Editing World War I reparations (section)

==Evolution of reparations==

===Initial demands===
{{further|Treaty of Versailles|Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919)|Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine|Treaty of Trianon|Treaty of Sèvres}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R02190, Deutsche Reparationslieferungen.jpg|thumb|right|Trains loaded with machinery deliver their cargo in 1920 as reparation payment in kind.|alt=Several trains loaded with machinery take up the center of the photo. A group of nine men stand to the left.]]

The Treaty of Versailles stated that a [[Reparation Commission]] would be established in 1921. This commission would consider the resources available to Germany and her capacity to pay, provide the German Government with an opportunity to be heard on the subject, and decide on the final reparation figure that Germany would be required to pay. In the interim, Germany was required to pay an equivalent of {{nowrap|20 billion}} gold marks {{nowrap|({{USD|5 billion}})}} in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or other forms. The money would be used to pay Allied occupation costs and to buy food and raw materials for Germany.{{sfn|Martel|2010|p=156}}<ref>[[s: Treaty of Versailles/Part VIII|Treaty of Versailles, articles 232–235]]</ref> Article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly acknowledged that "the resources of Bulgaria are not sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation". Therefore, the treaty required Bulgaria to pay a sum equivalent of 2.250&nbsp;billion [[Gold franc]]s in reparations.<ref>[[s: Treaty of Neuilly/Part VII#Article 121|Treaty of Neuilly, Article 121]]</ref>

The treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Trianon, and Sèvres acknowledged that [[First Austrian Republic|Austria]], [[Hungarian Republic (1919–20)|Hungary]], and [[Ottoman Empire|Turkey]] did not have the resources to pay reparations, and delayed the establishment of a final figure until the Reparation Commission was established.<ref>[[s: Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye|Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, articles 178–9]]</ref><ref>[[s: Treaty of Trianon/Part VIII|Treaty of Trianon, articles 162–163]]</ref><ref>[[s: Treaty of Sèvres/Part VIII|Treaty of Sèvres, articles 231–236]]</ref> In addition, Bulgaria was required to hand over thousands of livestock to [[Kingdom of Greece (Glücksburg)|Greece]], [[Kingdom of Romania|Romania]], and the [[Yugoslavia|Serb-Croat-Slovene State]] "in restitution for animals taken away by Bulgaria during the war". This would not be credited towards the reparation figure.<ref>[[s: Treaty of Neuilly/Part VII#Article 127|Treaty of Neuilly, Article 127]]</ref> Likewise, Bulgaria had to dispatch 50,000 tons of coal a year to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in restitution for destroyed mines. These shipments would not be credited against Bulgaria's reparation sum.<ref>[[s: Treaty of Neuilly/Part VII#Article 128|Treaty of Neuilly, Article 128]]</ref> Germany, Austria, and Hungary all had commitments to handover timber, ore, and livestock to the Allied Powers. They would, however, be credited for these goods.<ref>[[s: Treaty of Versailles/Part VIII|Treaty of Versailles, Annex IV–V]]</ref><ref>[[s: Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye|Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Annex IV–V]]</ref><ref>[[s: Treaty of Trianon/Part VIII|Treaty of Trianon, Annex V]]</ref>

In January 1921, the Allied Powers grew impatient and established the reparation sum at 226&nbsp;billion gold marks. The Germans countered with an offer of 30&nbsp;billion.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=410}} On 24 April 1921, the German Government wrote to the American Government expressing "her readiness to acknowledge for reparation purposes a total liability of 50&nbsp;billion gold marks", but was also prepared "to pay the equivalent of this sum in annuities adapted to her economic capacity totalling 200&nbsp;billion gold marks".{{sfn|United States Department of State|1921|p=46}} In addition, the German Government stated that "to accelerate the redemption of the balance" and "to combat misery and hatred created by the war", Germany was willing to provide the resources needed and "to undertake herself the rebuilding of townships, villages, and hamlets".{{sfn|United States Department of State|1921|p=47}}

===London Schedule of Payments===
The London Schedule of Payments of 5 May 1921 established "the full liability of all the Central Powers combined, not just Germany alone," at {{nowrap|132 billion}} gold marks.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}} This sum was a compromise promoted by Belgium{{mdash}}against higher figures demanded by the French and [[Kingdom of Italy|Italians]] and the lower figure the British supported{{mdash}}that "represented an assessment of the lowest amount that public opinion&nbsp;...&nbsp;would tolerate".{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=236}}

