Editing Russian Revolution (section)

== Dual power: ''Dvoyevlastiye''==
{{Main|Dual power}}
The effective power of the Provisional Government was challenged by the authority of an institution that claimed to represent the will of workers and soldiers and could, in fact, mobilize and control these groups during the early months of the revolution&nbsp;– the Petrograd Soviet Council of Workers' Deputies. The model for the Soviets were workers' councils that had been established in scores of Russian cities during the 1905 Revolution. In February 1917, striking workers elected deputies to represent them and socialist activists began organizing a citywide council to unite these deputies with representatives of the socialist parties. On 27 February, socialist Duma deputies, mainly Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, took the lead in organizing a citywide council. The Petrograd Soviet met in the [[Tauride Palace]], room 13, permitted by the Provisional Government.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Orlovsky |first=Daniel |date=1997 |title=Corporatism or democracy: the Russian Provisional Government of 1917 |journal=Soviet and Post-Soviet Review |volume=24 |issue=1 |pages=15–25|doi=10.1163/187633297X00031 }}</ref>

The leaders of the Petrograd Soviet believed that they represented [[Proletariat|particular classes]] of the population, not the whole nation. They also believed Russia was not ready for socialism. They viewed their role as limited to pressuring hesitant "[[bourgeoisie]]" to rule and to introduce extensive democratic reforms in Russia (the replacement of the monarchy by a republic, guaranteed civil rights, a democratic police and army, abolition of religious and ethnic discrimination, preparation of elections to a constituent assembly, and so on). They met in the same building as the emerging Provisional Government not to compete with the Duma Committee for state power, but to best exert pressure on the new government, to act, in other words, as a popular democratic lobby.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sukhanov |first=N. N. |title=The Russian Revolution: A Personal Record |date=1955 |publisher=Oxford University Press |others=originally published in Russian |editor-last=Carmichael |editor-first=Joel |pages=101–108 |translator-last=Carmichael |translator-first=Joel |orig-date=1922}}</ref>

The relationship between these two major powers was complex from the beginning and would shape the politics of 1917. The representatives of the Provisional Government agreed to "take into account the opinions of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies", though they were also determined to prevent interference which would create an unacceptable situation of dual power. In fact, this was precisely what was being created, though this "dual power" (dvoyevlastiye) was the result less of the actions or attitudes of the leaders of these two institutions than of actions outside their control, especially the ongoing social movement taking place on the streets of Russia's cities, factories, shops, barracks, villages, and in the trenches.{{Sfn|Hasegawa|2018}}

[[File:BatallónDeLaMuerteDesfilandoAnteElPalacioDeInvierno--historywartimes14londuoft.jpg|thumb|The 2nd Moscow Women Death Battalion protecting the Winter Palace as the last guards of the stronghold]]

A series of political crises&nbsp;– see the chronology below&nbsp;– in the relationship between population and government and between the Provisional Government and the Soviets (which developed into a nationwide movement with a national leadership). The All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK) undermined the authority of the Provisional Government but also of the moderate socialist leaders of the Soviets. Although the Soviet leadership initially refused to participate in the "bourgeois" Provisional Government, [[Alexander Kerensky]], a young, popular lawyer and a member of the [[Socialist-Revolutionaries|Socialist Revolutionary Party]] (SRP), agreed to join the new cabinet, and became an increasingly central figure in the government, eventually taking leadership of the Provisional Government. As minister of war and later Prime Minister, Kerensky promoted [[freedom of speech]], released thousands of [[political prisoner]]s, continued the war effort, even organizing another [[Kerensky Offensive|offensive]] (which, however, was no more successful than its predecessors). Nevertheless, Kerensky still faced several great challenges, highlighted by the soldiers, urban workers, and peasants, who claimed that they had gained nothing by the revolution:
* Other political groups were trying to undermine him.
* Heavy military losses were being suffered on the front.
* The soldiers were dissatisfied and demoralised and had started to defect. (On arrival back in Russia, these soldiers were either imprisoned or sent straight back into the front.)
* There was enormous discontent with Russia's involvement in the war, and many were calling for an end to it.
* There were great shortages of food and supplies, which was difficult to remedy because of the wartime economic conditions.

The political group that proved most troublesome for Kerensky, and would eventually overthrow him, was the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Bolshevik Party]], led by [[Vladimir Lenin]]. Lenin had been living in exile in neutral [[Switzerland]] and, due to democratization of politics after the February Revolution, which legalized formerly banned [[Political party|political parties]], he perceived the opportunity for his [[Marxism|Marxist]] revolution. Although return to Russia had become a possibility, the war made it logistically difficult. Eventually, German officials arranged for Lenin to pass through their territory, hoping that his activities would weaken Russia or even&nbsp;– if the Bolsheviks came to power&nbsp;– lead to Russia's withdrawal from the war. Lenin and his associates, however, had to agree to travel to Russia in a [[sealed train]]: Germany would not take the chance that he would foment revolution in Germany. After passing through the front, he arrived in Petrograd in April 1917.

