Editing Relativism (section)

==Criticisms==
{{anchor|paradox_of_relativism}}A common argument<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.asa3.org/ASA/education/views/reality.htm| title = Craig Rusbult. ''Reality 101''}}</ref><ref>Keith Dixon. ''Is Cultural Relativism Self-Refuting''? (British Journal of Sociology, vol 28, No. 1)</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/cultural-relativism.htm| title = ''Cultural Relativism'' at All About Philosophy.}}</ref> against relativism suggests that it inherently [[self-refuting idea|refutes itself]]: the statement "all is relative" classes either as a relative statement or as an absolute one. If it is relative, then this statement does not rule out absolutes. If the statement is [[wikt:absolute|absolute]], on the other hand, then it provides an example of an absolute statement, proving that not all truths are relative. However, this argument against relativism only applies to relativism that positions truth as relative–i.e. epistemological/truth-value relativism. More specifically, it is only extreme forms of epistemological relativism that can come in for this criticism as there are many epistemological relativists{{Who|date=July 2015}} who posit that some aspects of what is regarded as factually "true" are not universal, yet still accept that other universal truths exist (e.g. [[gas laws]] or moral laws).

Another argument against relativism posits the existence of [[Natural Law|natural law]]. Simply put, the physical universe works under basic principles: the "Laws of Nature". Some contend that a natural moral law may also exist, for example as argued by, [[Immanuel Kant]] in ''[[Critique of Practical Reason]]'', [[Richard Dawkins]] in ''[[The God Delusion]]'' (2006)<ref>[[The God Delusion]], Chapter 6</ref> and addressed by [[C. S. Lewis]] in ''[[Mere Christianity]]'' (1952).<ref>Mere Christianity, Chapter 1</ref> Dawkins said "I think we face an equal but much more sinister challenge from the left, in the shape of cultural relativism - the view that scientific truth is only one kind of truth and it is not to be especially privileged".<ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/may/28/dawkinschristmascardlist| title = Richard Dawkins quoted in ''Dawkins' Christmas card list; Dawkins at the Hay Festival,'' The Guardian, 28 May 2007| website = [[TheGuardian.com]]| date = 28 May 2007}}</ref>
<!-- Forced to exclude this too - it hangs. --><!--[[Plato]] opposed relativism. He criticized the views of the [[sophist]] [[Protagoras]] in his dialogue ''[[Theaetetus (dialogue)|Thaetetus]]''. In a paraphrased dialogue, the philosopher [[Socrates]] argued that relativism is self-defeating with the following: "My opinion is: Truth must be absolute and that you Mr. Protagoras, are absolutely in error. Since this is indeed my opinion, then you must concede that it is true according to your philosophy."<ref name=socratesdialogue/>
must be absolute and that you Mr. Protagoras, are absolutely in error. Since this is indeed my opinion, then you must concede that it is true according to your philosophy."<ref name=socratesdialogue/>--><!-- Quite a mess. (Plato could be o'k, but 1) make it chronologically, 2) make it clear.) --><!-- "In Defense of Relativity." claims that Protagoras had but to respond, “but my view says that truth is relative to viewpoint, thus you have demonstrated by your very viewpoint that truth is relative,” and thus demonstrated the “truth” that truth is relative." It goes further to state that "Socrates declared that (from his view), Protagoras' idea of relative truth is wrong, thus it is wrong relative to Socrates' view. Protagoras merely needed to respond that from his view, truth is relative to viewpoint, his statement is therefore true from his viewpoint and false from Socrates' viewpoint, denoting the relative truths found in their respective relative views, and thus demonstrating the relative truth of Protagoras..." --> <!-- See above. --> <!-- Would you mind not corrupting other text next time? Etc. -->
Philosopher [[Hilary Putnam]],<ref>[[Maria Baghramian|Baghramian, M.]] ''Relativism'', 2004</ref> among others,<ref>Including Julien Beillard, who presents his case on the impossibility of moral relativism in the July 2013 issue of [[Philosophy Now|Philosophy Now magazine]], accessible [http://philosophynow.org/issues/97/Moral_Relativism_Is_Unintelligible here]</ref> states that some forms of relativism make it impossible to believe one is in error. If there is no truth beyond an individual's [[belief]] that something is true, then an individual cannot hold their own beliefs to be false or mistaken. A related criticism is that relativizing truth to individuals destroys the distinction between truth and belief.

Philosopher [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] presented an influential critique of conceptual relativism in his 1974 essay ''[[Donald Davidson (philosopher)#Third dogma of empiricism|On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme]]''. Conceptual relativism is the idea that different people or even entire communities could make sense of the world in radically different, [[commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] (meaning untranslatable) ways. Davidson attacks what he believes to be the entire framework which makes conceptual relativism intelligible, namely scheme–content dualism, which is the idea that all knowledge is the result of a subjective scheme imposing one's concepts onto objective content from the world. In refuting scheme–content dualism, Davidson shows that knowledge of one's scheme of concepts is necessarily inseparable from one's knowledge of the world, and so translation between different people or communities is always possible in principle.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Davidson |first=D. |date=1974 |title=On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3129898?origin=crossref |journal=Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association |volume=47 |pages=5–20 |doi=10.2307/3129898 |issn=0065-972X}}</ref>

According to Belgian philosopher of science [[Maarten Boudry]], relativism is rarely applied consistently. In an opinion piece, he argues that no one truly acts according to the belief that truth is relative. Even self-proclaimed relativists, he suggests, do not genuinely believe their own slogans and catchphrases. They become indignant when falsely accused of a crime and laugh at those who claim the Earth is flat. Boudry contends that people abandon their relativism when it really matters—for instance, when visiting a doctor for cancer screening or boarding a plane, trusting in the laws of physics. He argues that relativism about truth is not so much a sincere conviction as it is an empty slogan or a convenient rhetorical device people deploy when it suits them. Boudry refers to this phenomenon as “occasional relativism,” highlighting what he sees as the casual and opportunistic nature of such relativist claims.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Boudry |first=Maarten |title=Gelegenheidsrelativisme |url=https://maartenboudry.be/2017/04/gelegenheidsrelativisme.html |website=Maarten Boudry |date=15 April 2017 |access-date=20 May 2025 |language=nl}}</ref>