This figure was divided into three series of [[Bond (finance)|bonds]]: "A" and "B" Bonds together had a nominal value of {{nowrap|50 billion}} gold marks {{nowrap|({{US$|12.5&nbsp;billion)}}}}{{mdash}}less than the sum Germany had previously offered to pay. "C" Bonds, comprising the remainder of the reparation figure, "were deliberately designed to be [[Chimera (mythology)|chimerical]]",{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}} with the Germans being informed that they would not be expected to pay them under realistic conditions.<ref name="Working Papers No. 163/12">{{cite book |last1=Ritschl |first1=Albrecht |title=Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany (Working Papers No. 163/12) |date=2012 |publisher=LSE |page=5 |url=https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44335/1/WP163.pdf |access-date=2 March 2024}}</ref> They were "a political bargaining chip" that served the domestic policies of France and the United Kingdom.{{sfn|Crafts|Fearon|2013|p=113}} The figure was completely unreal; its primary function was to mislead public opinion "into believing that the 132-billion-mark figure was being maintained". Furthermore, "Allied experts knew that Germany could not pay 132&nbsp;billion marks and that the other Central Powers could pay little. Thus, the A and B Bonds, which were genuine, represented the actual Allied assessment of German capacity to pay."{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}} Taking into account the sum already paid between 1919 and 1921, Germany's immediate obligation was 41&nbsp;billion gold marks.{{sfn|Ferguson|1998|p=414}}

To pay towards this sum, Germany could pay in kind or in cash. Commodities paid in kind included coal, timber, chemical dyes, pharmaceuticals, livestock, agricultural machines, construction materials, and factory machinery. The gold value of these would be deducted from what Germany was required to pay. Germany's assistance with the restoration of the university library of [[Leuven|Louvain]], which was destroyed by the Germans on 25 August 1914, was also credited towards the sum, as were some of the territorial changes the treaty imposed upon Germany.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=223–234}}{{sfn|Kramer|2008|p=10}} The payment schedule required {{nowrap|{{US$|250 million}}}} within twenty-five days and then {{nowrap|{{US$|500 million}}}} annually, plus 26 per cent of the value of German exports. The German Government was to issue bonds at five per cent interest and set up a [[sinking fund]] of one per cent to support the payment of reparations.{{sfn|Martel|2010|p=156}}

In the London ultimatum of 5 May, Germany was given six days to recognize the Schedule of Payments and to comply with the Treaty of Versailles' demands for disarmament and the extradition of German "war criminals". If it did not, the Allies threatened to occupy the [[Ruhr]].<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Scriba |first=Arnulf |date=14 September 2014 |title=Londoner Ultimatum |url=https://www.dhm.de/lemo/kapitel/weimarer-republik/aussenpolitik/londoner-ultimatum.html |access-date=5 May 2024 |website=Deutsches Historisches Museum |language=de}}</ref> In anticipation of such an ultimatum, the German [[Fehrenbach cabinet|government of Constantin Fehrenbach]], finding itself unable to reach agreement on the issue, had resigned on 4 May.<ref>{{cite web |title=Das Kabinett Fehrenbach – Der Rücktritt des Kabinetts |trans-title=The Fehrenbach Cabinet – The Resignation of the Cabinet |url=https://www.bundesarchiv.de/aktenreichskanzlei/1919-1933/0000/feh/feh1p/kap1_1/para2_10.html#Start |accessdate=5 May 2024 |website=Das Bundesarchiv |language=de}}</ref> The government of the new chancellor, [[First Wirth cabinet|Joseph Wirth]], accepted the ultimatum on 11 May and began the "policy of fulfillment" – by attempting to meet the demands, it tried to show the impossibility of complying with the scheduled payments.<ref name=":0" />

===End of reparations for Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey===

