Editing Treaty of Versailles (section)

==Negotiations==
[[File:Big four.jpg|thumb|The heads of the "[[The Big Four (World War I)|Big Four]]" nations at the Paris Peace Conference, 27 May 1919. From left to right: [[David Lloyd George]], [[Vittorio Orlando]], [[Georges Clemenceau]], and [[Woodrow Wilson]]]]

Talks between the Allies to establish a common negotiating position started on 18 January 1919, in the {{lang|fr|Salle de l'Horloge}} (Clock Room) at the [[Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (France)|French Foreign Ministry]] on the [[Quai d'Orsay]] in Paris.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=37}}
Initially, 70 delegates from 27 nations participated in the negotiations.{{sfn|Lentin|1985|p=84}} [[Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic|Russia]] was excluded due to their signing of a separate peace (the [[Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Russia–Central Powers)|Treaty of Brest-Litovsk]]) and early withdrawal from the war. Furthermore, German negotiators were excluded to deny them an opportunity to divide the Allies diplomatically.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=12}}

Initially, a "Council of Ten" (comprising two delegates each from Britain, France, the United States, Italy, and Japan) met officially to decide the peace terms. This council was replaced by the "Council of Five", formed from each country's foreign ministers, to discuss minor matters. French Prime Minister [[Georges Clemenceau]], Italian Prime Minister [[Vittorio Emanuele Orlando]], British Prime Minister [[David Lloyd George]], and United States President [[Woodrow Wilson]] formed the "[[The Big Four (World War I)|Big Four]]" (at one point becoming the "Big Three" following the temporary withdrawal of Orlando). These four men met in 145 closed sessions to make all the major decisions, which were later ratified by the entire assembly. The minor powers attended a weekly "Plenary Conference" that discussed issues in a general forum but made no decisions. These members formed over 50 commissions that made various recommendations, many of which were incorporated into the final text of the treaty.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|pp=40–41}}{{sfn|Venzon|1999|p=439}}{{sfn|Lentin|2012|p=22}}

===French aims===
France had lost 1.3&nbsp;million soldiers, including {{nowrap|25% of}} French men aged {{nowrap|18–30, as well as}} {{nowrap|400,000 civilians.}} France had also been more physically damaged than any other nation; the so-called [[zone rouge]] (Red Zone), the most industrialized region and the source of most coal and iron ore in the north-east, had been devastated, and in the final days of the war, mines had been flooded and railways, bridges and factories destroyed.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=43}}
Clemenceau intended to ensure the security of France, by weakening Germany economically, militarily, territorially and by supplanting Germany as the leading producer of steel in Europe.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=43}}{{sfn|Lentin|2012|p=21}}{{sfn|Layne|1996|p=187}}
British economist and Versailles negotiator [[John Maynard Keynes]] summarized this position as attempting to "set the clock back and undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished."{{sfn|Keynes|1920|p=34}}

Clemenceau told Wilson: "America is far away, protected by the ocean. Not even [[Napoleon]] himself could touch England. You are both sheltered; we are not".{{sfn|Keylor|1998|p=43}}
The French wanted a frontier on the [[Rhine River|Rhine]], to protect France from a German invasion and compensate for French demographic and economic inferiority.{{sfn|Keylor|1998|p=34}}{{sfn|Lentin|1992|p=28}}
American and British representatives refused the French claim and after two months of negotiations, the French accepted a British pledge to provide an immediate alliance with France if Germany attacked again, and Wilson agreed to put a similar proposal to the [[United States Senate|Senate]]. Clemenceau had told the [[Chamber of Deputies (France)|Chamber of Deputies]], in December 1918, that his goal was to maintain an alliance with both countries. Clemenceau accepted the offer, in return for an occupation of the Rhineland for fifteen years and that Germany would also [[demilitarized zone|demilitarise]] the Rhineland.{{sfn|Lentin|1992|pp=28–32}}

