Editing USS Cole bombing (section)

==Aftermath==

===Rules of engagement===
{{location map|Yemen|caption=Approximate location of bombing, Aden Harbor, Yemen|lat_deg=12.8|lat_min=0|lat_sec=0|lon_deg=45.0|lon_min=0|lon_sec=0}}
The destroyer's rules of engagement, as approved by the Pentagon, forbade guards to fire upon the small boat (which was not known to be loaded with explosives) without permission from ''Cole''{{'}}s captain or another officer.<ref name=Robinson>{{Cite news|last=Robinson|first=Stephen|title=Bombed US warship was defended by sailors with unloaded guns|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/1374316/Bombed-US-warship-was-defended-by-sailors-with-unloaded-guns.html |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220112/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/1374316/Bombed-US-warship-was-defended-by-sailors-with-unloaded-guns.html |archive-date=12 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live|journal=The Daily Telegraph|location=London|date=15 November 2000|access-date=27 May 2010}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

Petty Officer John Washak said that right after the blast, a senior chief petty officer ordered him to turn an M-60 machine gun on ''Cole''{{'}}s fantail away from a second small boat approaching. "With blood still on my face", he said, he was told: "That's the rules of engagement: no shooting unless we're shot at." He added, "In the military, it's like we're trained to hesitate now. If somebody had seen something wrong and shot, he probably would have been court-martialed." Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick said that if the sentries had fired on the suicide craft, "we would have gotten in more trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing seventeen American sailors."<ref name=Robinson /><!----There needs to be a counter-point added here for these "what if" scenarios (if possible). What if they shot at a small boat near-by and killed innocent fishermen? (with sourcing, of course)---->

=== Consequences ===
President [[Bill Clinton]] declared, "If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/13/world/in-clinton-s-words-doing-their-duty.html|title=In Clinton's Words: 'Doing Their Duty'|date=13 October 2000|agency=Associated Press|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref>

On 19 January 2001, the U.S. Navy completed and released its [[Judge Advocate General's Corps|Judge Advocate General]] Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the incident, concluding that ''Cole''{{'}}s commanding officer Commander Kirk Lippold "acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself" when ''Cole'' arrived in Aden to refuel. The JAGMAN investigation also concluded that "the commanding officer of ''Cole'' did not have the specific intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship", and recommended significant changes in Navy procedures. In spite of this finding, Lippold was subsequently denied promotion and retired at the same rank of commander in 2007.<ref name="Roberts, John 2008">Roberts, John, and Jamie McIntyre, "Exclusive Interview With Former USS ''Cole'' Captain", ''The Situation Room'', [[CNN|Cable News Network]], 1 July 2008.</ref>

In Afghanistan the bombing was a "great victory for [[Osama bin Laden|bin Laden]]. Al-Qaeda camps filled with new recruits, and contributors from the Gulf States arrived with [[Petrodollar recycling|petrodollar]]s."<ref name=Tower />

Both Clinton and his successor [[George W. Bush]] had been criticized for failing to respond militarily to the attack on ''Cole'' before 11 September 2001. The ''[[9/11 Commission Report]]'' cites one source who said in February 2001, "[bin Laden] complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked [in response to the ''Cole'']&nbsp; Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger."<ref name=911CommissionChap6>{{Cite web | url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch6.htm |publisher=[[9/11 Commission]] |title=Chapter 6 |access-date=4 March 2007}}</ref>

Evidence of Al-Qaeda's involvement was inconclusive for months after the attack. The staff of the 9/11 Commission found that Al-Qaeda's direction of the bombing was under investigation but "increasingly clear" on 11 November 2000. It was an "unproven assumption" in late November. By 21 December the CIA had made a "preliminary judgment" that "al Qaeda appeared to have supported the attack" without a "definitive conclusion".<ref name=911CommissionStaffStatement8>{{Cite web |url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_8.pdf |publisher=[[9/11 Commission]] |title=Staff Statement 8 |access-date=4 March 2007}}</ref>

