Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

=== Philosophy of mind and cognitive science ===
[[File:John searle2.jpg|thumb|130px|John Searle]]
[[John Searle]] suggests that the obsession with the philosophy of language during the 20th century has been superseded by an emphasis on the [[philosophy of mind]].<ref>Postrel and Feser, February 2000, ''Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle'' at {{cite web |date=February 2000 |title=Reality Principles: An Interview with John R. Searle |url=http://www.reason.com/news/show/27599.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080929023644/http://www.reason.com/news/show/27599.html |archive-date=29 September 2008 |access-date=23 September 2008}}</ref>

==== Physicalism ====
Motivated by the logical positivists' interest in verificationism, [[logical behaviorism]] was the most prominent [[philosophy of mind|theory of mind]] of analytic philosophy for the first half of the 20th century.<ref>Graham, George, "Behaviorism", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/behaviorism/]</ref> Behaviorism later became much less popular, in favor of either [[Identity theory of mind|type physicalism]] or [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalism]]. During this period, topics of the philosophy of mind were often related strongly to topics of [[cognitive science]], such as [[modularity of mind|modularity]] or [[Psychological nativism|innateness]].

===== Behaviorism =====
Behaviorists such as [[B. F. Skinner]] tended to opine either that statements about the mind were equivalent to ''statements about'' behavior and dispositions to behave in particular ways or that mental states were directly equivalent to behavior and dispositions to behave.
 
[[File:Hilary Putnam.jpg|thumb|120px|Hilary Putnam]]

Hilary Putnam criticized behaviorism by arguing that it confuses the symptoms of mental states with the mental states themselves, positing "super Spartans" who never display signs of pain.<ref>Brains and Behavior, Hilary Putnam</ref>

See also: {{slink|Verbal_Behavior#Chomsky's_review_and_replies}}

===== Type Identity =====
Type physicalism or type identity theory identified mental states with brain states. Former students of Ryle at the [[University of Adelaide]]  [[J. J. C. Smart]] and [[Ullin Place]] argued for type physicalism.

===== Functionalism =====
Functionalism remains the dominant theory. Type identity was criticized using [[multiple realizability]].

Searle's [[Chinese room]] argument criticized functionalism and holds that while a computer can understand syntax, it could never understand semantics.

===== Eliminativism =====
The view of [[eliminative materialism]] is most closely associated with [[Paul Churchland|Paul]] and [[Patricia Churchland]], who deny the existence of propositional attitudes, and with [[Daniel Dennett]], who is generally considered an eliminativist about [[qualia]] and phenomenal aspects of consciousness.

==== Dualism ====
[[File:David chalmers.jpg|thumb|140px|David Chalmers]]

Finally, analytic philosophy has featured a certain number of philosophers who were [[Dualism (philosophy of mind)|dualists]], and recently forms of [[property dualism]] have had a resurgence; the most prominent representative is [[David Chalmers]].<ref>{{cite SEP|url-id=dualism|title=Dualism}}</ref> Kripke also makes a notable argument for dualism.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Kripke on the distinctness of the mind from the body |url=https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/415/kripke-mind-body.html |access-date=2024-04-22 |website=www3.nd.edu}}</ref>

[[Thomas Nagel]]'s "[[What Is It Like to Be a Bat?|What is it like to be a bat]]?" challenged the physicalist account of mind. So did [[Frank Jackson (philosopher)|Frank Jackson]]'s [[knowledge argument]], which argues for [[qualia]].

==== Theories of consciousness ====
In recent years, a central focus of research in the philosophy of mind has been [[consciousness]] and the [[philosophy of perception]]. While there is a general consensus for the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Dennett |first1=D. |year=2001 |title=Are we explaining consciousness yet? |journal=Cognition |volume=79 |issue=1–2 |pages=221–237 |doi=10.1016/S0010-0277(00)00130-X |pmid=11164029 |s2cid=2235514}}</ref> there are many opinions as to the specifics. The best known theories are Searle's [[Naïve realism|naive realism]], [[Fred Dretske]] and [[Michael Tye (philosopher)|Michael Tye]]'s [[direct and indirect realism|representationalism]],  [[Daniel Dennett]]'s [[heterophenomenology]], and the [[Higher-order theories of consciousness|higher-order theories]] of either [[David M. Rosenthal (philosopher)|David M. Rosenthal]]—who advocates a higher-order thought (HOT) model—or [[David Malet Armstrong|David Armstrong]] and [[William Lycan]]—who advocate a higher-order perception (HOP) model. An alternative higher-order theory, the higher-order global states (HOGS) model, is offered by [[Robert van Gulick]].<ref>For summaries and some criticism of the different higher-order theories, see Van Gulick, Robert (2006) "Mirror Mirror – Is That All?" In Kriegel & Williford (eds.), ''Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness''. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The final draft is also available here {{cite web |title=Mirror Mirror – Is That All? |url=http://web.syr.edu/~rnvangul/mirror-mirror.final.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081002035247/http://web.syr.edu/~rnvangul/mirror-mirror.final.pdf |archive-date=2 October 2008 |access-date=23 September 2008}}. For Van Gulick's own view, see Van Gulick, Robert. "Higher-Order Global States HOGS: An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness." In Gennaro, R.J., (ed.) ''Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology.'' Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.</ref>