Editing Tariff (section)

===19th century onwards===
In the 19th century, statesmen such as Senator [[Henry Clay]] continued Hamilton's themes within the [[Whig Party (United States)|Whig Party]] under the name "[[American System (economic plan)|American System]]" which consisted of protecting industries and developing infrastructure in explicit opposition to the "British system" of free trade.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Luthin |first1=Reinhard H. |title=Abraham Lincoln and the Tariff |journal=The American Historical Review |date=1944 |volume=49 |issue=4 |pages=609–629 |doi=10.2307/1850218 |jstor=1850218}}</ref> Before 1860 they were always defeated by the low-tariff Democrats.<ref>William K. Bolt, ''Tariff Wars and the Politics of Jacksonian America'' (2017) covers 1816 to 1861.</ref>

From 1846 to 1861, American tariffs were lowered but this was followed by a series of recessions and the 1857 panic, which eventually led to higher demands for tariffs than President James Buchanan signed in 1861 (Morrill Tariff).<ref name=Chang1/><ref name=Chang2/>

During the American Civil War (1861–1865), agrarian interests in the South were opposed to any protection, while manufacturing interests in the North wanted to maintain it. The war marked the triumph of the protectionists of the industrial states of the North over the free traders of the South. Abraham Lincoln was a protectionist like Henry Clay of the Whig Party, who advocated the "American system" based on infrastructure development and protectionism. Once elected, Lincoln implemented a 44-percent tariff during the [[American Civil War|Civil War]]—in part to pay for railroad subsidies and for the war effort, and to protect favored industries. After the war, tariffs remained at or above wartime levels. High tariffs were a policy designed to encourage rapid industrialisation and protect the high American wage rates.<ref name="Chang2" />

The policy from 1860 to 1933 was usually high protective tariffs (apart from 1913 to 1921). After 1890, the tariff on wool did affect an important industry, but otherwise the tariffs were designed to keep American wages high. The conservative Republican tradition, typified by [[William McKinley]] was a high tariff, while the Democrats typically called for a lower tariff to help consumers but they always failed until 1913.<ref name=Taussig1931>F.W. Taussig,. ''The Tariff History of the United States''. 8th ed. (1931); [https://books.google.com/books?id=MyqgiptJzfwC 5th ed. 1910 is online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230107190506/https://books.google.com/books?id=MyqgiptJzfwC |date=2023-01-07 }}</ref><ref>Robert W. Merry, ''President McKinley: Architect of the American Century'' (2017) pp. 70–83.</ref>

In the early 1860s, Europe and the United States pursued completely different trade policies. The 1860s were a period of growing protectionism in the United States, while the European free trade phase lasted from 1860 to 1892. The tariff average rate on imports of manufactured goods in 1875 was from 40% to 50% in the United States, against 9% to 12% in continental Europe at the height of free trade.<ref name=Bairoch />

After the United States caught up with European industries in the 1890s, the [[Mckinley Tariff]]'s argument was no longer to protect "infant industries", but to maintain workers' wages, support agricultural protection and the principle of reciprocity.<ref name=Bairoch />

In 1913, following the electoral victory of the Democrats in 1912, there was a significant reduction in the average tariff on manufactured goods from 44% to 25%. However, the First World War rendered this bill ineffective, and new "emergency" tariff legislation was introduced in 1922 after the Republicans returned to power in 1921.<ref name="Chang2" />

According to economic historian Douglas Irwin, a common myth about United States trade policy is that low tariffs harmed American manufacturers in the early 19th century and then that high tariffs made the United States into a great industrial power in the late 19th century.<ref name="The Economist 20171126">{{cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly |title=A historian on the myths of American trade |newspaper=The Economist |access-date=2017-11-26 |language=en |archive-date=2017-11-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171126044721/https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21731616-douglas-irwin-agrees-trade-policy-important-all-manner-powers-are-wrongly |url-status=live}}</ref> A review by the ''Economist'' of Irwin's 2017 book ''Clashing over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy'' notes:<ref name="The Economist 20171126" /><blockquote>Political dynamics would lead people to see a link between tariffs and the economic cycle that was not there. A boom would generate enough revenue for tariffs to fall, and when the bust came pressure would build to raise them again. By the time that happened, the economy would be recovering, giving the impression that tariff cuts caused the crash and the reverse generated the recovery. Mr Irwin also methodically debunks the idea that protectionism made America a great industrial power, a notion believed by some to offer lessons for developing countries today. As its share of global manufacturing powered from 23% in 1870 to 36% in 1913, the admittedly high tariffs of the time came with a cost, estimated at around 0.5% of GDP in the mid-1870s. In some industries, they might have sped up development by a few years. But American growth during its protectionist period had more to do with its abundant resources and openness to people and ideas.</blockquote>