French negotiators required reparations, to make Germany pay for the destruction induced throughout the war and to decrease German strength.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=43}} The French also wanted the iron ore and coal of the [[Saar (river)|Saar Valley]], by annexation to France.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|pp=43–44}}
The French were willing to accept a smaller amount of [[World War&nbsp;I reparations]] than the Americans would concede and Clemenceau was willing to discuss German capacity to pay with the German delegation, before the final settlement was drafted. In April and May 1919, the French and Germans held separate talks, on mutually acceptable arrangements on issues like reparation, reconstruction and industrial collaboration. France, along with the British Dominions and Belgium, opposed [[League of Nations mandate]]s and favored annexation of former [[German colonial empire|German colonies]].{{sfn|Trachtenberg|1982|p=499}}

The French, who had suffered significantly in the areas occupied by Germany during the war, were in favour of trying German war criminals, including the Kaiser. In the face of American objections that there was no applicable existing law under which the Kaiser could be tried, Clemenceau took the view that the "law of responsibility" overruled all other laws and that putting the Kaiser on trial offered the opportunity to establish this as an international precedent.{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|p=269}}

===British aims===
{{Further|Heavenly Twins (Sumner and Cunliffe)|Fontainebleau Memorandum}}
[[File:David Lloyd George.jpg|thumb|upright|British Prime Minister [[David Lloyd George]]|alt=A man poses for a photograph.]]

Britain had suffered heavy financial costs but suffered little physical devastation during the war.{{sfn|Thomson|1970|p=605}} British public opinion wanted to make Germany pay for the War.{{sfn|Henig|1995|pp=2–3}}
Public opinion favoured a "just peace", which would force Germany to pay reparations and be unable to repeat the aggression of 1914, although those of a "liberal and advanced opinion" shared Wilson's ideal of a peace of reconciliation.{{sfn|Schmitt|1960|p=102}}

In private Lloyd George opposed revenge and attempted to compromise between Clemenceau's demands and the Fourteen Points, because Europe would eventually have to reconcile with Germany.{{sfn|Brezina|2006|p=21}}
Lloyd George wanted terms of reparation that would not cripple the German economy, so that Germany would remain a viable economic power and trading partner.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=44}}{{sfn|Brezina|2006|p=21}}{{sfn|Thomson|1970|p=605}} By arguing that British war pensions and widows' allowances should be included in the German reparation sum, Lloyd George ensured that a large amount would go to the British Empire.{{sfn|Yearwood|2009|p=127}}

Lloyd George also intended to maintain a [[European balance of power]] to thwart a French attempt to establish itself as the dominant European power. A revived Germany would be a counterweight to France and a deterrent to Bolshevik Russia. Lloyd George also wanted to neutralize the German navy to keep the [[Royal Navy]] as the greatest naval power in the world; dismantle the German colonial empire with several of its territorial possessions ceded to Britain and others being established as [[League of Nations mandate]]s, a position opposed by the [[Dominion]]s.{{sfn|Brezina|2006|p=21}}

Together with the French, the British favoured putting German war criminals on trial, and included the Kaiser in this. Already in 1916 [[H. H. Asquith|Herbert Asquith]] had declared the intention "to bring to justice the criminals, whoever they be and whatever their station", and a resolution of the war cabinet in 1918 reaffirmed this intent.{{sfn|Kim|2000|pp=52–53}} Lloyd George declared that the British people would not accept a treaty that did not include terms on this, though he wished to limit the charges solely to violation of the 1839 treaty guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|pp=269–270}} The British were also well aware that the Kaiser having sought refuge in the Netherlands meant that any trial was unlikely to take place and therefore any Article demanding it was likely to be a dead letter.{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|p=272}}

===American aims===
Before the American entry into the war, Wilson had talked of a "peace without victory".{{sfn|Wilson|1917}} This position fluctuated following the US entry into the war. Wilson spoke of the German aggressors, with whom there could be no compromised peace.{{sfn|Trachtenberg|1982|p=490}}
On 8 January 1918, however, Wilson delivered a speech (known as the [[Fourteen Points]]) that declared the American peace objectives: the rebuilding of the [[Economy of Europe|European economy]], self-determination of European and Middle Eastern ethnic groups, the promotion of free trade, the creation of appropriate mandates for former colonies, and above all, the creation of a powerful League of Nations that would ensure the peace.{{sfn|Cooper|2011|pp=454–505}} The aim of the latter was to provide a forum to revise the peace treaties as needed, and deal with problems that arose as a result of the peace and the rise of new states.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=48}}{{sfn|Brezina|2006|p=21}}