Between the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine and April 1922, Bulgaria paid 173 million gold francs in reparations.{{sfn|World Peace Foundation|1922|p=18}} In 1923, the Bulgarian reparation sum was revised downwards to 550 million gold francs, "plus a lump sum payment of 25&nbsp;million francs for occupation costs".{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=234–235}} Towards this figure, Bulgaria paid 41 million gold francs between 1925 and 1929. In 1932, the Bulgarian reparation obligation was abandoned following the [[Lausanne Conference of 1932|Lausanne Conference]].{{sfn|Crampton|1987|p=84}}

Because Austria was "so impoverished" after the war, and because of the collapse of the Bank of Vienna, the country paid no reparations "beyond credits for transferred property".{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=234–235}}{{sfn|Taylor|2001|p=59}} Likewise, Hungary paid no reparations beyond coal deliveries because of the collapse of the Hungarian economy.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=234–235}}{{sfn|Taylor|2001|p=60}} Turkish reparations had been "sharply limited in view of the magnitude of Turkish territorial losses". However, the Treaty of Sèvres was never ratified. When the [[Treaty of Lausanne (1923)|Treaty of Lausanne]] was signed in 1923, Turkish reparations were "eliminated altogether".{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=234–235}}

===German defaults===
{{Main|Occupation of the Ruhr}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-00121, München, Turnfest, Festzug.jpg|thumb|right|Protests by gymnasts from the Ruhr at the 1923 [[Munich]] Gymnastics Festival. The sign on the left reads "The Ruhr remains German". The right placard reads "We never want to be vassals".|alt=People holding banners and waving flags march down a street. Lining the road are crowds of supporting people.]]

From the initiation of reparations, German coal deliveries were below the level agreed. In an attempt to rectify this situation, the [[Spa Conference of 1920|Spa Conference]] was held in July 1920. At this conference it was decided that Germany would be paid five marks per coal ton delivered to facilitate coal shipments and help feed the miners. Despite this, Germany continued to default on her obligations.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=235–236}} By late 1922, the German defaults on payments had grown so serious and regular that a crisis engulfed the Reparations Commission. French and Belgian delegates urged the seizure of the [[Ruhr]] to encourage the Germans to make more effort to pay, while the British supported postponing payments to facilitate the financial reconstruction of Germany.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=239–240}} On 26 December 1922, Germany defaulted on timber deliveries. The timber quota was based upon a German proposal and the default was massive.{{refn|name=timberdefault|group=Note|By the 1922 quota deadline, "France had received 29% of her sawn timber allotment and 29% of her share of telegraph poles." While the German default was aimed specifically at France, there "was also substantial default on timber deliveries to Belgium and Italy". In addition, Britain "was still awaiting 99.80" per cent of her 1922 timber deliveries.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=240}}}}

The Allies were unanimous that the default was in bad faith.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=240}} Whilst Germany had lost important coal-fields in Silesia when these were transferred to Poland under the Versailles treaty, the required coal-quota had also been reduced. Exporting of German coal to Austria and Switzerland continued until December 1921 when the Reparations Committee banned all exports of German coal except to the Netherlands. In January 1923, despite quota reductions, the German Government defaulted on coal deliveries for the 34th time in three years.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=241}}{{sfn|Hehn|2005|p=66}}

On 9 January 1923, the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in default of her coal deliveries and voted to occupy the Ruhr to enforce the country's reparation commitments. Britain was the lone dissenting voice to both measures. On 11 January, French and Belgian soldiers{{mdash}}supported by engineers including an Italian contingent{{mdash}}entered the region, initiating the [[Occupation of the Ruhr]].{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=243}}{{sfn|Bell|1997|pp=24–25}}

The French Premier [[Raymond Poincaré]] was deeply reluctant to order the occupation and had only taken this step after the British had rejected his proposals for more moderate sanctions against Germany.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=244}} By December 1922, Poincaré was faced with Anglo-American-German hostility; coal supplies for French steel production were running low.{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=26}} Exasperated with Britain's failure to act, he wrote to the French ambassador in London:
<blockquote>Judging others by themselves, the English, who are blinded by their loyalty, have always thought that the Germans did not abide by their pledges inscribed in the Versailles Treaty because they had not frankly agreed to them&nbsp;...&nbsp;We, on the contrary, believe that if Germany, far from making the slightest effort to carry out the treaty of peace, has always tried to escape her obligations, it is because until now she has not been convinced of her defeat&nbsp;...&nbsp;We are also certain that Germany, as a nation, resigns herself to keep her pledged word only under the impact of necessity.{{sfn|Schwarzschild|1942|p= 140}}</blockquote>

