Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

==== Physicalism ====
Motivated by the logical positivists' interest in verificationism, [[logical behaviorism]] was the most prominent [[philosophy of mind|theory of mind]] of analytic philosophy for the first half of the 20th century.<ref>Graham, George, "Behaviorism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/behaviorism/]</ref> Behaviorism later became much less popular, in favor of either [[Identity theory of mind|type physicalism]] or [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]]. During this period, topics of the philosophy of mind were often related strongly to topics of [[cognitive science]], such as [[modularity of mind|modularity]] or [[Psychological nativism|innateness]].

===== Behaviorism =====
Behaviorists such as [[B. F. Skinner]] tended to opine either that statements about the mind were equivalent to ''statements about'' behavior and dispositions to behave in particular ways or that mental states were directly equivalent to behavior and dispositions to behave.
 
[[File:Hilary Putnam.jpg|thumb|120px|Hilary Putnam]]

Hilary Putnam criticized behaviorism by arguing that it confuses the symptoms of mental states with the mental states themselves, positing "super Spartans" who never display signs of pain.<ref>Brains and Behavior, Hilary Putnam</ref>

See also: {{slink|Verbal_Behavior#Chomsky's_review_and_replies}}

===== Type Identity =====
Type physicalism or type identity theory identified mental states with brain states. Former students of Ryle at the [[University of Adelaide]]  [[J. J. C. Smart]] and [[Ullin Place]] argued for type physicalism.

===== Functionalism =====
Functionalism remains the dominant theory. Type identity was criticized using [[multiple realizability]].

Searle's [[Chinese room]] argument criticized functionalism and holds that while a computer can understand syntax, it could never understand semantics.

===== Eliminativism =====
The view of [[eliminative materialism]] is most closely associated with [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]], who deny the existence of propositional attitudes, and with [[Daniel Dennett]], who is generally considered an eliminativist about [[qualia]] and phenomenal aspects of consciousness.