Editing Strategic bombing (section)

===Interwar period===
Following the war, the concept of strategic bombing developed. Calculations of the number of dead to the weight of bombs would have a profound effect on the attitudes of the British authorities and population in the interwar years. As bombers became larger, it was fully expected that deaths would dramatically increase. The fear of aerial attack on such a scale was one of the fundamental driving forces of the [[appeasement]] of [[Nazi Germany]] in the 1930s.<ref>{{harvnb|Doerr|1998|p=16}}</ref>

These early developments of [[aerial warfare]] led to two distinct branches in the writings of air warfare theorists: tactical air warfare and strategic air warfare. [[Air warfare|Tactical air warfare]] was developed as part of a combined-arms attack which would be developed to a significant degree by [[Nazi Germany|Germany]], and which contributed much to the success of the [[Wehrmacht]] during the first four years (1939–42) of World War II. The [[Luftwaffe]] became a major element of the German [[blitzkrieg]].{{cn|date=April 2025}}

Some leading theorists of [[air warfare|strategic air warfare]], namely strategic bombing during this period were the Italian [[Giulio Douhet]], the Trenchard school in Great Britain, and General [[Billy Mitchell]] in the United States. These theorists thought that aerial bombardment of the enemy's homeland would be an important part of future wars. Not only would such attacks weaken the enemy by destroying important military infrastructure, they would also break the morale of the civilian population, forcing their government to capitulate. Although area bombing theorists acknowledged that measures could be taken to defend against bombers—using [[fighter plane]]s and [[anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft artillery]]—the maxim of the times remained "[[the bomber will always get through]]". These theorists for strategic bombing argued that it would be necessary to develop a fleet of [[strategic bomber]]s during peacetime, both to deter any potential enemy, and also in the case of a war, to be able to deliver devastating attacks on the enemy industries and cities while suffering from relatively few friendly casualties before victory was achieved.<ref>{{harvnb|Overy|2014|p=Chapter 1}}</ref>

In the period between the two world wars, military thinkers from several nations advocated strategic bombing as the logical and obvious way to employ aircraft. Domestic political considerations saw to it that the British worked harder on the concept than most. The British [[Royal Flying Corps]] and [[Royal Naval Air Service]] of the Great War had been merged in 1918 to create a separate air force, which spent much of the following two decades fighting for survival in an environment of severe government spending constraints.{{cn|date=April 2025}}

In Italy, the airpower prophet General [[Giulio Douhet]] asserted the basic principle of strategic bombing was the offensive, and there was no defense against [[carpet bombing]] and [[poison gas]] attacks. The seeds of Douhet's apocalyptic predictions found fertile soil in France, Germany, and the United States, where excerpts from his book ''The Command of the Air'' (1921) were published. These visions of cities laid waste by bombing also gripped the popular imagination and found expression in novels such as Douhet's ''[[Giulio Douhet#Aerial strategy|The War of 19--]]'' (1930) and [[H. G. Wells]]'s ''[[The Shape of Things to Come]]'' (1933) (filmed by [[Alexander Korda]] as ''[[Things to Come]]'' (1936)).<ref>{{harvnb|Black|2007|p=392}}</ref>

Douhet's proposals were hugely influential among air force enthusiasts, arguing as they did that the bombing air arm was the most important, powerful, and invulnerable part of any military. He envisaged future wars as lasting a matter of a few weeks. While each opposing Army and Navy fought an inglorious holding campaign, the respective Air Forces would dismantle their enemies' country, and if one side did not rapidly surrender, both would be so weak after the first few days that the war would effectively cease. Fighter aircraft would be relegated to spotting patrols but would be essentially powerless to resist the mighty bombers. In support of this theory, he argued for targeting of the civilian population as much as any military target, since a nation's morale was as important a resource as its weapons. Paradoxically, he suggested that this would actually reduce total casualties, since "The time would soon come when to put an end to horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war...".<ref>{{harvnb|Pape|1996|p=60}}</ref> As a result of Douhet's proposals, [[air force]]s allocated greater resources to their bomber squadrons than to their fighters, and the 'dashing young pilots' promoted in the propaganda of the time were invariably bomber pilots.{{cn|date=April 2025}}

[[Royal Air Force]] leaders, in particular Air Chief Marshal [[Hugh Trenchard]], believed the key to retaining their independence from the senior services was to lay stress on what they saw as the unique ability of a modern air force to win wars by unaided strategic bombing. As the speed and altitude of bombers increased in proportion to fighter aircraft, the prevailing strategic understanding became "the bomber will always get through". Although anti-aircraft guns and fighter aircraft had proved effective in the Great War, it was accepted there was little warring nations could do to prevent massive [[Civilian casualties of strategic bombing|civilian casualties from strategic bombing]]. High civilian morale and retaliation in kind were seen as the only answers—a later generation would revisit this, as [[Mutual Assured Destruction]].<ref>{{harvnb|Grosscup|2006|pp=21-35}}</ref>