The occupation proved marginally profitable; the occupying powers received 900 million gold marks, and much of this merely covered the military costs of occupation. However, the real issue behind the occupation was not German defaults on coal and timber deliveries, but the forcing of Germany "to acknowledge her defeat in World War I and to accept the Versailles Treaty".{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=245}} Poincaré recognized that if Germany could get away with defying Versailles in regard to the reparations, a precedent would be created and inevitably the Germans would proceed to dismantle the rest of the Versailles treaty.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=245}}

===Dawes Plan===
{{Main|Dawes Plan}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-00924, Berlin, Amerikanisches Gold für die Reichsbank.jpg|thumb|alt=men standing around looking at barrels|The first American gold arrives as per the Dawes Plan]]

Although the French succeeded in their objective during the Ruhr occupation, the Germans had wrecked their economy by funding passive resistance and brought about [[hyperinflation]].{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=245}} Under Anglo-American pressure and simultaneous decline in the value of the franc, France was increasingly isolated and her diplomatic position was weakened.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=246}} In October 1923, a committee consisting of American, Belgian, British, French, German, and Italian experts and chaired by the former Director of the [[Office of Management and Budget|US Bureau of the Budget]] [[Charles G. Dawes]] was formed, to consider "from a purely technical standpoint", how to balance the German budget, stabilize the economy and set an achievable level of reparations.{{sfn|Bell|1997|pp=37–38}}

In April 1924, the [[Dawes Plan]] was accepted and it replaced the London schedule of payment. While the "C" Bonds were omitted from the plan's framework, they were not formally rescinded. French troops were to withdraw from the Ruhr, and a bank independent of the German Government, with a ruling body at least {{nowrap|50 per cent non-German}}, was to be established and the German currency was to be stabilized. The payment of reparations was also reorganized. In the first year following the implementation of the plan, Germany would have to pay {{nowrap|1 billion}} marks. This figure would rise to {{nowrap|2.5 billion}} marks per year by the fifth year of the plan. A Reparations Agency was established with Allied representatives to organize the payment of reparations. Furthermore, a loan of {{nowrap|800 million}} marks was to be raised{{mdash}}over 50 per cent coming from the United States, 25 per cent from Britain, and the balance from other European nations{{mdash}}to back the German currency and to aid in the payment of reparations.{{sfn|Bell|1997|pp=37–38}}{{sfn|Crafts|Fearon|2013|pp=82, 114}}

===Young Plan===
{{Main|Young Plan}}
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-08968, Eröffnung der zweiten Haager Konferenz.jpg|thumb|alt=Great hall containing many people|The opening of the [[Hague conference on reparations|Second Hague Conference]]: one of the two conferences aimed at implementing the Young Plan.]]

The adoption of the plan was followed by the [[Locarno Treaties]]. The subsequent "spirit of Locarno" saw an apparent reconciliation between the European Powers. The implementation of the Dawes Plan also saw a positive economic impact in Europe, largely funded by American loans.{{sfn|Herring|Carroll|1996|p=70}} Under the Dawes Plan, Germany always met her obligations.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=249–250}} However, German long-term goals remained the same despite the apparent reconciliation: the revision of the Treaty of Versailles to end reparations. The Dawes Plan was seen only a temporary measure, with expected future revisions.{{sfn|Herring|Carroll|1996|p=70}}{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=249–250}} In late 1927, the Agent-General for Reparations "called for a more permanent scheme" for payments and in 1928 the Germans followed suit.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=249}} German Foreign Minister [[Gustav Stresemann]] called for a final reparation plan to be established alongside an early withdrawal of Allied troops from the Rhineland. The French, aware of their weakening political and financial position, acquiesced. On 16 September 1928, a joint Entente-German statement acknowledging the need for a new reparation plan was issued.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=249–250}}

