Editing Philosophy of science (section)

===The purpose of science===
{{See also|Scientific realism|Instrumentalism}}

Should science aim to determine ultimate truth, or are there questions that science [[Empirical limits in science|cannot answer]]? ''Scientific realists'' claim that science aims at truth and that one ought to regard [[scientific theories]] as true, approximately true, or likely true. Conversely, ''scientific anti-realists'' argue that science does not aim (or at least does not succeed) at truth, especially truth about [[unobservable]]s like electrons or other universes.<ref name="Levin1984">{{cite book
 | last = Levin
 | first = Michael
 | editor = Jarrett Leplin
 | title = Scientific Realism
 | year = 1984
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | location = Berkeley
 | isbn = 978-0-520-05155-3
 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/124 124–1139]
 | chapter = What Kind of Explanation is Truth?
 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/124
 }}
</ref> [[Instrumentalism|Instrumentalists]] argue that scientific theories should only be evaluated on whether they are useful. In their view, whether theories are true or not is beside the point, because the purpose of science is to make predictions and enable effective technology.

Realists often point to the success of recent scientific theories as evidence for the truth (or near truth) of current theories.<ref name="Boyd2002"/><ref>Specific examples include:
* {{cite book
 | last = Popper
 | first = Karl
 | author-link = Karl Popper
 | title = Conjectures and Refutations
 | year = 2002
 | publisher = Routledge Classics
 | location = London & New York
 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fZnrUfJWQ-YC&q=conjectures+and+refutations
 |isbn=978-0-415-28594-0
 |postscript=First published 1963 by Routledge and Kegan Paul}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Smart
 | first = J.J.C.
 | title = Between Science and Philosophy
 | url = https://archive.org/details/betweenscienceph0000smar
 | url-access = registration
 | year = 1968
 | publisher = Random House
 | location = New York}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Putnam
 | first = Hilary
 | author-link = Hilary Putnam
 | title = Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, Vol. I)
 | year = 1975
 | publisher = Cambridge University Press
 | location = London}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Putnam
 | first = Hilary
 | author-link = Hilary Putnam
 | title = Meaning and the Moral Sciences
 | year = 1978
 | publisher = Routledge and Kegan Paul
 | location = London}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Boyd
 | first = Richard
 | editor = Jarrett Leplin
 | title = Scientific Realism
 | year = 1984
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | location = Berkeley
 | isbn = 978-0-520-05155-3
 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/41 41–82]
 | chapter = The Current Status of Scientific Realism
 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/41
 }}</ref> Antirealists point to either the many false theories in the [[history of science]],<ref name="Stanford2006">{{cite book
 | last = Stanford
 | first = P. Kyle
 | title = Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
 | year = 2006
 | publisher = Oxford University Press
 | isbn = 978-0-19-517408-3}}</ref><ref name="Laudan1981">{{cite journal
 | last = Laudan
 | first = Larry
 | author-link = Larry Laudan
 | year = 1981
 | title = A Confutation of Convergent Realism
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 48
 | pages = 218–249
 | doi = 10.1086/288975| citeseerx = 10.1.1.594.2523
 | s2cid = 108290084
 }}</ref> epistemic morals,<ref name="vanFraassen1980"/> the success of false [[Scientific modelling|modeling]] assumptions,<ref name="Winsberg2006">{{cite journal
 | last = Winsberg
 | first = Eric
 | s2cid = 18275928
 |date=September 2006
 | title = Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth
 | journal = Synthese
 | volume = 152
 | pages = 1–19
 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-004-5404-6}}</ref> or widely termed [[postmodern]] criticisms of objectivity as evidence against scientific realism.<ref name="Boyd2002">{{cite web
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
|title = Scientific Realism
|access-date = 2007-12-01
|last = Boyd
|first = Richard
|year = 2002
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070706080354/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
|archive-date = 2007-07-06
|url-status = live
}}</ref> Antirealists attempt to explain the success of scientific theories without reference to truth.<ref name="Stanford2000">{{cite journal
 | last = Stanford
 | first = P. Kyle
 | s2cid = 35878807
 |date=June 2000
 | title = An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 67
 | pages = 266–284
 | doi = 10.1086/392775
 | issue = 2}}</ref> Some antirealists claim that scientific theories aim at being accurate only about observable objects and argue that their success is primarily judged by that criterion.<ref name="vanFraassen1980">
{{cite book
 | last = van Fraassen
 | first = Bas
 | author-link = Bas van Fraassen
 | title = The Scientific Image
 | year = 1980
 | publisher = The Clarendon Press
 | location = Oxford
 | isbn = 978-0-19-824424-0 }}</ref>

==== Real patterns ====
The notion of [[real patterns]] has been propounded, notably by philosopher [[Daniel Dennett|Daniel C. Dennett]], as an intermediate position between strong realism and [[eliminative materialism]].{{technical inline|please define|date=May 2025}} This concept delves into the investigation of patterns observed in scientific phenomena to ascertain whether they signify underlying truths or are mere constructs of human interpretation. Dennett provides a unique ontological account concerning real patterns, examining the extent to which these recognized patterns have predictive utility and allow for efficient compression of information.<ref>Dennett, D. (1991). Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy.</ref>

The discourse on real patterns extends beyond philosophical circles, finding relevance in various scientific domains. For example, in biology, inquiries into real patterns seek to elucidate the nature of biological explanations, exploring how recognized patterns contribute to a comprehensive understanding of biological phenomena.<ref>Burnston, D. C. (2017). Real Patterns in Biological Explanation. Philosophy of Science.</ref> Similarly, in chemistry, debates around the reality of chemical bonds as real patterns continue.<ref>Seifert, V. A. (2022). The Chemical Bond is a Real Pattern. Philosophy of Science.</ref>

Evaluation of real patterns also holds significance in broader scientific inquiries. Researchers, like Tyler Millhouse, propose criteria for evaluating the realness of a pattern, particularly in the context of universal patterns and the human propensity to perceive patterns, even where there might be none.<ref>Millhouse, T. (2020). Really real patterns. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.</ref> This evaluation is pivotal in advancing research in diverse fields, from climate change to machine learning, where recognition and validation of real patterns in scientific models play a crucial role.<ref>Santa Fe Institute. (2022). Real patterns in science & cognition. https://www.santafe.edu/news-center/news/real-patterns-science-cognition</ref>