Editing Nguyễn Khánh (section)

==Setting up the junta==
Khánh used de Gaulle's policy plans to enact retribution against Generals Đôn and Kim. Khánh had them arrested on grounds of neutralism. Khánh noted that they had served in the French-backed VNA, although he did as well. The generals were flown to My Khe beach, near [[Đà Nẵng]], along with Generals [[Tôn Thất Đính]] and [[Mai Hữu Xuân]], the interior minister and police chief, respectively, of the MRC.<ref name=l/> However, Khánh was unable to produce any proof that Đôn and Kim had been working with the French agents to create a neutralist government in Saigon, and the case collapsed in court, with Khánh instead pressing for charges of "lax morality" to compensate for his failure to find any evidence supporting his claim of a French conspiracy.<ref name="Karnow p.359">Karnow p. 359</ref>

Khánh also had Major [[Nguyễn Văn Nhung]], the bodyguard of Minh, shot. Nhung had executed Diệm and his brother [[Ngô Đình Nhu]] in the 1963 coup, as well as the loyalist Special Forces head Colonel [[Lê Quang Tung]], and claimed it to be suicide.<ref name="Karnow p.358"/> On 31 January 1964, Nhung was forced to kneel in a garden behind a Saigon villa and was shot once in the head by one of Khánh's bodyguards, through the official story was that Nhung had hanged himself out of guilt for executing the Diệm brothers.<ref name="Karnow p.358"/> Karnow wrote that Nhung was a "professional assassin" known for his love of killing, but his symbolic importance outweighed his unsavory and brutal life.<ref name="Karnow p.358"/> Nhung had become a symbol of anti-Diệmism, and his execution lead to fears that Diệm's policies and loyalists would return. This resulted in riots in Saigon, notably among Buddhists who were persecuted by Diệm.<ref name="karnow354">Karnow, p. 354.</ref><ref>Langguth, p. 279.</ref> Of the 14 Buddhist sects in South Vietnam, the heads of 11 of them agreed to form an alliance to oppose the Khánh regime, which was seen as favoring the same Vietnamese Catholics who had been favored under Diệm.<ref name="Karnow p.358"/> Tri Quang, the Buddhist monk who had organized protests against Diệm in 1963, was planning to go on a pilgrimage to "bury my life" in India, Japan and Ceylon when he heard of Nhung's execution, and instead decided to stay in South Vietnam to challenge the new government.<ref name="Karnow p.359"/>

Khánh proclaimed himself as the new head of state and chairman of the MRC, replacing Minh. Khánh later managed to persuade Minh to remain as a figurehead head of state due to American pressure. They reasoned that the popular Minh would be a unifying and stabilising factor in the new régime and provide continuity. However, Khánh soon came to dominate the MRC. Khánh turned out to be far more politically astute and vigorous than his predecessors, seeking out veteran Vietnamese politicians and technicians to create a new government. A week after coming to power, Khánh summoned [[Nguyễn Tôn Hoàn]], a Roman Catholic who was one of the former leaders of the southern branch of the Catholic-aligned [[Đại Việt Quốc dân đảng|Đại Việt Quốc Dân Dảng]] (Greater Vietnam Nationalist Party). Hoàn had been exiled in Paris during the Diệm era, but remained active, publishing a magazine and keeping up to speed with developments in Vietnam.<ref name=s2367/><ref name=k355/> Hoàn had generated little popular following during his campaign for power in the 1940s and 1950s and was unable to form a government as prime minister when he returned. Hoàn was unpopular with the younger members of the Đại Việt who complained that he was too old and had spent too much time in exile to really understand modern Vietnam.<ref name="Karnow p.360">Karnow p. 360</ref> Khánh decided to act as both Prime Minister and chairman of the reorganised MRC, which he expanded to include 17 generals and 32 further officers, giving a total of 50 members.<ref name=s2367/>

Khánh made Hoàn the first Deputy Prime Minister in charge of rural pacification. Khánh gave Hoàn five ministries, including the Interior, National Defense and Rural Affairs and two special commissions, which were primarily engaged in consolidating the [[strategic Hamlet Program|strategic hamlets]] of [[Ngô Đình Nhu]] into the renamed New Rural Life Hamlets. A second Deputy Prime Ministerial post was given to [[Harvard University]] trained banker and economist [[Nguyễn Xuân Oánh]], who was associated with the Đại Việt. Oánh was charged with managing the finance and economy of the country. Mậu was the third deputy, overseeing social and cultural affairs.<ref name=s2367>Shaplen, pp. 236–237.</ref><ref name=k355>Karnow, p. 355.</ref>

Khánh selected a cabinet of thirteen ministers and two Secretaries of State at Cabinet level and chose new provincial and district chiefs. He originally tried to include members of a variety of political and religious groups including representatives of the [[Cao Đài]] and [[Hòa Hảo]], which still had remnants of their private armies intact after their dismantling by Diệm in 1955. Although Khánh insisted that he had no party affiliation, the orientation of his government was toward the Đại Việt, who held many key posts. This provoked bitterness from other anti-communist nationalists and groups that were banned under the Diệm period and were seeking a greater role in the public life of South Vietnam, as well as from younger citizens who felt that the established nationalist parties were responsible for divisions in the country.<ref name=s237>Shaplen, p. 237.</ref>