In February 1929, a new committee was formed to re-examine reparations. It was chaired by the American banker [[Owen D. Young]] and presented its findings in June 1929. The "[[Young Plan]]" was accepted and was ratified by the German Government on 12 March 1930. The plan established a theoretical final reparation figure at 112&nbsp;billion gold marks {{nowrap|({{USD|26.35 billion}})}}, with a new payment schedule that would see reparations completed by 1988{{mdash}}the first time a final date had been set. In addition, foreign oversight of German finances was to end with the withdrawal of the Reparations Agency, which would be replaced by the [[Bank for International Settlements]]. The bank was established to provide cooperation among central banks and to receive and disburse reparation payments. A further loan of {{Nowrap|{{USD|300 million}}}} was to be raised and given to Germany.{{sfn|Backhaus|2012|p=70}}{{sfn|Bell|1997|p=38}}{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=250–251}}{{sfn|Young|2006|p=171}}

As a result of the plan, German payments were half the sum required under the Dawes Plan.{{sfn|Marks|1978|pp=251–252}} The implementation of the Young Plan required the Anglo-French withdrawal from the Rhineland within months.{{sfn|Shamir|1989|p=25}} Despite the reduction, there was increasing German hostility to the plan. For example, the Law against the Enslavement of the German People, or Freedom Law, was proposed by the nationalist politician [[Alfred Hugenberg]]. Hugenberg's proposed law called for the end of the Ruhr occupation, the official renouncement of [[Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles|Article 231]] (the "war guilt" clause) and the rejection of the Young Plan. While politicians rejected it, it attracted enough support from voters in order to be put up for a referendum. The [[German referendum, 1929|plebiscite]] was held in December 1929, resulting in 5.8 million people out of 6.3 million voters voting in favor of the law. This fell below the required 21 million votes (50% of eligible voters) in order for it to take effect. While this was a political defeat for Hugenberg, it did result in significant national attention for [[Adolf Hitler]], who had worked with Hugenberg to promote the referendum, and subsequently in valuable right-wing financing.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=251}}{{sfn|Mommsen|Foster|1988|pp=279–281}}{{sfn|Nohlen|Stöver|2010|p=770}}

===End of German reparations===
{{Main|Lausanne Conference of 1932}}

In March 1930, the German Government collapsed and was replaced by a new coalition led by Chancellor [[Heinrich Brüning]]. In June, Allied troops withdrew from near [[Mainz]]{{mdash}}the last occupation zone in the Rhineland{{mdash}}and Brüning's Government broached the subject of demanding further refinement to reparations, but this demand was refused by [[William Tyrrell, 1st Baron Tyrrell|William Tyrrell]], the British ambassador to France.{{sfn|Young|2006|pp=171–172}} During 1931, a financial crisis began in Germany. In May, [[Creditanstalt]]{{mdash}}the largest bank in Austria{{mdash}}collapsed, sparking a banking crisis in Germany and Austria. In response, Brüning announced that Germany was suspending reparation payments. This resulted in a massive withdrawal of domestic and foreign funds from German banks. By mid-July, all German banks had closed.{{sfn|Young|2006|p=174}} Until this point, France's policy had been to provide Germany with financial support to help Brüning's Government stabilize the country. Brüning, now under considerable political pressure from [[Far-right politics|the far-right]] and [[President of Germany (1919–1945)|President]] [[Paul von Hindenburg]], was unable to make any concessions or reverse policy. As a result, Brüning was unable to borrow money from foreign or domestic sources. Further attempts to enlist British support to end reparations failed; the British said it was a joint issue with France and the United States. In early July, Brüning announced "his intention to seek the outright revision of the Young Plan".{{sfn|Shamir|1989|pp=56–58}} In light of the crisis and with the prospect of Germany being unable to repay her debts, United States President [[Herbert Hoover]] intervened. In June, Hoover publicly proposed a one-year [[Moratorium (law)|moratorium]] to reparation and war debts. By July, the "[[Hoover Moratorium]]" had been accepted.{{sfn|Crafts|Fearon|2013|p=155}}

The moratorium was widely supported in both Germany and the United Kingdom. The French, initially hesitant, eventually agreed to support the American proposal.{{sfn|Albrecht-Carrié|1960|p=200}} However, on 13 July, the German [[Danatbank|Darmstädter Bank]] collapsed, leading to further bankruptcies and a rise in unemployment further exacerbating Germany's financial crisis.{{sfn|Harsch|2009|p=160}} With the [[Great Depression]] now exerting its influence, the Bank for International Settlements reported that the Young Plan was unrealistic in light of the economic crisis and urged the world governments to reach a new settlement on the various debts they owed each other. During January 1932, Brüning said he would seek the complete cancellation of reparations. His position was supported by the British and Italians, and opposed by the French.{{sfn|Temin|Toniolo|2008|p=137}}