On the way to Russia, Lenin prepared the [[April Theses]], which outlined central Bolshevik policies. These included that the Soviets take power (as seen in the slogan "all power to the Soviets") and denouncing the liberals and social revolutionaries in the Provisional Government, forbidding co-operation with it. Many Bolsheviks, however, had supported the Provisional Government, including [[Lev Kamenev]].{{Sfn|Smele|2017|page=27}}

[[File:Revolución-marzo-rusia--russianbolshevik00rossuoft.png|thumb|Revolutionaries attacking the tsarist police in the early days of the February Revolution]]

With Lenin's arrival, the popularity of the [[Bolsheviks]] increased steadily. Over the course of the spring, public dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government and the war, in particular among workers, soldiers and peasants, pushed these groups to radical parties. Despite growing support for the Bolsheviks, buoyed by maxims that called most famously for "all power to the Soviets", the party held very little real power in the moderate-dominated Petrograd Soviet. In fact, historians such as [[Sheila Fitzpatrick]] have asserted that Lenin's exhortations for the Soviet Council to take power were intended to arouse indignation both with the Provisional Government, whose policies were viewed as conservative, and the Soviets themselves, which were viewed as subservients to the conservative government. By some other historians' accounts, Lenin and his followers were unprepared for how their groundswell of support, especially among influential worker and soldier groups, would translate into real power in the summer of 1917.

On 18 June, the Provisional Government launched an attack against Germany that failed miserably. Soon after, the government ordered soldiers to go to the front, reneging on a promise. The soldiers refused to follow the new orders. The arrival of radical [[Kronstadt]] sailors&nbsp;– who had tried and executed many officers, including one admiral&nbsp;– further fueled the growing revolutionary atmosphere. Sailors and soldiers, along with Petrograd workers, took to the streets in violent protest, calling for "all power to the Soviets". The revolt, however, was disowned by Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders and dissipated within a few days.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lenin |first=Vladimir I. |author-link=Vladimir Lenin |title=One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution |date=1964 |publisher=Progress Publishers |others=Jim Riordan |editor-last=Apresyan |editor-first=Stephen |edition=4th |volume=25 |location=Moscow |pages=370–77 |language=ru |orig-date=1917}}</ref> In the aftermath, Lenin fled to [[Finland]] under threat of arrest while Trotsky, among other prominent Bolsheviks, was arrested. The [[July Days]] confirmed the popularity of the anti-war, radical Bolsheviks, but their unpreparedness at the moment of revolt was an embarrassing gaffe that lost them support among their main constituent groups: soldiers and workers.

The Bolshevik failure in the July Days proved temporary. The Bolsheviks had undergone a spectacular growth in membership. Whereas, in February 1917, the Bolsheviks were limited to only 24,000 members, by September 1917 there were 200,000 members of the Bolshevik faction.<ref name="Cohen46">{{Cite book |last=Cohen |first=Stephen |title=Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography 1888–1938 |date=1980 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=London |page=46}}</ref> Previously, the Bolsheviks had been in the minority in the two leading cities of Russia{{snd}}St. Petersburg and Moscow behind the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries, by September the Bolsheviks were in the majority in both cities.<ref name=Cohen46/> Furthermore, the Bolshevik-controlled Moscow Regional Bureau of the Party also controlled the Party organizations of the 13 provinces around Moscow. These 13 provinces held 37% of Russia's population and 20% of the membership of the Bolshevik faction.<ref name=Cohen46/>

In August, poor and misleading communication led General [[Lavr Kornilov]], the recently appointed Supreme Commander of Russian military forces, to believe that the Petrograd government had already been captured by radicals, or was in serious danger thereof.{{Dubious |Kornilov Affair|date=February 2018}} In response, he ordered troops to Petrograd to pacify the city. To secure his position, Kerensky had to ask for Bolshevik assistance. He also sought help from the Petrograd Soviet, which called upon armed [[Red Guards (Russia)|Red Guards]] to "defend the revolution". The [[Kornilov Affair]] failed largely due to the efforts of the Bolsheviks, whose influence over railroad and telegraph workers proved vital in stopping the movement of troops. With his coup failing, Kornilov surrendered and was relieved of his position. The Bolsheviks' role in stopping the attempted coup further strengthened their position.

In early September, the Petrograd Soviet freed all jailed Bolsheviks and Trotsky became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. Growing numbers of socialists and lower-class Russians viewed the government less as a force in support of their needs and interests. The Bolsheviks benefited as the only major organized opposition party that had refused to compromise with the Provisional Government, and they benefited from growing frustration and even disgust with other parties, such as the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, who stubbornly refused to break with the idea of national unity across all classes.

[[File:Vallankumouskokous.jpg|thumb|200px|A revolutionary meeting of Russian soldiers in March 1917 in Dalkarby of [[Jomala]], [[Åland]]]]
In Finland, Lenin had worked on his book ''[[State and Revolution]]'' and continued to lead his party, writing newspaper articles and policy decrees.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lenin |first=Vladimir I. |author-link=Vladimir Lenin |title=Collected Works of Lenin |date=1974 |publisher=Progress Publishers |volume=25 |location=Moscow |pages=3395–3487 |chapter=State and Revolution}}</ref> By October, he returned to Petrograd (present-day St. Petersburg), aware that the increasingly radical city presented him no legal danger and a second opportunity for revolution. Recognising the strength of the Bolsheviks, Lenin began pressing for the immediate overthrow of the Kerensky government by the Bolsheviks. Lenin was of the opinion that taking power should occur in both St. Petersburg and Moscow simultaneously, parenthetically stating that it made no difference which city rose up first.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lenin |first=Vladimir I. |author-link=Vladimir Lenin |title=Collected Works of Lenin |date=1972 |publisher=Progress Publishers |volume=26 |location=Moscow |page=21 |chapter=The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power}}</ref> The Bolshevik Central Committee drafted a resolution, calling for the dissolution of the Provisional Government in favor of the Petrograd Soviet. The resolution was passed 10–2 ([[Lev Kamenev]] and [[Grigory Zinoviev]] prominently dissenting) promoting the [[October Revolution]].