In the meantime, the government continued to lose the war against the guerrillas of the National Liberation Front, better known as the Viet Cong, which increased the tempo of their operations in the countryside and began a campaign of assassinations and bombings in Saigon targeting government officials and American advisers.<ref name="Karnow p.360"/> In late February 1964, the government suffered a humiliating debacle when an outnumbered Viet Cong battalion in the Mekong delta were surrounded by 3, 000 of the "best" South Vietnamese troops.<ref name="Karnow p.360"/> Despite being outnumbered and outgunned, the Viet Cong fought off the attacks and were able to escape from the pocket as the South Vietnamese Army were unwilling to fight without air support and artillery support.<ref name="Karnow p.360"/> The fact that the troops engaged in this operation had been graded as among the very "best" soldiers in the entire South Vietnamese Army by the American advisers who had trained them added to the humiliation.<ref name="Karnow p.360"/> In the aftermath, Khánh sacked 3 out of the 4 corps commanders and 5 out of the 9 division commanders, complaining that the army was led by officers unwilling to fight.<ref name="Karnow p.360"/> In Washington, the news that despite the fact that South Vietnam had received American military aid worth hundreds of millions of dollars and had its army trained by American officers that the South Vietnamese Army was still incapable of winning battles provoked much worry about what was going on in South Vietnam.<ref name="Karnow p.360"/> [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]], the inspector-general of the CIA, visited the American embassy in Saigon that same month, and reported to Washington that he was "...shocked by the number of our people and of the military, even those whose job is always to say that we are winning, who feel the tide is against us".<ref name="Karnow p.360"/>

Starting on 8 March 1964, the US Defense Secretary, [[Robert McNamara]], visited South Vietnam for four days to assess the military situation and to let the South Vietnamese people know that the United States was firmly behind Khánh.<ref>Karnow pp. 360–361</ref> Speaking carefully memorized phrases in badly mangled Vietnamese (McNamara kept forgetting Vietnamese is a tonal language) in a series of speeches McNamara praised Khánh as the "best possible leader" that South Vietnam had and urged all South Vietnamese people to back his government.<ref name="Karnow p.361">Karnow p. 361</ref> McNamara's visit was a disaster for Khánh's image as the Americans believed that the South Vietnamese people would back his government more effectively if they knew that the United States was supporting him; to Vietnamese ears, McNamara's speeches came across as arrogant and colonialist as it seemed that he was telling the Vietnamese that they should follow Khánh because the United States wanted them to do.<ref name="Karnow p.361"/> As a result, Khánh came to be seen as an American stooge by many of his people. Upon his return to Washington, McNamara told President Johnson that the situation had "unquestionably been growing worse" since his last trip to South Vietnam in December 1963; that 40% of the countryside was under "Vietcong control or predominant influence"; while the Vietcong was "recruiting energetically" desertions in the South Vietnamese Army were "high and increasing"; and finally the South Vietnamese people were overcome by "apathy and indifference" as no one it seemed really wanted to save South Vietnam.<ref name="Karnow p.361"/> Despite his public praise of Khánh, McNamara told Johnson that the "greatest weakness" was the "uncertain viability of Khánh's regime, which might crumble at any moment in another coup".<ref name="Karnow p.361"/> However, McNamara's conclusion was that the weakness of Khánh's regime meant that the United States should increase its involvement in Vietnam as McNamara recommend that the United States should drastically increase its military and economic aid to South Vietnam, advice that was accepted in an "action memorandum" issued by the National Security Council shortly afterwards.<ref name="Karnow p.361"/>

Khánh promised that the village elections that were abolished under Diệm would be held as soon as feasible and that a new National Assembly would be elected within a year. He started by abolishing the Council of Notables, an advisory body. Many Vietnamese and American observers considered this rash and premature, as promises of elections had been frequently broken and the council had at least been an effective forum for dissent in the absence of parliamentary representation.<ref name=s2389>Shaplen, pp. 238–239.</ref>

However, Khánh received little assistance from Minh, who resented his deposal by a younger officer whom he viewed as an unscrupulous upstart. Minh was also upset with the detention of his colleagues and around 30 of his junior officers. The latter were set free when Minh demanded that Khánh release them as a condition for his cooperation. Khánh attempted to avoid the issue of substantiating the alleged plot as long as he could,<ref name=s2445/> and then claimed that French agents were attempting to assassinate him and implement neutralism. Khánh offered no evidence, only claiming that the French had paid a hit man US$1,300 to kill him, before later inflating the supposed reward for his assassination. US intelligence officials in Vietnam found the story spurious.<ref name="s2445"/>

===Trial of rival generals===
Khánh presided over the trial of the MRC members,<ref name=l/> which took place in May 1964.<ref name=s2445/> Minh was accused of misusing money before being allowed to serve as an advisor on the trial panel.<ref name=k355/><ref name=s2445/> The generals were interrogated for five and a half hours, and the military court deliberated for over nine hours. When it reconvened for the verdict, Khánh stated, "We ask that once you begin to serve again in the army, you do not take revenge on anybody".<ref name=l>Langguth, pp. 289–291.</ref> The tribunal "congratulated" the generals, but found that they were of "lax morality", unqualified to command due to a "lack of a clear political concept". They were chastised for being "inadequately aware of their heavy responsibility" and of letting "their subordinates take advantage of their positions". They were allowed to remain in Đà Lạt under surveillance with their families.<ref name=l/><ref name="s2445"/>

All four were barred from commanding troops for various periods. Offices were prepared for the quartet so that they could participate in "research and planning".<ref name=l/> Khánh made some preliminary arrangements to send the generals to the United States for military study so that they could not stage a coup, but this fell through.<ref name=k355/><ref name="s2445">Shaplen, pp. 244–245.</ref> Khánh's actions left divisions among the officer corps of the ARVN. When Khánh was himself deposed in 1965, he handed over dossiers proving that the generals were innocent.<ref>Langguth, p. 347.</ref> Shaplen said "the case ... continued to be one of Khánh's biggest embarrassments".<ref name=s2445/>