Because of the political differences between countries on the subject and impending elections in France and Germany, a conference could not be established until June. On 16 June, the Lausanne Conference opened. However, discussions were complicated by the ongoing [[World Disarmament Conference]]. At the latter conference, the US informed the British and French that they would not be allowed to default on their war debts. In turn, they recommended that war debts be tied into German reparation payments, to which the Germans objected. On 9 July, an agreement was reached and signed. The Lausanne Conference annulled the Young Plan and required Germany to pay a final, single installment of 3&nbsp;billion marks.{{sfn|Temin|Toniolo|2008|pp=137–138}}{{sfn|Mommsen|Foster|1988|p=454}}{{sfn|Joshi|2005|p=78}} The Lausanne Treaty was to become effective as soon as a corresponding agreement had been reached with the United States on the repayment of the loans it had made to the Allied powers during World War I.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=September 1932 |title=The Result of the Lausanne Conference |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20662122 |journal=World Affairs |publisher=Sage Publications, Inc. |volume=95 |issue=2 |pages=75–77 |jstor=20662122 }}</ref> Due to the failure to come to such an agreement, the Lausanne Treaty was not ratified by any of the states involved and therefore never became legally valid.<ref>{{Cite book |url={{Google books|Xj17DQAAQBAJ|page=575|plainurl=yes}} |title=Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1917–1990 |publisher=De Gruyter |year=2016 |isbn=978-3110465266 |editor-last=Abelshauser |editor-first=Werner |location=Berlin |pages=575 |language=de |trans-title=Economic Policy in Germany 1917–1990 |editor-last2=Ritschl |editor-first2=Albrecht |editor-last3=Fisch |editor-first3=S. |editor-last4=Holtfrerich |editor-first4=Carl-Ludwig |editor-last5=Hoffmann |editor-first5=Dierk O.}}</ref> Germany still paid interest on bonds created under the Dawes and Young plans until 1939,<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Brown |first1=William O. |last2=Burdekin |first2=Richard C. K. |date=2002 |title=German Debt Traded in London during the Second World War: A British Perspective on Hitler |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3549020 |journal=Economica |volume=69 |issue=276 |pages=655–669 |doi=10.1111/1468-0335.00305 |jstor=3549020 |issn=0013-0427}}</ref> but did not resume paying reparations until after 1945.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Lausanne Conference |url=https://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1515.html |access-date=3 November 2023 |website=U-S-History.com}}</ref>

===Amount paid by Germany===
The precise figure Germany paid is a matter of dispute.{{sfn|Grenville|Wasserstein|2000|p=140}} The German Government estimated it had paid the equivalent of 67.8&nbsp;billion gold marks in reparations. The German figure included{{mdash}}other than gold or goods in kind{{mdash}}the [[scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow]], state property lost in lands ceded to other countries, and the loss of colonial territories.{{sfn|Kindleberger|1986|p=19}} The Reparation Commission and the Bank for International Settlements state that {{nowrap|20.598 billion}} gold marks was paid by Germany in reparations, of which {{nowrap|7.595 billion}} was paid before the implementation of the London Schedule of Payments.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=233}} [[Niall Ferguson]] provides a slightly lower figure. He estimates that Germany paid no more than {{nowrap|19 billion}} gold marks.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=424}} Ferguson further estimates that this sum amounted to 2.4 per cent of Germany's national income between 1919 and 1932. Stephen Schuker, in his comprehensive econometric study, concedes that Germany transferred 16.8&nbsp;billion marks over the whole period, but points out that this sum was vastly offset by the devaluation of Allied paper-mark deposits up to 1923, and by loans that Germany subsequently repudiated after 1924. The net capital transfer into Germany amounted to 17.75&nbsp;billion marks, or 2.1% of Germany's entire national income over the period 1919–1931. In effect, America paid Germany four times more, in price-adjusted terms, than the U.S. furnished to West Germany under the post-1948 Marshall Plan.{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=424}}{{sfn|Schuker|1988|p=11, 106–119}}{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=43}} According to [[Gerhard Weinberg]], reparations were paid, towns were rebuilt, orchards replanted, mines reopened and pensions paid. However, the burden of repairs was shifted away from the German economy and onto the damaged economies of the war's victors.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=16}} Hans Mommsen wrote "Germany financed its reparation payments to Western creditor nations with American loans", which the British and French then used to "cover their long-term interest obligations and to retire their wartime debts with the United States."{{sfn|Mommsen|Foster|1988|p=177}}

