|date=1992|publisher=Lynn Rienner Publishers|isbn=978-1-55587-250-2|page=131}}</ref>

====Gaining civilian support====
To secure the loyalty of the Shia population, Saddam allowed more Shias into the Ba'ath Party and the government, and improved Shia living standards, which had been lower than those of the Iraqi Sunnis. Saddam had the state pay for restoring [[Ali|Imam Ali]]'s tomb with Italian white marble.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Baathists also increased their policies of repression against the Shia. The most infamous event was the [[Dujail Massacre|massacre of 148 civilians]] of the Shia town of [[Dujail]].<ref name="Dujail-Indian Express">{{cite news|title=The Dujail Massacre|url=http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-dujail-massacre-/19772|date=31 December 2006|newspaper=The Indian Express}}</ref>

Despite the costs of the war, the Iraqi regime made generous contributions to Shia ''[[waqf]]'' (religious endowments) as part of the price of buying Iraqi Shia support.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|75–76|date=November 2012}} The importance of winning Shia support was such that welfare services in Shia areas were expanded during a time in which the Iraqi regime was pursuing austerity in all other non-military fields.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|76|date=November 2012}} During the first years of the war in the early 1980s, the Iraqi government tried to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the war against Iran. In 1983, the [[Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]] agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remained opposed.<ref name=katzman>{{cite report|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf|title=The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq|page=2|date=1 October 2010|access-date=2 August 2011|publisher=Congressional Research Service|author=Katzman, Kenneth|via=Federation of American Scientists|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110815173718/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf|archive-date=15 August 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1983, Saddam signed an autonomy agreement with [[Jalal Talabani]] of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), though Saddam later reneged on the agreement. By 1985, the PUK and KDP had joined forces, and Iraqi Kurdistan saw widespread guerrilla warfare up to the end of the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

===Iran===

[[File:Unknown soldier funeral in Mashhad.jpg|thumb|An Iranian soldier's funeral in [[Mashhad]], 2013]]

Israeli-British historian [[Ephraim Karsh]] argued that the Iranian government saw the outbreak of war as chance to strengthen its position and consolidate the Islamic revolution, noting that government propaganda presented it domestically as a glorious ''[[jihad]]'' and a test of Iranian national character. The Iranian regime followed a policy of total war from the beginning, and attempted to mobilise the nation as a whole. They established a group known as the [[Reconstruction Campaign]], whose members were exempted from conscription and were instead sent into the countryside to work on farms to replace the men serving at the front.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

Iranian workers had a day's pay deducted from their pay cheques every month to help finance the war, and mass campaigns were launched to encourage the public to donate food, money, and blood. To further help finance the war, the Iranian government banned the import of all non-essential items, and launched a major effort to rebuild the damaged oil plants.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

According to former Iraqi general [[Ra'ad al-Hamdani]], the Iraqis believed that in addition to the Arab revolts, the Revolutionary Guards would be drawn out of Tehran, leading to a [[counter-revolution]] in Iran that would cause Khomeini's government to collapse and thus ensure Iraqi victory.<ref name="Woods 2010" /><ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins|publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=107–109 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> However, rather than turning against the revolutionary government as experts had predicted, Iran's people (including Iranian Arabs) rallied in support of the country and put up a stiff resistance.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />

The [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|IRGC]] grew as an organisation to encompass not just military concerns but also matters of economic, religious, and educational importance.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Tracy Samuel|first=Annie|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/unfinished-history-of-the-iraniraq-war/C83D5341A9DC845B9B458F8C3143BC56|title=The Unfinished History of the Iran–Iraq War: Faith, Firepower, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards|date=2021|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-47842-7|location=Cambridge|access-date=26 April 2024|archive-date=26 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240426224945/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/unfinished-history-of-the-iraniraq-war/C83D5341A9DC845B9B458F8C3143BC56|url-status=live}}</ref> The organisation's growth during the war is vital to understanding its role in Iranian society and how it has evolved since its initial formation in 1979. Domestically, the IRGC dealt with suppressing uprisings by Kurds, Baluchs, Turkmen, and the [[Mojahedin-e-Khalq]] (MEK) which broke with Khomeini in June 1981. While initially dealing with internal threats to the revolution in its first few years, the IRGC focused its attention on external threats at the outbreak of the war in 1980. In January 1981, the IRGC would take control of the [[Basij]] to aid in the fight against Iraqi forces.<ref name=":3" /> The Basij helped bolster the prominence and legitimacy of the IRGC during the war as a vehicle for indoctrination and through its contributions to the defence of Iran. The transformation of the IRGC organised its command structure, which enabled the organisation to match the force of Iran's regular military and its first abroad deployment during the war began the sponsoring of other armed groups in the region through its command of the [[Quds Force|Quds force]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Iran's Revolutionary Guards|url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards|access-date=2024-04-26|website=Council on Foreign Relations|language=en|archive-date=20 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020120758/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Civil unrest====
In June 1981, street battles broke out between the Revolutionary Guard and the left-wing Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK), continuing for several days and killing hundreds on both sides.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|250|date=November 2012}} In September, more unrest broke out on the streets of Iran as the MEK attempted to seize power.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Thousands of left-wing Iranians (many of whom were not associated with the MEK) were shot and hanged by the government. The MEK began an assassination campaign that killed hundreds of regime officials by the fall of 1981. On 28 June 1981, they assassinated the secretary-general of the Islamic Republican Party, [[Mohammad Beheshti]] and on 30 August, killed Iran's president, [[Mohammad-Ali Rajai]].<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|251|date=November 2012}} The government responded with mass executions of suspected MEK members, a practice that lasted until 1985.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

