Editing Timor-Leste Defence Force (section)

=== Force development plans ===

The 2006 crisis left the F-FDTL "in ruins".<ref name=icgi>International Crisis Group (2008), p. i</ref> The F-FDTL's strength fell from 1,435 in January 2006 to 715 in September and the proportion of westerners in the military fell from 65&nbsp;per cent to 28&nbsp;per cent.<ref name=icg5/> The F-FDTL started a rebuilding process with support from several nations and the United Nations, but was still not ready to resume responsibility for Timor-Leste's external security two years after the crisis.<ref name=icgi/>
[[File:F-FDTL-Centro de Instrução-Metinaro-2009.JPG|thumb|alt=White gates with buildings behind them|The gate to the F-FDTL Nicolau Lobato Training Centre near Metinaro]]

In 2004 the commander of the F-FDTL formed a team, which included international contractors, to develop a long-term strategic vision document for the military. This study was supported by the Australian Government.<ref>Burton (2007), p. 101</ref> The resulting ''Force 2020'' document was completed in 2006 and made public in 2007.<ref name=icg8>International Crisis Group (2008), p. 8</ref> The document sets out an 'aspirational' vision for the development of the F-FDTL to 2020 and beyond and is of equivalent status to a defence [[white paper]]. It proposes expanding the military to a strength of 3,000 regular personnel in the medium term through the introduction of [[conscription]]. It also sets longer-term goals such as establishing an air component and purchasing modern weapons, such as [[Anti-tank warfare|anti-armour weapons]], [[armoured personnel carrier]]s and [[missile boat]]s, by 2020.<ref>{{cite news |first=Mark |last=Dodd |title=Secret missile plan for East Timor |url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21869293-601,00.html |newspaper=[[The Australian]] |date=8 June 2007 |access-date=10 August 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070711130500/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21869293-601,00.html|archive-date=11 July 2007}}</ref>

The ''Force 2020'' plan is similar to option&nbsp;1 in the King's College report. The King's College study team strongly recommended against such a force structure, labelling it "unaffordable" and raising concerns over the impact of conscription upon East Timorese society and military readiness. The team estimated that sustaining such a force structure would cost 2.6 to 3.3&nbsp;per cent of Timor-Leste's annual gross domestic product and would "represent a heavy burden on the East Timor economy".<ref>The Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. Paragraphs 7.2 and 205–212.</ref> Moreover, the ''Force 2020'' plan may not be realistic or suitable as it appears to emphasise military expansion to counter external threats over spending on other government services and internal security and outlines ideas such as the long-term (~2075) development of [[Militarisation of space|space forces]].<ref>International Crisis Group (2008), pp. 6, 9</ref>

While the ''Force 2020'' plan has proven controversial, it appears to have been adopted by the East Timorese government. The plan was criticised by the United Nations and the governments of Australia and the United States as unaffordable and in excess of Timor-Leste's needs.<ref>{{cite news |first=Mark |last=Dodd |title=Timor military blueprint unrealistic: Downer |url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21871852-2702,00.html?from=public_rss |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120918142233/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21871852-2702,00.html?from=public_rss |url-status=dead |archive-date=18 September 2012 |newspaper=[[The Australian]] |date=6 August 2007 |access-date=10 August 2007 }}</ref> East Timorese President José Ramos-Horta defended the plan, however, arguing that its adoption will transform the F-FDTL into a professional force capable of defending Timor-Leste's sovereignty and contributing to the nation's stability.<ref>{{cite press release |title=Force 2020 is important for the East Timor Government |publisher=East Timor Ministry of Defence |date=3 July 2007|url=http://www.timor-leste.gov.tl/mindef/Eng/n3.htm |access-date=11 August 2007}} {{dead link| date=June 2010 | bot=DASHBot}}</ref> East Timorese defence officials have also stressed that ''Force 2020'' is a long-term plan and does not propose acquiring advanced weapons for some years.<ref name=icg8/>
[[File:F-FDTL Infanteria Componente Terrestre.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Photograph of a group of men in military uniforms marching in close formation|East Timorese soldiers during a parade in 2019]]

