Editing Mind (section)

== Theories of the nature of mind ==
Theories of the nature of mind aim to determine what all [[mental state]]s have in common. They seek to discover the "mark of the mental", that is, the criteria that distinguish mental from non-mental phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olson|2013|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=17–18}} | {{harvnb|O'Madagain|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Bayne|2022|pp=8–9}} }}</ref> Epistemic criteria say that the unique feature of mental states is how people know about them. For example, if a person has a toothache, they have direct or non-inferential knowledge that they are in pain. But they do not have this kind of knowledge about non-mental phenomena such as the physical causes of the pain, and may have to consult [[empirical evidence|external evidence]] through visual inspection or a visit to the dentist. Another feature commonly ascribed to mental states is that they are private, meaning that others do not have direct access to a person's mental state. As a result, external observers have to make inferences from other indicators, like the pain behavior of the person with the toothache. Some philosophers claim that knowledge of some or all mental states is [[infallible]], for instance, that a person cannot be mistaken about whether they are in pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=18–20}} | {{harvnb|Bayne|2022|pp=8–10}} | {{harvnb|Audi|1993|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pfLzbG5VjscC&pg=PA167 167–168]}} }}</ref>

A related view asserts that all mental states are either conscious or accessible to consciousness. According to this view, when a person actively remembers the fact that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris then this state is mental because it is part of consciousness. When the person does not think about it, this belief is still considered a mental state because the person could bring it to consciousness by thinking about it. This view denies the existence of a "deep unconsciousness", that is, unconscious mental states that cannot in principle become conscious.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ICf-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA384 384]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|1991|pp=45–47, 50}} | {{harvnb|Gillett|1996|pp=191–192}} }}</ref>

Another theory says that [[intentionality]]{{efn|Intentionality is to be [[Intention#Intention and intentionality|distinguished from intention]] in the sense of having a plan to perform a certain action.<ref>{{harvnb|Jacob|2023|loc=§ 1. Why Is Intentionality So-called?}}</ref>}} is the mark of the mental. A state is intentional if it refers to or [[Mental representation|represents]] something. For example, if a person perceives a piano or thinks about it then the mental state is intentional because it refers to a piano. This view distinguishes between the original intentionality of mental phenomena and the derivative intentionality of some non-mental phenomena. According to this view, the ability of words and pictures to refer to things derives from the fact that they can evoke mental states. In this sense, only mental states have original intentionality, whereas words and pictures have derivative intentionality since they would not refer if divorced from linguistic conventions or visual interpretations. Some philosophers disagree that all mental states are intentional, citing itches, tickles, and pains as possible exceptions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|O'Madagain|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2015|p=141}} | {{harvnb|Kim|2011|pp=23–25}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ICf-AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA383 383–384]}} | {{harvnb|Crane|1998|pp=229–230}} }}</ref>

According to [[behaviorism]], mental states are dispositions to engage in certain publicly observable behavior as a reaction to particular external stimuli. This view implies that mental phenomena are not private internal states but are accessible to empirical observation like regular physical phenomena.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=§ 2.3 Behaviorism}} | {{harvnb|Graham|2023|loc=§ 1. What Is Behaviorism?, § 5. Why Be a Behaviorist}} | {{harvnb|Cunningham|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ubdiw-ALgo0C&pg=PA40 40]}} }}</ref> [[Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|Functionalism]] agrees that mental states do not depend on the exact internal constitution of the mind and characterizes them instead in regard to their functional role. The functional role of a mental state is the way it interacts with other phenomena. For example, [[pain]] is often caused by bodily injury and typically leads to pain behavior, like moaning, and a desire to stop the pain. As a result, injury, pain behavior, and desire are part of the functional role of pain.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Levin|2023|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What Is Functionalism?}} | {{harvnb|Polger|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Cunningham|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ubdiw-ALgo0C&pg=PA40 40]}} }}</ref> [[Computationalism]], a similar theory prominent in cognitive science, defines minds in terms of cognitions and [[computation]]s as information processors.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rescorla|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 3. The Classical Computational Theory of Mind}} | {{harvnb|Friedenberg|Silverman|Spivey|2022|pp=2–3}} | {{harvnb|Bermúdez|2014|pp=3, 85}} }}</ref>

Theories under the umbrella of [[externalism]] emphasize the mind's dependency on the environment. According to this view, mental states and their contents are at least partially determined by external circumstances.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|Smith|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> For example, some forms of content externalism hold that it can depend on external circumstances whether a belief refers to one object or another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 1. Introduction, § 3. Content Externalism}} | {{harvnb|Smith|loc=§ 1. Hilary Putnam and Natural Kind Externalism}} }}</ref> The position of [[Embodied embedded cognition|embedded cognition]] emphasizes that mental processes happen in the context of a physical and social environments. It examines how this context shapes cognitive activity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shapiro|Spaulding|2024|loc=§ 2.2 Embedded Cognition}} | {{harvnb|Weiskopf|Adams|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hKoPBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA127 127–128]}} }}</ref> The [[extended mind thesis]] states that external circumstances not only influence the mind but are part of it. In this sense, a diary is part of the mind by helping it store information. Similarly, an electronic calculator is part of the mind by helping it perform calculations.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 1. Introduction, § 5. Extended Mind}} | {{harvnb|Greif|2017|pp=4311–4312}} | {{harvnb|Kiverstein|Farina|Clark|2013}} }}</ref> The closely related view of [[enactivism]] holds that mental processes involve an interaction between organism and environment.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 7. Extended Mind and the 4E Mind}} | {{harvnb|Rowlands|2009|pp=53–56}} }}</ref> A theory from the field of [[embodied cognition]] states that the connection to a body is an essential feature of minds. It asserts that certain aspects of the body outside the nervous system, like motor capacities, are part of the mind.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rowlands|Lau|Deutsch|2020|loc=§ 7. Extended Mind and the 4E Mind}} | {{harvnb|Shapiro|Spaulding|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Three Themes of Embodied Cognition}} | {{harvnb|Shapiro|2019|pp=5, 197–198}} }}</ref>{{efn|More generally, embodied cognition is the study of the effects of bodily phenomena on the mind. It examines, for example, how certain bodily movements improve or hinder cognitive performance and how motor capacities affect the development of cognitive abilities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cowart|loc=§ 2. General Characteristics of Embodied Cognition}} | {{harvnb|Shapiro|2019|pp=1–3}} }}</ref>}}