Editing World (section)

=== Phenomenology ===
Within [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], worlds are defined in terms of ''horizons'' of experiences.<ref name="Sandkühler"/><ref name="Mittelstraß"/> When we perceive an object, like a house, we do not just experience this object at the center of our attention but also various other objects surrounding it, given in the periphery.<ref name="Embree">{{cite book |last1=Embree |first1=Lester |title=Encyclopedia of Phenomenology |date=1997 |publisher=Kluwer Academic Publishers |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/EMBEOP |chapter=World}}</ref> The term "horizon" refers to these co-given objects, which are usually experienced only in a vague, indeterminate manner.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=David Woodruff |title=Phenomenology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 April 2021 |date=2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=Joel |title=Phenomenology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=9 April 2021}}</ref> The perception of a house involves various horizons, corresponding to the neighborhood, the city, the country, the Earth, etc. In this context, the world is the biggest horizon or the "horizon of all horizons".<ref name="Embree"/><ref name="Sandkühler"/><ref name="Mittelstraß"/> It is common among phenomenologists to understand the world not just as a spatiotemporal collection of objects but as additionally incorporating various other relations between these objects. These relations include, for example, indication-relations that help us anticipate one object given the appearances of another object and means-end-relations or functional involvements relevant for practical concerns.<ref name="Embree"/>