Accounts thereafter are varied and somewhat contradictory. Then-[[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] [[Condoleezza Rice]] told the Commission that when the administration took office on 20 January 2001; "We knew that there was speculation that the 2000 ''Cole'' attack was al Qaeda. We received, I think, on January 25 the same assessment [of Al-Qaeda responsibility]. It was preliminary. It was not clear." On 9 February, Vice President [[Dick Cheney]] was briefed on bin Laden's responsibility "without hedge."<ref name="WashingtonPost020119">{{Cite news|author=Barton Gellman|date=20 January 2002|title=A Strategy's Cautious Evolution: Before Sept. 11, the Bush Anti-Terror Effort Was Mostly Ambition|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url=http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A8734-2002Jan19|url-status=dead|access-date=6 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110513090104/http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A8734-2002Jan19|archive-date=13 May 2011}}</ref> One report stated that "six days after Bush took office", the FBI "believed they had clear evidence tying the bombers to Al Qaeda."<ref name=Newsweek>{{Cite news |url=http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorismfoi/whatwentwrong.html |title=The inside story of the missed signals and intelligence failures that raise a chilling question: did September 11 have to happen? |author=Michael Hirsh, Michael Isikoff |work=Newsweek |date=27 May 2002 |access-date=4 March 2007 |archive-date=23 February 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070223042859/http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorismfoi/whatwentwrong.html |url-status=dead }}</ref>

These conclusions are contrasted by testimony of key figures before the 9/11 Commission, summarized in the ''[[9/11 Commission Report]]''. Former CIA Director [[George Tenet]] testified (page 196) that he "believed he laid out what was knowable early in the investigation, and that this evidence never really changed until after 9/11."<ref name=911Commission /> The report suggests (pages 201–202) that the official assessment was similarly vague until at least March 2001:

<blockquote style="font-size:100%">On 25 January, Tenet briefed the President on the ''Cole'' investigation. The written briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA had told the Clinton White House in November. This included the "preliminary judgment" that al Qaeda was responsible, with the caveat that no evidence had yet been found that Bin Ladin himself ordered the attack in March 2001, the CIA's briefing slides for Rice were still describing the CIA's "preliminary judgment" that a "strong circumstantial case" could be made against al Qaeda but noting that the CIA continued to lack "conclusive information on external command and control" of the attack.<ref name=911Commission>{{Cite web |url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm |publisher=[[9/11 Commission]] |title=911 Commission Report |access-date=4 March 2007}}</ref></blockquote>

According to Rice, the decision not to respond militarily to the ''Cole'' bombing was President Bush's. She said he "made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al Qaeda one attack at a time. He told me he was 'tired of swatting flies.'" The administration instead began work on a new strategy to eliminate Al-Qaeda.<ref name=911Commission040408>{{Cite web |url=http://www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing9/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-08.htm |publisher=[[9/11 Commission]] |title=Hearing transcript from 8 April 2004 |access-date=4 March 2007}}</ref>

As a result of the ''Cole'' bombing, the U.S. Navy began to reassess its anti-terrorism and force protection methods, both at home and abroad. The Navy stepped up Random Anti-Terrorism Measures (RAM), which are meant to complicate the planning of a terrorist contemplating an attack by making it difficult to discern a predictable pattern to security posture.<ref>[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2001_hr/01-06-28bouchard.htm Statement of Captain Joseph F. Bouchard, USN, Commanding Officer, NS Norfolk to the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism of the House Armed Service Committee]. via GlobalSecurity.org 28 June 2001.</ref>

In November 2001, the Navy opened an Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection Warfare Center at Naval Amphibious Base (NAB) Little Creek, in [[Virginia Beach, Virginia]], with the objective of developing tactics, equipment and training to combat terrorists.<ref>[http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2002/June/Pages/US_Navy4066.aspx U.S. Navy Raises Barriers To Protect Base at Norfolk] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110114211826/http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2002/JUNE/Pages/US_Navy4066.aspx |date=14 January 2011 }} National Defense Magazine. June 2002. [[National Defense Industrial Association]].</ref>

On 3 November 2002, a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]-operated [[General Atomics MQ-1 Predator|Predator UAV]] fired an [[AGM-114 Hellfire]] missile at a vehicle in Yemen carrying Abu Ali al-Harithi, a suspected planner of the bombing plot. Also in the vehicle was [[Kamal Derwish]], a.k.a. Ahmed Hijazi, a U.S. citizen and four suspected Yemeni terrorists. All six were killed in the strike.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Targeted Killings: The Death of Anwar al-Awlaki|url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/targeted-killings-death-anwar-al-awlaki|access-date=2021-01-13|website=Council on Foreign Relations|language=en}}</ref>

