Editing Philosophy of religion (section)

===Knowledge and belief===
{{See also|Belief#Religion}}
[[File:Blind monks examining an elephant.jpg|thumb|The [[Blind men and an elephant]] is a parable widely used in Buddhism and Jainism to illustrate the dangers of dogmatic religious belief.]]
All religious traditions make knowledge claims which they argue are central to religious practice and to the ultimate solution to the main problem of human life.<ref>Yandell, 2002, p. 53-54.</ref> These include [[Epistemology|epistemic]], metaphysical and [[Ethics in religion|ethical]] claims.

[[Evidentialism]] is the position that may be characterized as "a belief is rationally justified only if there is sufficient evidence for it".<ref name="auto1">Rowe 2007, pp 105</ref> Many theists and non-theists are evidentialists, for example, [[Aquinas]] and [[Bertrand Russell]] agree that belief in God is rational only if there is sufficient evidence, but disagree on whether such evidence exists.<ref name="auto1"/> These arguments often stipulate that subjective religious experiences are not reasonable evidence and thus religious truths must be argued based on non-religious evidence. One of the strongest positions of evidentialism is that by [[William Kingdon Clifford]] who wrote: "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence".<ref name="auto2">{{cite web| url = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/religion-epistemology/| title = Forrest, Peter, "The Epistemology of Religion", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ''(Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)| date = 23 April 1997| last1 = Forrest| first1 = Peter| access-date = 12 December 2017| archive-date = 18 March 2019| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190318090610/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/religion-epistemology/| url-status = live}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|last=Clifford|first=William Kingdon|title=Lectures and Essays|chapter=The Ethics of Belief|pages=177–211|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-139-14988-4|doi=10.1017/cbo9781139149884.007|year=2011|s2cid=211881350 |editor1-last=Stephen|editor1-first=Leslie|editor2-last=Pollock|editor2-first=Frederick}}</ref> His view of evidentialism is usually read in tandem with William James's article ''A Will to Believe'' (1896), which argues against Clifford's principle. More recent supporters of evidentialism include [[Antony Flew]] ("The Presumption of Atheism", 1972) and [[Michael Scriven]] (Primary philosophy, 1966). Both of them rely on the [[Ockhamist]] view that in the absence of evidence for X, belief in X is not justified. Many modern [[Thomists]] are also evidentialists in that they hold they can demonstrate there is evidence for the belief in God. Another move is to argue in a [[Bayesian probability|Bayesian]] way for the probability of a religious truth like God, not for total conclusive evidence.<ref name="auto2"/>

Some philosophers, however, argue that religious belief is warranted ''without evidence'' and hence are sometimes called ''non-evidentialists''. They include [[Fideism|fideists]] and [[reformed epistemologists]]. [[Alvin Plantinga]] and other [[reformed epistemologists]] are examples of philosophers who argue that religious beliefs are "properly basic beliefs" and that it is not irrational to hold them even though they are not supported by any evidence.<ref>Rowe 2007, pp 106</ref><ref>Meister 2009, p. 161.</ref> The rationale here is that some beliefs we hold must be foundational and not be based on further rational beliefs. If this is not so, then we risk an [[infinite regress]]. This is qualified by the proviso that they can be defended against objections (this differentiates this view from fideism). A properly basic belief is a belief that one can reasonably hold without evidence, such as a memory, a basic sensation or a perception. Plantinga's argument is that belief in God is of this type because within every human mind there is a natural awareness of divinity.<ref>Meister 2009, p. 163.</ref>

[[William James]] in his essay "[[The Will to Believe]]" argues for a pragmatic conception of religious belief. For James, religious belief is justified if one is presented with a question which is rationally undecidable and if one is presented with genuine and live options which are relevant for the individual.<ref>Rowe 2007, pp 98</ref> For James, religious belief is defensible because of the pragmatic value it can bring to one's life, even if there is no rational evidence for it.

Some work in recent epistemology of religion goes beyond debates over evidentialism, fideism, and reformed epistemology to consider contemporary issues deriving from new ideas about knowledge-how and practical skill; how practical factors can affect whether one could know whether theism is true; from formal epistemology's use of probability theory; or from social epistemology (particularly the epistemology of testimony, or the epistemology of disagreement).<ref>E.g. see {{cite book |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew |last2=Hawthorne |first2=John |last3=Rabinowitz |first3=Dani |title=Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=9780198798705 |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/knowledge-belief-and-god-9780198798705}}.</ref>

For example, an important topic in the epistemology of religion is that of religious disagreement, and the issue of what it means for intelligent individuals of the same epistemic parity to disagree about religious issues. Religious disagreement has been seen as possibly posing first-order or higher-order problems for religious belief. A first order problem refers to whether that evidence directly applies to the truth of any religious proposition, while a higher order problem instead applies to ''whether one has rationally assessed'' the first order evidence.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://iep.utm.edu/rel-disa/|title=Disagreement, Religious &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=Sep 9, 2020|archive-date=August 11, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200811194601/https://iep.utm.edu/rel-disa/|url-status=live}}</ref> One example of a first order problem is the [[Argument from nonbelief]]. Higher order discussions focus on whether religious disagreement with epistemic peers (someone whose epistemic ability is equal to our own) demands us to adopt a skeptical or agnostic stance or whether to reduce or change our religious beliefs.<ref>See {{cite book |last1=Benton |first1=Matthew |last2=Kvanvig |first2=Jonathan |title=Religious Disagreement and Pluralism |date=2022 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn= 9780198849865 |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/religious-disagreement-and-pluralism-9780198849865}}</ref>