Editing Subject and object (philosophy) (section)

=== German idealism ===
''Subject'' as a key-term in thinking about human [[consciousness]] began its career with the [[German idealist]]s, in response to [[David Hume]]'s radical [[skepticism]]. The idealists' starting point is Hume's conclusion that there is nothing to the self over and above a big, fleeting bundle of perceptions. The next step was to ask how this undifferentiated bundle comes to be experienced as a unity&nbsp;– as a single ''subject''. Hume had offered the following proposal:

:"''...the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects.''<ref>Hume, David. {{Google books|6c3f0NqRmnUC|The Philosophical Works of David Hume (1826 edition)|page=27|19 July 2016}}</ref>

[[Immanuel Kant|Kant]], [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]] and their successors sought to flesh out the process by which the subject is constituted out of the flow of sense impressions. Hegel, for example, stated in his Preface to the ''[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' that a subject is constituted by "the process of reflectively mediating itself with itself."<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm| title = Preface to the ''Phenomenology of Spirit''}}</ref>

Hegel begins his definition of the subject at a standpoint derived from [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] physics: "the unmoved which is also ''self-moving''" (Preface, para. 22). That is, what is not moved by an outside force, but which propels itself, has a ''[[prima facie]]'' case for subjectivity. Hegel's next step, however, is to identify this power to move, this unrest that is the subject, as ''pure negativity''. Subjective self-motion, for Hegel, comes not from any pure or simple kernel of authentic individuality, but rather, it is

::"...the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its anti-thesis" (Preface, para. 18).

The Hegelian subject's ''modus operandi'' is therefore cutting, splitting and introducing distinctions by injecting negation into the flow of sense-perceptions. Subjectivity is thus a kind of structural effect&nbsp;– what happens when Nature is diffused, refracted around a field of negativity and the "unity of the subject" for Hegel, is in fact a second-order effect, a "negation of negation". The subject experiences itself as a unity only by purposively negating the very diversity it itself had produced. The Hegelian subject may therefore be characterized either as "self-restoring sameness" or else as "reflection in otherness within itself" (Preface, para. 18).