On 29 September 2004, a Yemeni judge sentenced Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri and Jamal al-Badawi to death for their roles in the bombing. Al-Nashiri, believed to be the operation's mastermind, was detained by the United States at [[Guantanamo Bay detention camp|Guantanamo Bay]].<ref name="odni14">[http://www.odni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf Biographies of 14 detainees] {{Webarchive|url=https://swap.stanford.edu/20091119181208/http://www.odni.gov/announcements/content/DetaineeBiographies.pdf |date=19 November 2009}}, [[Director of National Intelligence#Office of the Director of National Intelligence|Office of the Director of National Intelligence]].</ref>

In October 2004 the Navy consolidated the forces it deploys for anti-terrorism and force protection under a single command at NAB Little Creek. The new Maritime Force Protection Command (MARFPCOM) was activated to oversee the administration and training of the expeditionary units the Navy deploys overseas to protect ships, aircraft and bases from terrorist attack. MARFPCOM aligned four existing components: the Mobile Security Forces, [[Naval Coastal Warfare (United States)|Naval Coastal Warfare]], [[Explosive ordnance disposal (United States Navy)|Explosive Ordnance Disposal]] (EOD), and [[Navy diver (United States Navy)|Expeditionary Mobile Diving and Salvage Forces]].<ref>[http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=15309 "Maritime Force Protection Command to Activate Oct. 1."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070813080126/http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=15309 |date=13 August 2007 }} United States Navy News. 27 September 2004.</ref>

On 3 February 2006, 23 suspected or convicted Al-Qaeda members escaped from jail in Yemen. This number included 13 who were convicted of the bombings of ''Cole'' and the French tanker [[Maritime Jewel|MV ''Limburg'']] in 2002. Among those who reportedly escaped was Al-Badawi. Al-Qaeda's Yemeni number two Abu Assem al-Ahdal may also have escaped.<ref name=Bbc>{{Cite news |date= 4 February 2006 |title=Hunt on for Yemeni jailbreakers |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4682214.stm |publisher=[[BBC]] |access-date=4 March 2007}}</ref>

On 17 October 2007, al-Badawi surrendered to Yemeni authorities as part of an agreement with Al-Qaeda militants. Following his surrender, Yemeni authorities released him in return for a pledge not to engage in any violent or Al-Qaeda-related activity, despite a [[United States dollar|US$]]5 million reward for his capture. Two other escapees remained at large.<ref>[[Agence France-Presse]]. [http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22600364-23109,00.html "Top al-Qaeda suspect turns himself in"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071219111054/http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22600364-23109,00.html |date=19 December 2007 }}. 17 October 2007.</ref><ref>Whitlock, Craig, "Probe of USS Cole Bombing Unravels", ''[[The Washington Post]]'', 4 May 2008, p. 1.</ref>

In June 2008 the United States charged Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri with planning and conducting the attack. The United States planned to seek the death penalty in his case.<ref name="Roberts, John 2008" /> On 5 February 2009, the United States dropped all charges against al-Nashiri "without prejudice" to comply with President Obama's order to shut down the military prison at Guantanamo Bay, but reserved the right to file charges at a later date.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN25491168 |title=U.S. drops Guantanamo charges per Obama order |work=[[Reuters]] |access-date=6 February 2009 |date=6 February 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090209093839/https://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN25491168 |archive-date=9 February 2009 |url-status=live}}</ref>

In 2009, U.S. federal judge [[Kimba Wood]] released $13.4 million in frozen assets belonging to Sudan, to be awarded to 33 spouses, parents, and children of the sailors killed in the attack. The money was awarded based on the 2002 [[Terrorism Risk Insurance Act]] and spearheaded by Miami Attorney Andrew C. Hall.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=The Anti-Terror Attorney: Andrew Hall's Life Is a Story of Survival Against Tyranny|journal=ABA Journal|date=1 September 2011|url=http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_anti-terror_attorney_andrew_halls_life_is_a_story_of_survival_against/}}</ref> Previously, the court had found Sudan culpable in facilitating the attack on the destroyer. John Clodfelter, father of Kenneth Clodfelter who was killed in the bombing, said; "It's about time something was done. It's taken so much more time than we thought it should take."<ref>''[[The Virginian-Pilot]]'', "U.S. Judge Releases $13.4M For Cole Victims' Families", 22 April 2009.</ref>

