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==Morality as a binding force== It can be unclear what it means to say that a person "ought to do X because it is moral, whether they like it or not." [[Morality]] is sometimes presumed to have some kind of special binding force on behaviour, though some philosophers believe that, used this way, the word "ought" seems to wrongly attribute magic powers to morality. For instance, [[G. E. M. Anscombe]] worries that "ought" has become "a word of mere mesmeric force."<ref name=":1">[[G. E. M. Anscombe|Anscombe, Elizabeth]]. 1958. "Modern Moral Philosophy." [[Philosophy (journal)|''Philosophy'']] 33(24).</ref> {{Quote box|align=right|width=40em| quote = If he is an amoral man he may deny that he has any reason to trouble his head over this or any other moral demand. Of course, he may be mistaken, and his life as well as others' lives may be most sadly spoiled by his selfishness. But this is not what is urged by those who think they can close the matter by an emphatic use of 'ought'. My argument is that they are relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral 'ought' a magic force.| salign=right|source = —Philippa Foot<ref name=FootHypo/>}} The British [[ethicist]] [[Philippa Foot]] elaborates that morality does not seem to have any special binding force, and she clarifies that people only behave morally when motivated by other factors. Foot says "People talk, for instance, about the 'binding force' of morality, but it is not clear what this means if not that we feel ourselves unable to escape."<ref name=FootHypo/> The idea is that, faced with an opportunity to steal a book because we can get away with it, moral obligation itself has no power to stop us unless we ''feel'' an obligation. Morality may therefore have no binding force beyond regular human motivations, and people must be motivated to behave morally. The question then arises: what role does reason play in motivating moral behaviour? ===Motivating morality=== {{See also|Science of morality}} The [[categorical imperative]] perspective suggests that proper reason always leads to particular moral behaviour. As mentioned above, Foot instead believes that humans are actually motivated by desires. Proper reason, on this view, allows humans to discover actions that get them what they want (i.e., [[hypothetical imperative]]s)—not necessarily actions that are moral. [[Social structure]] and motivation can make morality binding in a sense, but only because it makes moral norms feel inescapable, according to Foot.<ref name=FootHypo/> [[File:Shame.jpg|thumb|right|200px|Feelings like shame and love are sometimes considered the only meaningful sense in which morality is binding. Absent those feelings, a person could behave "immorally" without remorse.]] [[John Stuart Mill]] adds that external pressures, to please others for instance, also influence this felt binding force, which he calls human "[[conscience]]". Mill says that humans must first reason about what is moral, then try to bring the feelings of our conscience in line with our reason.<ref name=MillChap3/> At the same time, Mill says that a good moral system (in his case, [[utilitarianism]]) ultimately appeals to aspects of human nature—which, must themselves be nurtured during upbringing. Mill explains: <blockquote>This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilisation.</blockquote> Mill thus believes that it is important to appreciate that it is feelings that drive moral behavior, but also that they may not be present in some people (e.g. [[psychopaths]]). Mill goes on to describe factors that help ensure people develop a conscience and behave morally. Popular texts such as Joseph Daleiden's ''The Science of Morality: The Individual, Community, and Future Generations'' (1998) describe how societies can use science to figure out how to make people more likely to be good.
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