Editing Philosophy of history (section)

== Operative theories ==

=== Teleological approaches ===
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Early teleological approaches to history can be found in [[theodicies]], which attempted to reconcile the [[problem of evil]] with the existence of God—providing a global explanation of history with belief in a progressive directionality organized by a superior power, leading to an [[eschatological]] end, such as a [[Messianic Age]] or [[Apocalypse]]. However, this transcendent teleological approach can be thought as [[immanent]] to human history itself. [[Augustine of Hippo]], [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet]], in his 1679 ''Discourse On Universal History'', and [[Gottfried Leibniz]], who coined the term, formulated such philosophical theodicies. Leibniz based his explanation on the [[principle of sufficient reason]], which states that anything that happens, does happen for a specific reason. Thus, if one adopts God's perspective, seemingly evil events in fact only take place in the larger [[divine plan]]. In this way theodicies explained the necessity of evil as a relative element that forms part of a larger plan of history. However, Leibniz's principles were not a gesture of [[fatalism]]. Confronted with the antique [[problem of future contingents]], Leibniz developed the theory of [[compossible worlds]], distinguishing two types of necessity, in response to the problem of [[determinism]].

[[G. W. F. Hegel]] may represent the epitome of teleological philosophy of history.<ref name=":0" /> Hegel's teleology was taken up by [[Francis Fukuyama]] in his ''[[The End of History and the Last Man]]''. Thinkers such as [[Nietzsche]], [[Michel Foucault]], [[Louis Althusser|Althusser]], or [[Deleuze]] deny any teleological sense to history, claiming that it is best characterized by discontinuities, ruptures, and various time-scales,{{citation needed|date=November 2019}} which the [[Annales School]] claimed to have demonstrated.

Schools of thought influenced by Hegel also see history as progressive, but they see progress as the outcome of a [[dialectic]] in which factors working in opposite directions are over time reconciled. History was best seen as directed by a {{lang|de|[[Zeitgeist]]}}, and traces of the {{lang|de|Zeitgeist}} could be seen by looking backward. Hegel believed that history was moving man toward [[civilization]], and some also claim he thought that the [[Prussia]]n state incarnated the ''[[end of history]]''. In his ''Lessons on the History of Philosophy'', he explains that each epochal philosophy is in a way the whole of philosophy; it is not a subdivision of the Whole but this Whole itself apprehended in a specific modality.

=== Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ===
[[File:G.W.F. Hegel (by Sichling, after Sebbers).jpg|thumb|[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]], philosopher of [[absolute idealism]] who developed a [[dialectic]] conception of history]]

''[[Lectures on the Philosophy of History|Lectures on the Philosophy of World History]]'' bring together the theses of the philosophy of history that Hegel developed during his classes at the [[Humboldt University of Berlin|University of Berlin]] taught in the years 1822–1823, 1828 and 1830–1831. Editions of the work by [[Eduard Gans]] in 1837, Charles Hegel in 1840 and [[Georg Lasson]] in 1917 stand out. Hegel's work presents a complex exposition of his theses, which can lead to more than one mistake. For this reason, a series of works have been written aimed at interpreting the writings of the German philosopher, including his philosophy of history, which has been considered one of his clearest works.<ref>Sibree, John "Translator's Introduction" in Georg Hegel (2001) [1837]. Charles Hegel, ed. The Philosophy of History. Ontario: Batoche Books. pp. 5-6.</ref>

Hegel's philosophy of history aimed for a philosophical reflection on world history, thinking about the history of humanity in all its spatial and temporal breadth. This Hegelian particularity, versus the works of historians, rests on the fact that the German philosopher sought to determine what the teleology of history was, particularly what the end of history was, and how that process would develop.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hegel |first1=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich |title=Lectures on the philosophy of world history |last2=Nisbet |first2=Hugh Barr |last3=Forbes |first3=Duncan |last4=Hoffmeister |first4=Johannes |date=1992 |publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press |isbn=978-0-521-28145-4 |edition=1. paperback ed., [Reprint] |location=Cambridge |pages=11}}</ref> With this end in mind, Hegel applied his philosophical system, both metaphysical and logical, to develop the thesis that the history of humanity consists of a rational process of constant progress towards freedom.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hegel |first1=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich |title=Lectures on the philosophy of world history |last2=Nisbet |first2=Hugh Barr |last3=Forbes |first3=Duncan |last4=Hoffmeister |first4=Johannes |date=1992 |publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press |isbn=978-0-521-28145-4 |edition=1. paperback ed., [Reprint] |location=Cambridge |pages=27–29, 43, 47}}</ref>

