Editing Western Sahara (section)

=== Stalling of the referendum and Settlement Plan ===
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The referendum, originally scheduled for 1992, foresaw giving the local population the option between independence or affirming integration with Morocco, but it quickly stalled. In 1997, the [[Houston Agreement]] attempted to revive the proposal for a referendum but likewise has hitherto not had success. {{As of|2010}}, negotiations over terms have not resulted in any substantive action. At the heart of the dispute lies the question of who qualifies to be registered to participate in the referendum, and, since about the year 2000, Morocco considers that since there is no agreement on persons entitled to vote, a referendum is not possible. Meanwhile, Polisario still insisted on a referendum with independence as a clear option, without offering a solution to the problem of who is qualified to be registered to participate in it.

Both sides blame each other for the stalling of the referendum. The Polisario has insisted on only allowing those found on the 1974 Spanish Census lists (see below) to vote, while Morocco has insisted that the census was flawed by evasion and sought the inclusion of members of Sahrawi tribes that escaped from Spanish invasion to the north of Morocco by the 19th century.

Efforts by the UN special envoys to find a common ground for both parties did not succeed. By 1999 the UN had identified about 85,000 voters, with nearly half of them in the Moroccan-controlled parts of Western Sahara or Southern Morocco, and the others scattered between the [[Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf Province, Algeria|Tindouf refugee camps]], Mauritania and other places of exile. Polisario accepted this voter list, as it had done with the previous list presented by the UN (both of them originally based on the Spanish census of 1974), but Morocco refused and, as rejected voter candidates began a mass-appeals procedure, insisted that each application be scrutinized individually. This again brought the process to a halt.

According to a NATO delegation, MINURSO election observers stated in 1999, as the deadlock continued, that "if the number of voters does not rise significantly the odds were slightly on the [[Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic|SADR]] side".<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/trip/as79gsm993-morocco.asp |title=Visit to Morocco 28 April - 2 May 1999 |date=May 1999 |publisher=NATO PA&nbsp;– Archives |access-date=13 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110928052936/http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/trip/as79gsm993-morocco.asp |archive-date=28 September 2011 |url-status=dead}}</ref> By 2001, the process had effectively stalemated and the UN Secretary-General asked the parties for the first time to explore other, third-way solutions. Indeed, shortly after the Houston Agreement (1997), Morocco officially declared that it was "no longer necessary" to include an option of independence on the ballot, offering instead autonomy. Erik Jensen, who played an administrative role in MINURSO, wrote that neither side would agree to a voter registration in which they were destined to lose (see ''[[#Bibliography|Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate]]'').