Editing Probability interpretations (section)

==Logical, epistemic, and inductive probability==
{{Main|Probabilistic logic}}

It is widely recognized that the term "probability" is sometimes used in contexts where it has nothing to do with physical randomness. Consider, for example, the claim that the extinction of the dinosaurs was '''probably''' caused by a large meteorite hitting the earth. Statements such as "Hypothesis H is probably true" have been interpreted to mean that the (presently available) [[empirical evidence]] (E, say) supports H to a high degree. This degree of support of H by E has been called the '''logical''', or '''epistemic''', or '''inductive''' probability of H given E.

The differences between these interpretations are rather small, and may seem inconsequential. One of the main points of disagreement lies in the relation between probability and belief. Logical probabilities are conceived (for example in [[John Maynard Keynes|Keynes]]' [[A Treatise on Probability|Treatise on Probability]]<ref name=keynes />) to be objective, logical relations between propositions (or sentences), and hence not to depend in any way upon belief. They are degrees of (partial) [[entailment]], or degrees of [[logical consequence]], not degrees of [[belief]]. (They do, nevertheless, dictate proper degrees of belief, as is discussed below.) [[Frank P. Ramsey]], on the other hand, was skeptical about the existence of such objective logical relations and argued that (evidential) probability is "the logic of partial belief".<ref name=ramsey /> (p 157) In other words, Ramsey held that epistemic probabilities simply ''are'' degrees of rational belief, rather than being logical relations that merely ''constrain'' degrees of rational belief.

Another point of disagreement concerns the ''uniqueness'' of evidential probability, relative to a given state of knowledge. [[Rudolf Carnap]] held, for example, that logical principles always determine a unique logical probability for any statement, relative to any body of evidence. Ramsey, by contrast, thought that while degrees of belief are subject to some rational constraints (such as, but not limited to, the axioms of probability) these constraints usually do not determine a unique value. Rational people, in other words, may differ somewhat in their degrees of belief, even if they all have the same information.