According to Hegelian philosophy, reason made a spatial transition from east to west, that is, from Asia to Europe. This transition of reason, says Hegel, is made explicit in the concept of freedom that each civilization developed in these spaces has had. Thus, in the east, the Chinese civilization, India, and the various civilizations of Mesopotamia were characterized by considering that freedom belonged to a single subject, that person being understood as the emperor or empress, the king or queen. The rest of the individuals in these civilizations are, according to Hegel, like children under the tutelage of a father. The second stage of this transition of freedom overcame the paternal stage. Greece and Rome, civilizations where freedom no longer belonged only to the head of the state, but also to a limited number of people who met certain requirements, that is, the citizens. Finally, the third stage, German-Christian Europe, reached a level of consciousness about freedom that maintains that it no longer belonged to one or a few; on the contrary, freedom was good for all human beings.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Hegel |first1=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich |title=Lectures on the philosophy of world history |last2=Nisbet |first2=Hugh Barr |last3=Forbes |first3=Duncan |last4=Hoffmeister |first4=Johannes |date=1992 |publisher=Cambridge Univ. Press |isbn=978-0-521-28145-4 |edition=1. paperback ed., [Reprint] |location=Cambridge |pages=54–55}}</ref>

The reactions that Hegel's thesis generated have been diverse. On the one hand, it is argued that Hegel's contribution consisted of consolidating the philosophy of history as an independent and formal discipline of philosophy.<ref name=":0">Walsh, William (1951). «What is Philosophy of History». ''An Introduction to the Philosophy of History''. London: Hutchinson University Library. p. 11</ref><ref>Collingwood, Robin (1952) [1946]. ''Idea de la historia''. Ciudad de México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. p. 117</ref> On the other hand, it is argued that Hegel's philosophy of history is an example of [[totalitarianism]], [[racism]], and [[Eurocentrism]], widely debated criticisms.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Popper |first1=Karl R. |title=[[The open society and its enemies]] |last2=Soros |first2=George |last3=Ryan |first3=Alan |last4=Gombrich |first4=Ernst H. |last5=Popper |first5=Karl R. |date=2020 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-21084-1 |edition=One-Volume Edition, Princeton Classics paperback edition, first printing |series=Princeton Classics |location=Princeton Oxford |pages=273 |chapter=Hegel and the New Tribalism}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=MacCarney |first1=Joseph |title=Hegel on history |last2=MacCarney |first2=Joe |date=2000 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-11695-4 |edition=1. publ |series=Routledge philosophy guidebooks |location=London |pages=142–151}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Zuckert |first1=Rachel |title=Hegel on philosophy in history |last2=Kreines |first2=James |author-link2=James Kreines |date=2017 |publisher=Cambridge university press |isbn=978-1-107-09341-6 |location=Cambridge |pages=71}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Hodgson |first=Peter Crafts |title=Shapes of freedom: Hegel's philosophy of world history in theological perspective |date=2012 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-965495-6 |location=Oxford |pages=81, 124}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Buck-Morss |first=Susan |title=Hegel, Haiti, and universal history |date=2009 |publisher=Univ. of Pittsburgh Press |isbn=978-0-8229-4340-2 |series=Illuminations: cultural formations of the Americas |location=Pittsburgh, Pa |pages=60, 117}}</ref>

=== Thomas Carlyle ===
[[File:Thomas Carlyle, 1795 - 1881. Historian and essayist.jpg|left|thumb|[[Thomas Carlyle]], Scottish essayist, historian and philosopher of the [[great man theory]]]]
After Hegel, who insisted on the role of ''[[Great man theory|great men]]'' in history, with his famous statement about [[Napoleon]], "I saw the Spirit on his horse", [[Thomas Carlyle]] argued that history was the biography of a few central individuals, [[hero]]es, such as [[Oliver Cromwell]] or [[Frederick the Great]], writing that "The History of the world is but the Biography of great men." His view of heroes included not only political and military figures, the founders or topplers of states, but artists, poets, theologians and other cultural leaders. His history of great men, of geniuses, sought to organize change in the advent of [[greatness]].

