Editing Richard Helms (section)

===LBJ: Tuesday lunch===
As a result of the CIA's accurate prognosis concerning the duration, logistics, and outcome of the [[Six-Day War]] of June 1967, Helms' practical value to the President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, became evident.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) at 2.</ref> Recognition of his new status was not long in coming. Helms soon took a place at the table where the president's top advisors discussed foreign policy issues: the regular Tuesday luncheons with LBJ. Helms unabashedly called it "the hottest ticket in town".<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 294–295, 295 (quote); 307.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 202.</ref><ref>Cf., Turner (2005) pp. 107–108 re Johnson's Tuesday lunch.</ref>

[[File:Richard Helms.jpg|thumb|left|Richard Helms in the White House Cabinet Room, March 27, 1968. Four days later Johnson announced his decision not to run for reelection.<ref>Helms (2003) p. 333.</ref>]]
In a 1984 interview with a CIA historian, Helms recalled that following the Six-Day War, he and Johnson had engaged in intense private conversations which addressed foreign policy, including the Soviet Union. Helms went on:

<blockquote>And I think at that time he'd made up his mind that it would be a good idea to tie intelligence into the inner circle of his policy-making and decision-making process. So starting from that time he began to invite me to the Tuesday lunches, and I remained a member of that group until the end of his administration.<ref>Helms Interview of 8 Nov. 1984 by Robert M. Hathaway (CIA staff historian) at 8. Interview posted at CIA website.</ref></blockquote>

Helms' invitation to lunch occurred about three-and-a-half years into Johnson's five-year presidency and a year into Helms' nearly seven-year tenure as DCI. Thereafter in the Johnson administration, Helms functioned in proximity to high-level policymaking, with continual access to America's top political leadership. It constituted the pinnacle of Helms' influence and standing in Washington. Helms describes the "usual Tuesday lunch" in his memoirs.

<blockquote>[W]e gathered for a sherry in the family living room on the second floor of the White House. If the President, who normally kept to a tight schedule, was a few minutes late, he would literally bound into the room, pause long enough to acknowledge our presence, and herd us into the family dining room, overlooking Pennsylvania Avenue. Seating followed protocol, with the secretary of state ([[Dean Rusk]]) at the President's right, and the secretary of defense ([[Robert McNamara]], later [[Clark Clifford]]) at his left. General [[Earle Wheeler|Bus Wheeler]] (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) sat beside the secretary of defense. I sat beside Dean Rusk. [[Walt Rostow]] (the [[National Security Advisor (United States)|Special Assistant for National Security Affairs]]), [[George Christian (journalist)|George Christian]] (the White House Press Secretary), and Tom Johnson (the deputy press secretary) made up the rest of the table.<ref>Helms (2002) p. 307 (quote, with inserts in parentheses of attendee titles and/or names from Helms at p. 294). Photograph of a Tuesday lunch appears at sixth page of photos.</ref></blockquote>

In CIA interviews long after the war ended, Helms recalled the role played in policy discussions. As the neutral party, Helms could come up with facts applicable to the issue at hand. The benefit of such a role was the decisiveness in "keeping the game honest". Helms comments that many advocates of particular policy positions will almost invariably 'cherry pick' facts supporting their positions, whether consciously or not. Then the voice of a neutral could perform a useful function in helping to steer the conversation on routes within realistic parameters.<ref>Hathaway and Smith (1993) pp. 2–4.</ref>

The out-sized political personality of Johnson, of course, was the dominating presence at lunch. From his perch Helms marveled at the learned way President Johnson employed the primary contradictions in his personality to direct those around him, and forcefully manage the atmosphere of discourse.<ref>Cf., Helms (2003) p. 332, see also photograph of Johnson and Helms at sixth page of photos.</ref><ref>Cf., e.g., [[David Halberstam]], ''The Best and the Brightest'' (New York: Random House 1972; reprint Penguin 1983) pp. 522–557 (Chap. 20). Johnson combined "earthy, frontier attitudes" with political sophistication to become "a man of stunning force, of drive and intelligence" (p. 522). Yet he remained personally insecure, so that "as a public communicator in the White House [he] would not let the real Lyndon Johnson surface ... not trusting himself, he did not trust the public" (p. 552).</ref>

Regarding the perennial issues of Vietnam, a country in civil war, Helms led as an important institutional player in the political mix of Washington. Staff within the CIA were divided on the conflict. As the DCI, Helms' daily duties involved the difficult task of updating CIA intelligence and reporting on CIA operations to the American executive leadership. Vietnam then dominated the news. Notoriously, the American political consensus eventually broke. The public became sharply divided, with the issues being vociferously contested. About the so-called Vietnamese 'quagmire' it seemed confusion reigned within and without. Helms saw himself as struggling to best serve his view of America and his forceful superior, the President.<ref>Helms (2003) pp. 309–316.</ref><ref>Cf., Ranelagh (1986) pp. 453, 454.</ref><ref>Powers (1979) p. 203.</ref>