On 1 January 2019 Jamal al-Badawi, an Al-Qaeda militant behind the attack, died in a U.S. air strike, [[President Donald Trump]] confirmed. U.S. defense officials said a "precision strike" was carried out east of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46763048|title=USS Cole bomber Jamal al-Badawi targeted in Yemen air strike|publisher=bbc.com|date=4 January 2019|access-date=27 June 2022}}</ref>

Another lawsuit against Sudan was filed in the [[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]] in 2010 by 15 of the ''Cole'' sailors and three spouses, seeking damages from the country for knowingly supporting the terrorists that struck the ship. While the court action had been served to the Sudan embassy in Washington D.C., no representative of Sudan replied to the case or appeared at the hearing. A default judgement was awarded to the sailors for more than US$314 million in 2012. In the process of serving the necessary paperwork and actions to obtain the monetary damages from Sudan within the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit]], representatives of Sudan challenged the DC District Court ruling, arguing that under the [[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act]] (FSIA) which allows for private lawsuits to be filed against foreign nations, the original case paperwork was not properly sent to their embassy in Sudan. Lawyers for the sailors argued that rejecting this would require them to rehold the initial trial and re-determine guilt and damages, if any. The Second Circuit upheld that the paperwork was filed appropriately, leading the representatives of Sudan to petition the [[Supreme Court of the United States]] for writ of certiorari on the question of whether the initial paperwork was properly addressed. The Supreme Court accepted the case, ''[[Republic of Sudan v. Harrison]]'' (Docket 16–1094) and took oral arguments on 9 November 2018.<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sudan-sailors-terror-attack-supreme-court.html | title=A Thought Experiment at the Supreme Court Over How to Sue a Country | first=Adam | last=Liptak | date=7 November 2018 | access-date=9 November 2018 | work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> In March 2019, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's decision and overturned the award.

The ''Cole'' bombing plays a highly visible role in Navy damage-control training, which begins in boot camp with a pre-graduation Battle Stations event. "The ''Cole'' Scenario", launched in 2007, takes place aboard a realistic destroyer mock-up housed at [[Naval Station Great Lakes]], Illinois. The training focuses on preparing recruits for damage control challenges they may face in the fleet.<ref>McMichael, William H. [http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/10/navy-cole-10-years-later-101110w/ "10 years after Cole bombing, a different Navy"] ''Navy Times'', 11 October 2010.</ref>

On 13 February 2020, the Government of Sudan announced that it had reached an agreement to compensate the families of the USS ''Cole'' victims, a prerequisite for being removed from the [[State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list)|State Sponsors of Terrorism list]].<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.france24.com/en/20200213-sudan-says-deal-signed-with-families-of-victims-of-uss-cole-bombing |author=Agence France-Presse |author-link=Agence France-Presse |publisher=[[France 24]] |quote=Sudan said Thursday it has signed a deal with the families of the victims of the 2000 bombing of the USS ''Cole'' in Yemen, meeting a key condition for removing the country from Washington's terrorism blacklist. |date=13 February 2020 |title=Sudan says deal signed with families of victims of USS Cole bombing}}</ref> In its announcement, the Sudanese government reiterated that it was not responsible for the bombing but stated that its goal was to normalize relations with the United States and other countries and to settle historical claims arising from the previous regime.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/world/africa/sudan-bombing-USS-Cole-Yemen.html|title=Sudan Says It Agrees to Compensate Families of U.S.S. Cole Bombing|last=Latif Dahir|first=Abdi|date=13 February 2020|website=The New York Times|access-date=13 February 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://suna-sd.net/en/single?id=549694|title=Statement on agreement concluded with victims of Cole bombing|date=13 February 2020|website=Sudan News Agency (SUNA)|access-date=13 February 2020|archive-date=13 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200213230948/https://suna-sd.net/en/single?id=549694|url-status=dead}}</ref> The bilateral claims agreement was signed on October 30, 2020, under which Sudan agreed to pay $335 million in compensation to resolve the claims brought by U.S. families of the victims of the attack on the USS ''Cole'' (and the victims of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya).<ref name="2017-2021.state.gov"/>