Editing Thought (section)

====Language of thought hypothesis====
There are various theories about the relation between language and thought. One prominent version in contemporary philosophy is called the [[language of thought hypothesis]].<ref name="Harman4"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz">{{cite web |last1=Katz |first1=Matthew |title=Language of Thought Hypothesis |url=https://iep.utm.edu/lot-hypo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=27 October 2021}}</ref><ref name="Aydede">{{cite web |last1=Aydede |first1=Murat |title=Oxford Bibliographies: Language of Thought |url=https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0151.xml |access-date=27 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Fodor |first1=Jerry A. |title=Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited |date=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FODLT}}</ref> It states that thinking happens in the medium of a mental language. This language, often referred to as ''Mentalese'', is similar to regular languages in various respects: it is composed of words that are connected to each other in syntactic ways to form sentences.<ref name="Harman4"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz"/><ref name="Aydede"/> This claim does not merely rest on an intuitive analogy between language and thought. Instead, it provides a clear definition of the features a representational system has to embody in order to have a linguistic structure.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Aydede"/> On the level of syntax, the representational system has to possess two types of representations: atomic and compound representations. Atomic representations are basic whereas compound representations are constituted either by other compound representations or by atomic representations.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Aydede"/> On the level of semantics, the semantic content or the meaning of the compound representations should depend on the semantic contents of its constituents. A representational system is linguistically structured if it fulfills these two requirements.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Aydede"/>

The language of thought hypothesis states that the same is true for thinking in general. This would mean that thought is composed of certain atomic representational constituents that can be combined as described above.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="BorchertLanguageOfThought">{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/language-thought |chapter=Language of thought}}</ref> Apart from this abstract characterization, no further concrete claims are made about how human thought is implemented by the brain or which other similarities to natural language it has.<ref name="Katz"/> The language of thought hypothesis was first introduced by [[Jerry Fodor]].<ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz"/> He argues in favor of this claim by holding that it constitutes the best explanation of the characteristic features of thinking. One of these features is ''productivity'': a system of representations is ''productive'' if it can generate an infinite number of unique representations based on a low number of atomic representations.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="BorchertLanguageOfThought"/> This applies to thought since human beings are capable of entertaining an infinite number of distinct thoughts even though their mental capacities are quite limited. Other characteristic features of thinking include ''systematicity'' and ''inferential coherence''.<ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Katz"/><ref name="BorchertLanguageOfThought"/> Fodor argues that the language of thought hypothesis is true as it explains how thought can have these features and because there is no good alternative explanation.<ref name="Katz"/> Some arguments against the language of thought hypothesis are based on neural networks, which are able to produce intelligent behavior without depending on representational systems. Other objections focus on the idea that some mental representations happen non-linguistically, for example, in the form of maps or images.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/>

Computationalists have been especially interested in the language of thought hypothesis since it provides ways to close the gap between thought in the human brain and computational processes implemented by computers.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/><ref name="Milkowski"/> The reason for this is that processes over representations that respect syntax and semantics, like [[inference]]s according to the [[modus ponens]], can be implemented by physical systems using causal relations. The same linguistic systems may be implemented through different material systems, like brains or computers. In this way, computers can ''think''.<ref name="Katz"/><ref name="RescorlaLOTH"/>