Explicit defenses of Carlyle's position have been rare since the late twentieth century. Most philosophers of history contend that the motive forces in history can best be described only with a wider lens than the one he used for his portraits. A.C. Danto, for example, wrote of the importance of the individual in history, but extended his definition to include ''social individuals'', defined as "individuals we may provisionally characterize as containing individual human beings amongst their parts. Examples of social individuals might be social classes [. . .], national groups [. . .], religious organizations [. . .], large-scale events [. . .], large-scale social movements [. . .], etc."<ref>Danto, "The Historical Individual", 266, in ''Philosophical Analysis and History,'' edited by Williman H. Dray, Rainbow-Bridge Book Co., 1966</ref> The great man theory of history was most popular with professional historians in the nineteenth century; a popular work of this school is the ''[[Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition]]'' (1911), which contains lengthy and detailed biographies about the great men of history.{{notetag|See, for example, the biography of [[Attila the Hun]] of the [[Migrations Period]].}}

After [[Marx]]'s [[historical materialism|conception of a materialist history]] based on the [[class struggle]], which raised attention for the first time to the importance of social factors such as economics in the unfolding of history, [[Herbert Spencer]] wrote "You must admit that the genesis of the great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown. . . . Before he can remake his society, his society must make him."

=== Social evolutionism ===
{{main|Sociocultural evolution|l1=Sociocultural evolutionism}}
{{Off topic|date=November 2019}}
Inspired by the Enlightenment's ideal of progress, social evolutionism became a popular conception in the nineteenth century. [[Auguste Comte]]'s (1798–1857) [[positivism|positivist]] conception of history, which he divided into the theological stage, the metaphysical stage and the positivist stage, brought upon by modern science, was one of the most influential doctrines of progress. The [[Whig interpretation of history]], as it was later called, associated with scholars of the [[Victorian era|Victorian]] and [[Edwardian period|Edwardian]] eras in [[United Kingdom|Britain]], such as [[Henry Maine]] or [[Thomas Macaulay]], gives an example of such influence, by looking at human history as progress from savagery and ignorance toward peace, prosperity, and science. Maine described the direction of progress as "from status to contract," from a world in which a child's whole life is pre-determined by the circumstances of his birth, toward one of mobility and choice.

The publication of [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]]'s ''[[The Origin of Species]]'' in 1859 introduced [[human evolution]]. However, it was quickly transposed from its original biological field to the social field, in [[social Darwinism|social Darwinist]] theories. [[Herbert Spencer]], who coined the term "[[survival of the fittest]]", or [[Lewis Henry Morgan]] in ''[[Ancient Society]]'' (1877) developed evolutionist theories independent from Darwin's works, which would be later interpreted as social Darwinism. These nineteenth-century [[unilineal evolution]] theories claimed that societies start out in a primitive state and gradually become more [[civilisation|civilised]] over time, and equated the culture and technology of Western civilisation with progress.

[[Arthur Gobineau]]'s ''[[An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races]]'' (1853–55) argued that race is ''the'' primary force determining world events, that there are intellectual differences between human [[Race (human classification)|races]], and that civilizations decline and fall when the races are mixed. Gobineau's works had a large popularity in the so-called [[scientific racism]] theories that developed during the [[New Imperialism]] period.

After the [[World War I|first world war]], and even before [[Herbert Butterfield]] (1900–1979) harshly criticized it, the Whig interpretation had gone out of style. The bloodletting of that conflict had indicted the whole notion of linear progress. [[Paul Valéry]] famously said: "We civilizations now know ourselves mortal."

However, the notion itself didn't completely disappear. ''[[The End of History and the Last Man]]'' (1992) by [[Francis Fukuyama]] proposed a similar notion of progress, positing that the worldwide adoption of [[liberal democracy|liberal democracies]] as the single accredited political system and even modality of human consciousness would represent the "[[End of History]]". Fukuyama's work stems from a [[Alexandre Kojève|Kojevian]] reading of Hegel's ''[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' (1807).

Unlike [[Maurice Godelier]] who interprets history as a process of transformation, [[Tim Ingold]] suggests that history is a movement of [[autopoiesis]].<ref>Ingold, T. On the Distinction between Evolution and History. Social Evolution & History,. Vol. 1, num. 1. 2002. Pp. 5-24. P. 9, [http://www.socionauki.ru/journal/articles/130380/ socionauki.ru]</ref>

A key component to making sense of all of this is to simply recognize that all these issues in social evolution merely serve to support the suggestion that how one considers the nature of history will impact the interpretation and conclusions drawn about history. The critical under-explored question is less about history as content and more about history as process.

In 2011 [[Steven Pinker]] wrote a history of violence and humanity from an evolutionary perspective in which he shows that violence has declined statistically over time.<ref>" The better angels of our nature, a history of violence and humanity ", by [[Steven Pinker]], published 2012 by Penguin books {{ISBN|978-0-141-03464-5}}</ref>{{Importance inline|date=November 2019}}