Wilson brought along top intellectuals as advisors to the American peace delegation, and the overall American position echoed the Fourteen Points. Wilson firmly opposed harsh treatment on Germany.{{sfn|Cooper|2011|pp=454–505}} While the British and French wanted to largely annex the German colonial empire, Wilson saw that as a violation of the fundamental principles of justice and human rights of the native populations, and favored them having the right of self-determination via the creation of mandates. The promoted idea called for the major powers to act as disinterested trustees over a region, aiding the native populations until they could govern themselves.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|pp=46–47}}
In spite of this position and in order to ensure that Japan did not refuse to join the League of Nations, Wilson favored turning over the former German colony of [[Shandong Problem|Shandong]], in [[East China|Eastern China]], to the [[Empire of Japan|Japanese Empire]] rather than return the area to the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]]'s control.{{sfn|Slavicek|2010|p=65}}
Further confounding the Americans, was US internal partisan politics. In November 1918, the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] won the [[1918 United States Senate elections|Senate election]] by a slim margin. Wilson, a [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democrat]], refused to include prominent Republicans in the American delegation making his efforts seem partisan, and contributed to a risk of political defeat at home.{{sfn|Cooper|2011|pp=454–505}}

On the subject of war crimes, the Americans differed to the British and French in that Wilson's proposal was that any trial of the Kaiser should be solely a political and moral affair, and not one of criminal responsibility, meaning that the death penalty would be precluded.{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|p=271}} This was based on the American view, particularly those of [[Robert Lansing]],{{sfn|Kim|2000|pp=52–53}} that there was no applicable law under which the Kaiser could be tried.{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|p=269}} Additionally, the Americans favoured trying other German war criminals before military tribunals rather than an international court, with prosecutions being limited to "violation[s] of the laws and customs of war", and opposed any trials based on violations against what was called "[[Crimes against humanity|laws of humanity]]".{{sfn|Bassiouni|2002|p=271}}

===Italian aims===
[[Vittorio Emanuele Orlando]] and his foreign minister [[Sidney Sonnino]], an [[Anglican]] of British origins, worked primarily to secure the partition of the [[Habsburg Empire]] and their attitude towards Germany was not as hostile. Generally speaking, Sonnino was in line with the British position while Orlando favored a compromise between Clemenceau and Wilson. Within the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, Orlando obtained certain results such as the permanent membership of Italy in the security council of the [[League of Nations]] and a promised transfer of British [[Jubaland]] and French [[Aozou strip]] to the [[Italian Somaliland|Italian colonies of Somalia]] and [[Italian Libya|Libya]] respectively. [[Italian nationalism|Italian nationalists]], however, saw the War as a "[[mutilated victory]]" for what they considered to be little territorial gains achieved in the other treaties directly impacting Italy's borders. Orlando was ultimately forced to abandon the conference and resign. Orlando refused to see [[World War&nbsp;I]] as a mutilated victory, replying at nationalists calling for a greater expansion that "Italy today is a great state....on par with the great historic and contemporary states. This is, for me, our main and principal expansion." [[Francesco Saverio Nitti]] took Orlando's place in signing the treaty of Versailles.<ref>da Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Discussioni</ref>{{incomplete short citation|date=October 2020}}

The Italian leadership were divided on whether to try the Kaiser. Sonnino considered that putting the Kaiser on trial could result in him becoming a "patriotic martyr". Orlando, in contrast, stated that "the ex-Kaiser ought to pay like other criminals", but was less sure about whether the Kaiser should be ''tried'' as a criminal or merely have a political verdict cast against him. Orlando also considered that "[t]he question of the constitution of the Court presents almost insurmountable difficulties".{{sfn|Schabas|2018|pp=61–62}}