Editing Simplicius of Cilicia (section)

=== Cosmology ===
In his ''Commentary on the Enchiridion'', Simplicius defended Neoplatonic [[monism]], according to which there is only one basic principle called "[[The One (Neoplatonism)|The One]]" that is the sole origin of all beings and [[The Form of the Good]], against [[Manichaeism]], a religious doctrine that had been widespread since the 3rd century that offered a dualistic explanation of [[Good and evil]].<ref>Simplicius, ''In enchiridion'' 35:90–91.</ref> According to Manichaean dualism, the cosmos is divided between a kingdom of good and a kingdom of [[Evil]], irreconcilable adversaries that are in constant struggle. 

Simplicius attacked this cosmogony, accusing the Manichean myths of not being true myths but monstrosities. He also faulted the Manicheans themselves for not understanding that mythical representations are not true in the literal sense, but are to be interpreted symbolically.<ref>Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): ''Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète.'' Leiden 1996, p .&nbsp;140.</ref> As a Neoplatonist, Simplicius opposed this Manichean dualism and saw evil ''(kakón)'' as merely an absence of good rather than a separate principle in itself. According to Simplicius, following Plato and Aristotle, all striving is aimed at the Good and no one willingly chooses evil; someone who pursues evil either failed to recognize it and went astray, or accepted for the sake of a greater good. Wrong decisions and wickedness in a person are therefore only the result of a lack of insight, not of an evil nature in him. According to Simplicius, even if there were something inherently bad, it would act for its own benefit, that is, for something good. Therefore the world view of the Manicheans is contradictory, as according to their mythology, the kingdom of evil strives in the fight against good to gain some benefit from it; so, it actually wants something good, even though it is said to be absolutely bad. Thus, absolute evil seeks that which is contrary to its own nature, which is absurd for Simplicius.<ref>Christian Vogel: ''Stoic Ethics and Platonic Education.'' Heidelberg 2013, pp. 269–272.</ref> 

However, for Simplicius, the error of the Manichaeans also goes back to a legitimate concern: they raised the bad to an independent principle so that they didn't have to trace it back to God, who was supposed to be absolutely good. However, in doing so, the “fell into the fire while fleeing the smoke” by taking up a nonsensical position. The Manichaean idea of a struggle between two original principles presupposes that one principle attacks the other, according to them, good has voluntarily exposed itself to the influence of the opposing power in battle and has suffered losses in the process. This is absurd according to Simplicius' argument: if the good were to behave in this way, it would be unreasonable and incapable and therefore bad. A truly absolute good cannot enter into a fight at all; it is beyond the reach of anything bad.<ref>Heidelberg 2013, p. 267 f.; Ilsetraut Hadot (ed.): "Simplicius: Commentaire sur le Manuel d'Épictète." Leiden 1996, pp. 118–128, 140–144</ref>

Simplicius also accused the Manichaeans of taking away from man the realm of what fell within his competence because it relieved him of the responsibility for his ethical decisions and oaths. If an eternal, powerful principle of evil is the cause of evil, then it is also the cause of human error. A person's bad actions can then no longer be traced back to himself, because in this case he is exposed to an overpowering influence and his self-determination is revoked.<ref>Ilsetraut Hadot: ''The Refutation of Manichaeism in Simplicius' Commentary on the Epictetus''. In: ''Archive for the History of Philosophy'' 51, 1969, pp. 31–57, here: 35–45, 54–56.</ref>