Editing Value theory (section)

==== Absolute and relative ====
Another distinction relies on the contrast between absolute and relative value. Absolute value, also called ''value {{lang|la|simpliciter}}'', is a form of unconditional value. A thing has relative value if its value is limited to certain considerations or viewpoints.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA45 45–46]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1. Basic Questions}} }}</ref>

One form of relative value is restricted to the type of an entity, expressed in sentences like "That is a good knife" or "Jack is a good thief". This form is known as ''[[Attributive expression|attributive]] goodness'' since the word "good" modifies the meaning of another term. To be attributively good as a certain type means to possess qualities characteristic of that type. For instance, a good knife is sharp and a good thief has the skill of stealing without getting caught. Attributive goodness contrasts with [[Predicative expression|predicative]] goodness. The sentence "Pleasure is good" is an example since the word ''good'' is used as a predicate to talk about the unqualified value of pleasure.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3–4]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1. Basic Questions}} | {{harvnb|Zimmerman|2015|pp=13–14}} }}</ref> Attributive and predicative goodness can accompany each other, but this is not always the case. For instance, being a good thief is not necessarily a good thing.<ref>{{harvnb|Silverstein|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=96qkDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA227 227]}}</ref>

Another type of relative value restricts goodness to a specific person. Known as ''personal value'',{{efn|[[Prudential value]] is a closely related concept signifying what is good for a person.<ref>{{harvnb|Tiberius|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA158 158]}}</ref>}} it expresses what benefits a particular person, promotes their [[welfare spending|welfare]], or is in their interest. For example, a poem written by a child may have personal value for the parents even if the poem lacks value for others. Impersonal value, by contrast, is good in general without restriction to any specific person or viewpoint.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63 63–64]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1. Basic Questions}} | {{harvnb|Rønnow-Rasmussen|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=b_O3l9_QgNgC&pg=PA1 1–2]}} }}</ref> Some philosophers, like Moore, reject the existence of personal values, holding that all values are impersonal. Others have proposed theories about the relation between personal and impersonal value. The agglomerative theory says that impersonal value is nothing but the sum of all personal values. Another view understands impersonal value as a specific type of personal value taken from the perspective of the universe as a whole.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1.1.1 Good Simpliciter and Good For}} | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA63 63–65]}} }}</ref>

Agent-relative value is sometimes contrasted with personal value as another person-specific limitation of the evaluative outlook. Agent-relative values affect moral considerations about what a person is responsible for or guilty of. For example, if Mei promises to pick Pedro up from the airport then an agent-relative value obligates Mei to drive to the airport. This obligation is in place even if it does not benefit Mei, in which case there is an agent-relative value without a personal value. In [[consequentialism]],{{efn|Consequentialism is a theory in [[normative ethics]]. It says that whether an act is right depends on its consequences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2023|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Haines|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Hooker|2023|loc=§ 1. Utilitarianism}} }}</ref>}} agent-relative values are often discussed in relation to [[ethical dilemmas]]. One dilemma revolves around the question of whether an individual should murder an innocent person if this prevents the murder of two innocent people by a different perpetrator. The agent-neutral perspective tends to affirm this idea since one murder is preferable to two. The agent-relative perspective tends to reject this conclusion, arguing that the initial murder should be avoided since it negatively impacts the agent-relative value of the individual committing it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA73 73–74]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 3.3 Agent-Relative Value?}} | {{harvnb|Cullity|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uvzVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA96 96–97]}} }}</ref>

Traditionally, most value theorists see absolute value as the main topic of value theory and focus their attention on this type. Nonetheless, some philosophers, like [[Peter Geach]] and [[Philippa Foot]], have argued that the concept of absolute value by itself is meaningless and should be understood as one form of relative value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orsi|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cc3cBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA45 45–46, 61]}} | {{harvnb|Schroeder|2021|loc=§ 1.1.2 Attributive Good}} }}</ref>