The repercussions of the 2006 crisis lasted for several years. On 11 February 2008, a group of rebels led by Alfredo Reinado [[2008 East Timorese assassination attempts|attempted to kill or kidnap]] President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmão. Although Ramos-Horta and one of his guards were badly wounded, these attacks were not successful and Reinado and another rebel were killed. A joint F-FDTL and PNTL command was established to pursue the surviving rebels and the military and police demonstrated a high degree of co-operation during this operation.<ref>{{cite news |title=East Timor's window of opportunity |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7288484.stm |work=BBC News |date=10 March 2008 |access-date=6 April 2008 |archive-date=7 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080407052924/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7288484.stm |url-status=live }}</ref> The joint command was disbanded on 19 June 2008. While the joint command contributed to the surrender of many of Reinado's associates, it has been alleged that members of this unit committed human rights violations.<ref>UNMIT (2008), pp. 2, 5–6</ref> More broadly, the shock caused by the attack on Ramos-Horta and Gusmão led to lasting improvements in cooperation between the F-FDTL and PNTL.{{sfn|Glendhill|2014|p=142}} In June 2008 the Government offered to provide financial compensation to the petitioners who wished to return to civilian life. This offer was accepted, and all the petitioners returned to their homes by August that year.<ref>UNMIT (2009), p. 2</ref>

In May 2009, the F-FDTL accepted its first intake of recruits since the 2006 crisis. While the regional diversity of the 579 new recruits was generally much greater than that of the pre-crisis intakes, 60.3 per cent of officer candidates were from the country's eastern districts.<ref name=Sedra_11 /> From 2009 the F-FDTL established platoon-sized outposts to support the PNTL border police in the Bobonaro and Cova Lima border districts, and it has increasingly been deployed to undertake internal security tasks.<ref name="Sedra_2010a_5">Sedra et al. (2010a), p. 5</ref> From February to August 2010, 200 members of the F-FDTL were deployed to support PNTL operations against "Ninja" gangs. These troops undertook community engagement tasks, and were unarmed and not closely integrated with the PNTL efforts.<ref name="autogenerated1">Sedra et al. (2010a), pp. 11–12</ref>

In 2011 the F-FDTL was still under-strength and yet to reform its training and discipline standards.<ref name="Patrikainen_141">Patrikainen et al. (2011), p. 141</ref> Tensions within the F-FDTL also continued to threaten the stability of the force.<ref name="Robinson_1014">Robinson (2011), p. 1014</ref> However, the East Timorese government placed a high priority on re-establishing the F-FDTL and developing it into a force capable of defending the country.<ref name=Patrikainen_141 /> In 2012 the Government authorised an expansion of the F-FDTL to 3,600 personnel by 2020, of whom approximately one quarter will be members of the Naval Component.{{sfn|International Security Sector Advisory Team|2016}} The 2016 edition of the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]]' (IISS) publication ''The Military Balance'' stated that the F-FDTL was "only capable of internal and border-security roles".{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2016|p=296}}

The East Timorese Government published a new Strategic Defence and Security Concept during 2016. This document defined the role of the F-FDTL as defending the country against external threats and countering violent crime within Timor-Leste. The Strategic Defence and Security Concept also called for the F-FDTL's naval capabilities to be improved to adequately protect Timor-Leste's [[exclusive economic zone]]. In 2020 the IISS judged that the F-FDTL "has been reconstituted but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan".{{sfn|International Institute for Strategic Studies|2020|p=317}} Similarly, a 2019 [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] noted that there has been little progress in completing the acquisition program set out in the Force 2020 plan, likely due to a shortage of funds and "possibly also because there seems to be no rationale for
acquiring some of the equipment".{{sfn|Wezeman|2019|p=42}}

On 29 October 2020, the Council of Ministers approved of a plan to start compulsory national service for Timorese citizens who are 18 years old and above.<ref>Timor-Leste’s Government approves the decree law of compulsory military service, Independente, 29 October 2020</ref>

In a 2023 journal article, the academic Deniz Kocak noted that the F-FDTL does not have a written [[military doctrine|doctrine]], and the force's role was unclear. He observed that the F-FDTL continues to regard itself as the direct successor to FALINTIL and has a focus on [[guerrilla warfare]].{{sfn|Kocak|2023|pp=122-124}}