Editing Satisficing (section)

==== Other applications in economics ====
Apart from the behavioral theory of the firm, applications of the idea of satisficing behavior in economics include the Akerlof and Yellen model of [[menu cost]], popular in [[New Keynesian macroeconomics]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Akerlof |first1=George A. |last2=Yellen |first2=Janet L. |year=1985 |title=Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria? |journal=[[American Economic Review]] |volume=75 |issue=4 |pages=708–720 |jstor=1821349  }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Akerlof |first1=George A. |last2=Yellen |first2=Janet L. |year=1985 |title=A Near-rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia |journal=[[The Quarterly Journal of Economics]] |volume=100 |issue=5 |pages=823–838 |doi=10.1093/qje/100.Supplement.823 }}</ref> Also, in economics and [[game theory]] there is the notion of an [[Epsilon-equilibrium]], which is a generalization of the standard [[Nash equilibrium]] in which each player is within '''{{math|&epsilon;}}''' of his or her optimal payoff (the standard Nash-equilibrium being the special case where '''{{math|&epsilon; {{=}} 0}}''').<ref>{{cite journal|last=Dixon|first=H.|url=http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/restud/v54y1987i1p47-62.html|title=Approximate Bertrand Equilibria in a replicated Industry|journal=[[Review of Economic Studies]]|volume=54|issue=1|year=1987|pages=47–62|doi=10.2307/2297445|jstor=2297445}}</ref>