During the interwar period (1919–1939), the use of [[aerial bombing]] was developed as part of British foreign policy in its colonies, with [[Hugh Trenchard]] as its leading proponent, [[Sir Charles Portal]], [[Arthur Harris|Sir Arthur Harris]], and [[Sidney Osborne Bufton|Sidney Bufton]]. The Trenchard School theories were successfully put into action in [[Mesopotamia]] (modern-day [[Iraq]]) where RAF bombers used high-explosive bombs and strafing runs against Arab forces. The techniques of so-called "Air Control" also included target marking and locating, as well as formation flying. [[Arthur Harris]], a young RAF squadron commander (later nicknamed [[List of military figures by nickname#B|"Bomber"]]), reported after a mission in 1924, "The Arab and Kurd now know what real bombing means, in casualties and damage. They know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured".<ref>{{harvnb|Grosscup|2006|p=55}}</ref>

On an official level, RAF directives stressed:
{{quote|In these attacks, endeavour should be made to spare the women and children as far as possible, and for this purpose, a warning should be given, whenever practicable. It would be wrong even at this stage to think that airpower was simply seen as a tool for rapid retribution.<ref>{{harvnb|Hayward|2009|p=37}}</ref> }}

A statement clearly pointed out that the ability of aircraft to inflict punishment could be open to abuse:
{{quote|Their power to cover great distances at high speed, their instant readiness for action, their independence (within the detachment radius) of communications, their indifference to obstacles, and the unlikelihood of casualties to air personnel combine to encourage their use offensively more often than the occasion warrants.<ref>{{harvnb|Hayward|2009|p=37}}</ref> }}

In British strikes over [[Yemen]] in over a six-month period, sixty tons of bombs were dropped in over 1,200 cumulative flying hours. By August 1928, total losses in ground fighting and air attack, on the Yemeni side, were 65 killed or wounded (one RAF pilot was killed and one airman wounded).<ref>{{harvnb|Hayward|2009|pp=53–54}}</ref> Between the wars the RAF conducted 26 separate air operations within the Aden Protectorate. The majority were conducted in response to persistent banditry or to restore the Government's authority. Excluding operations against Yemeni forces—which had effectively ceased by 1934—a total of twelve deaths were attributed to air attacks conducted between 1919 and 1939.<ref>{{harvnb |Hayward|2009|p=54}}</ref> Bombing as a military strategy proved to be an effective and efficient way for the British to police their Middle East protectorates in the 1920s. Fewer men were required as compared to ground forces.<ref>{{harvnb |Omissi|1990|pp=63-64}}</ref>

Pre-war planners, on the whole, vastly overestimated the damage bombers could do, and underestimated the resilience of civilian populations. Jingoistic national pride played a major role: for example, at a time when Germany was still disarmed and France was Britain's only European rival, Trenchard boasted, "the French in a bombing duel would probably squeal before we did".<ref>{{harvnb|Johnson|1964|p={{Page needed|date=February 2011}}}}{{Verify source|date=February 2011}}</ref> At the time, the expectation was any new war would be brief and very brutal. A British Cabinet planning document in 1938 predicted that, if war with Germany broke out, 35% of British homes would be hit by bombs in the first three weeks. This type of expectation would justify the [[appeasement]] of [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] in the late 1930s.<ref>{{harvnb|Johnson|1964|p={{Page needed|date=February 2011}}}}{{Verify source|date=February 2011}}</ref>

[[Image:Bundesarchiv Bild 183-H25224, Guernica, Ruinen.jpg|thumb|300px|Ruins of Guernica (1937)]]
During the [[Spanish Civil War]], the [[bombing of Guernica]] by German aviators including the [[Condor Legion]], under Nationalist command, resulted in its near destruction. Casualties were estimated to be between 500 and 1500. Though this figure was relatively small, aerial bombers and their weaponry were continually improving—already suggesting the devastation that was to come in the near future. Yet the theory that "[[the bomber will always get through]]" started to appear doubtful, as stated by the U.S.&nbsp; Attaché in 1937, "The peacetime theory of the complete invulnerability of the modern type of bombardment airplane no longer holds. The increased speeds of both the bombardment and pursuit plane have worked in favor of the pursuit ... The flying fortress died in Spain."{{cn|date=April 2025}}

[[aerial bombing of cities|Large scale bombing of the civilian population]], thought to be demoralizing to the enemy, seemed to have the opposite effect. E.&nbsp;B.&nbsp;Strauss surmised, "Observers state that one of the most remarkable effects of the bombing of open towns in Government Spain had been the welding together into a formidable fighting force of groups of political factions who were previously at each other's throats...", a sentiment with which [[Hitler]]'s [[Luftwaffe]], supporting the Spanish Nationalists, generally agreed.<ref>{{harvnb|Budiansky|2004|pp=200-208}}</ref>