===Loan payments===
Germany's payment of reparations during the 1920s was funded mostly through foreign loans. In 1933, as well as stopping all reparations payments, the new German Chancellor Adolf Hitler in large part repudiated payment of these loans, including a default on all of debt owed in US Dollar bonds.{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=254–255}} In June 1953, an [[London Agreement on German External Debts|agreement was reached on this existing debt]] with West Germany. Germany agreed to repay 50 per cent of the loan amounts that had been defaulted on in the 1920s, but deferred some of the debt until West and [[East Germany]] were [[German reunification|unified]]. In 1995, following reunification, Germany began making the final payments towards the loans. A final installment of {{Nowrap|{{USD|94 million}}}} was made on 3 October 2010, settling German loan debts in regard to reparations.<ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023140,00.html|title=Why Did World War I Just End? |last1=Suddath|first1=Claire|date=4 October 2010|magazine=Time|access-date=29 July 2014}}</ref>

===Summary===

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Event
! German<br/>gold marks<br/>(billions)
! U.S. dollars<br/>(billions)
! 2019 US$<br/>(billions)
!Approximate percentage of Germany's GNP in 1925{{refn|name=repnote1|group=Note|Economic historian Paul Bairoch calculated German GNP in 1925 as approximately 45,002 million US Dollars at 1960 prices (see Bairoch, Paul (1976): "Europe's Gross National Product: 1800–1975", Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 5, pp. 273–340), which converts to approximately 388,685 million US dollars at 2019 prices}}
|-
| Initial German offer, 24 April 1921    
| align=center | 50 (capital value)<br />or 200 in annuities ([[Real versus nominal value (economics)|nominal value]]){{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}}{{sfn|United States Department of State|1921|pp=46–48}}
| align=center | 12.5 – 50{{refn|name=repnote2|group=Note|No figure currently found showing the exact mark to dollar conversion. Instead, the estimated dollar value has been presented based on Sally Marks' comment that while the "paper mark depreciated rapidly, the gold mark held at 4 to the dollar and 20 to the pound."{{sfn|Martel|1999|p=35}}}}
| align=center | {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|12.5|1921|2019}}}} – {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|50|1921|2019}}}}
| align=center | 53% – 184%
|-
| J.M. Keynes proposal in ''The Economic Consequences of the Peace'', 1919   
| align=center | 40{{refn|name=repnote2|group=Note}}
| align=center | 10
| align=center | {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|10|1919|2019}}}}
| align=center | 38%
|-
| London Schedule of Payments, 5 May 1921 (All Central Powers)      
| align=center | 132{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=236}}
| align=center | 33{{sfn|Grenville|Wasserstein|2000|p=140}}
| align=center | {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|33|1921|2019}}}}
| align=center | 123%
|-
| A and B Bonds, of the above payment scheme      
| align=center | 50{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}}
| align=center | 12.5{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=237}}
| align=center | {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|12.5|1921|2019}}}}
| align=center | 46%
|-
| Young Plan, 1929      
| align=center | 112{{sfn|Young|2006|p=171}}
| align=center | 26.35{{sfn|Backhaus|2012|p=70}}  
| align=center | {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|26.35|1929|2019}}}}
| align=center | 101%
|-
| Total German payments (cash. credit for state assets, and in-kind) made by 1932
| align=center |  19–20.5{{sfn|Marks|1978|p=233}}{{sfn|Boemeke|Feldman|Glaser|1998|p=424}}
| align=center |  4.75 – 5.12{{refn|name=repnote2|group=Note}}
| align=center | {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|4.75|1932|2019}}}} – {{formatnum:{{Inflation|US|5.12|1932|2019}}}}
| align=center | 23%–25%
|-
|}