Editing Nihilism (section)

=== Relativism ===
{{main|Relativism}}
Epistemological or epistemic nihilism is a family of views that challenge the existence or universal nature of knowledge. Some versions embrace relativism, denying that [[Subjectivity and objectivity (philosophy)|objectivity]] is possible. For example, [[Factual relativism|truth-relativism]] asserts that [[truth]] is relative to the [[Perspectivism|perspectives]] of specific individuals, groups, historical epochs, or cultural contexts.{{efn|Related forms of epistemological relativism target the standards of knowledge, justification, or rationality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>}} According to this view, statements like "the sun rises in the east" and "killing is wrong" are true in some perspectives and false in others. This theory not only claims that different people have different opinions but additionally asserts that no independent framework exists to assess which opinion is ultimately correct. As a result, there is no absolute truth on which observers from different perspectives can agree.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 35}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} | {{harvnb|Crosby|1998|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Hautamäki|2022|p=534}} }}</ref>

A related form of relativistic nihilism focuses on [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaning]] rather than truth. It argues that different people rely on incompatible [[conceptual scheme]]s{{efn|A conceptual scheme is a system of categories, concepts, or beliefs through which people organize their ideas, understand their experiences, and interpret reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Blackburn|2008}}</ref>}} to make sense of the world. In the absence of a universal framework, genuine communication and [[Intersubjectivity|shared understanding]] are deemed impossible since each viewpoint has its own interpretation of reality. Without a common ground, these [[Commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] belief systems are arbitrary constructions, limiting reason to operations within a specific system without the ability to reconcile them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–19, 23–26, 35}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} }}</ref>

[[File:Jean-Francois Lyotard cropped.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Black-and-white photo of man wearing a white shirt with his gaze directed slightly upward|Exploring [[antifoundationalism]], [[Jean-Francois Lyotard]] challenged [[metanarratives]] that aim to provide universal frameworks of rational understanding.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gratton|2018|loc=Lead section, § 3.2 Justice in light of the Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Woodward|loc=§ 4b. The Postmodern Condition}} | {{harvnb|Gertz|2019|pp=88–90, 92–93}} }}</ref>]]

One argument for relativism emphasizes the diversity of human viewpoints and the frequent inability to resolve [[Disagreement (epistemology)|disagreements]] and reach a shared understanding.<ref>{{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2. Why Relativism?}}</ref> Another argument asserts that theories are usually [[Underdetermination|underdetermined]] by the data supporting them. As a result, there are different equally valid interpretations without an objective standard to resolve their differences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baghramian|Carter|2025|loc=§ 2.4 Underdetermination of theory by data}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2014}} }}</ref> An influential criticism argues that relativism [[self-refuting idea|undermines itself]]: if all truths are relative to a viewpoint, then relativism itself is only true for some viewpoints and false for others.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Coady|2005|p=800}} | {{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=207–208}} }}</ref> Another objection suggests that the absence of absolute epistemic standards has odd consequences, for example, that people should not argue if they disagree or that they should generally suspend their judgments.<ref>{{harvnb|Moruzzi|2008|pp=211–212, 221–222}}</ref>

Nietzsche was an influential proponent of relativistic nihilism. He saw belief systems as expressions of the [[will to power]] with the goal to assert dominance rather than represent reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=18–21}} | {{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}} }}</ref> In [[postmodern philosophy]], epistemological nihilism is associated with [[antifoundationalism]], arguing that there is no ultimate rational ground of knowledge or action. It challenges universal frameworks, termed ''[[Metanarrative|grand metanarratives]]'', that claim to provide such a ground.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|loc=§ 2. Friedrich Nietzsche and Nihilism, § 4. Antifoundationalism and Nihilism}}</ref>