Editing Reconnaissance (section)

=== Reconnaissance-pull ===
Reconnaissance-pull is a tactic that is applied at the regiment to division level and defined as locating and rapidly exploiting enemy weaknesses. It is the ability to determine enemy positions and create exploitable gaps through which friendly forces can pass while avoiding obstacles and strong points.<ref>[http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll3/id/1688/rec/1 "Reconnaissance-pull"—seeking the path of least resistance] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304050239/http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll3/id/1688/rec/1 |date=2016-03-04 }} (monograph, US Command and General Staff College, 1991)</ref>

A textbook example of reconnaissance-pull was documented during the [[Battle of Tinian|Tinian landings]] of [[World War II]], utilized by the [[United States Marine Corps]]'s [[Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion]], from [[V Amphibious Corps]]. Aerial photography and the confirmation by the [[amphibious reconnaissance]] [[platoon]]s determined that the Japanese defenders had largely ignored the northern beaches of the island, focusing most of their defensive effort on beaches in the south-west which were more favorable for an amphibious landing. American forces quickly changed their landing location to the northern beaches and planned a small and hasty "[[Military deception|deception]]" operation off the southern beach, which resulted in a complete surprise for the Japanese forces. As a result, American forces were able to fight the Japanese force on land, where they had the advantage, leading to light losses and a [[Battle of Tinian|relatively short battle]] that lasted only 9 days.<ref name="MCDP 1-0">{{cite book |title=Marine Corps Operations (MCDP 1-0) |publisher=Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication |year=2007 |pages=11–10 |chapter=Chap. 11}}</ref>