In addition to the open civil conflict with the MEK, the Iranian government was faced with Iraqi-supported rebellions in Iranian Kurdistan, which were gradually put down through a campaign of systematic repression. 1985 also saw student anti-war demonstrations, which were crushed by government forces.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

====Economy====
In September 2020, [[Ali Fadavi]] announced that Iran spent $19.6 billion in the war.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1436923/%D8%A8%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85|title=ببینید {{pipe}} اعلام رسمی هزینه‌های جنگ تحمیلی توسط عالی‌ترین مقام نظامی کشور برای اولین بار|date=27 September 2020|website=خبرآنلاین|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=28 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201028232315/https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1436923/%D8%A8%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85|url-status=live}}</ref> The war furthered the decline of the Iranian economy that had begun with the revolution in 1978–79. Between 1979 and 1981, foreign exchange reserves fell from $14.6&nbsp;billion to $1&nbsp;billion.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> As a result of the war, living standards dropped dramatically,<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|252|date=November 2012}} and Iran was described by British journalists John Bulloch and Harvey Morris as "a dour and joyless place" ruled by a harsh regime that "seemed to have nothing to offer but endless war".<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|239|date=November 2012}}

Though Iran was becoming bankrupt, Khomeini interpreted Islam's prohibition of usury to mean they could not borrow against future oil revenues to meet war expenses. As a result, Iran funded the war by the income from oil exports after cash had run out. The revenue from oil dropped from $20&nbsp;billion in 1982 to $5&nbsp;billion in 1988.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|252|date=November 2012}} French historian Pierre Razoux argued that this sudden drop in economic industrial potential, in conjunction with the increasing aggression of Iraq, placed Iran in a challenging position that had little leeway other than accepting Iraq's conditions of peace.

In January 1985, former prime minister and anti-war Islamic Liberation Movement co-founder [[Mehdi Bazargan]] criticised the war in a telegram to the United Nations, calling it un-Islamic and illegitimate and arguing that Khomeini should have accepted Saddam's truce offer in 1982 instead of attempting to overthrow the Ba'ath.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> In a public letter to Khomeini sent in May 1988, he added "Since 1986, you have not stopped proclaiming victory, and now you are calling upon population to resist until victory. Is that not an admission of failure on your part?"<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|252|date=November 2012}} Khomeini was annoyed by Bazargan's telegram, and issued a lengthy public rebuttal in which he defended the war as both Islamic and just.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

By 1987, Iranian morale had begun to crumble, reflected in the failure of government campaigns to recruit "martyrs" for the front. Israeli historian Efraim Karsh points to the decline in morale in 1987–88 as being a major factor in Iran's decision to accept the ceasefire of 1988.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

Not all saw the war in negative terms. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was strengthened and radicalised.<ref>{{cite book|last=Nasr|first=Vali Nasr|title=The Shia revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future|year=2007|publisher=W.W. Norton|location=New York|isbn=978-0-393-32968-1|edition=New|page=140}}</ref> The Iranian government-owned ''Etelaat'' newspaper wrote, "There is not a single school or town that is excluded from the happiness of 'holy defence' of the nation, from drinking the exquisite elixir of martyrdom, or from the sweet death of the martyr, who dies in order to live forever in paradise."<ref>Column in ''Etelaat'', 4 April 1983, quoted in {{cite book|last=Molavi|first=Afshin|title=The soul of Iran a nation's journey to freedom|year=2005|publisher=W.W. Norton & Co|location=England|isbn=978-0-393-32597-3|edition=Revised}}</ref>